[Mb-civic] HEAVY STUFF about 9/11 COMMISION REPORT

[Michael Butler]

    Go to Original 

    UQ Wire: Sibel Edmonds Letter To Thomas Kean
    Scoop

     Monday 02 August 2004

     Open Letter To Thomas Kean
    - Chairman Of The 9/11 Commission -
    From FBI Whistleblower Sibel Edmonds

    August 1, 2004

     Thomas Kean, Chairman
    National Committee on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
    301 7th Street, SW
    Room 5125 
    Washington, DC 20407

     Dear Chairman Kean:

     It has been almost three years since the terrorist attacks on September
11; during which time we, the people, have been placed under a constant
threat of terror and asked to exercise vigilance in our daily lives. Your
commission, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United
States, was created by law to investigate "facts and circumstances related
to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001" and to "provide
recommendations to safeguard against future acts of terrorism", and has now
issued its "9/11 Commission Report". You are now asking us to pledge our
support for this report, its recommendations, and implementation of these
recommendations, with our trust and backing, our tax money, our security,
and our lives. Unfortunately, I find your report seriously flawed in its
failure to address serious intelligence issues that I am aware of, which
have been confirmed, and which as a witness to the commission, I made you
aware of. Thus, I must assume that other serious issues that I am not aware
of were in the same manner omitted from your report. These omissions cast
doubt on the validity of your report and therefore on its conclusions and
recommendations. Considering what is at stake, our national security, we are
entitled to demand answers to unanswered questions, and to ask for
clarification of issues that were ignored and/or omitted from the report. I,
Sibel Edmonds, a concerned American Citizen, a former FBI translator, a
whistleblower, a witness for a United States Congressional investigation, a
witness and a plaintiff for the Department of Justice Inspector General
investigation, and a witness for your own 9/11 Commission investigation,
request your answers to, and your public acknowledgement of, the following
questions and issues:

     After the terrorist attacks of September 11 we, the translators at the
FBI's largest and most important translation unit, were told to slow down,
even stop, translation of critical information related to terrorist
activities so that the FBI could present the United States Congress with a
record of 'extensive backlog of untranslated documents', and justify its
request for budget and staff increases. While FBI agents from various field
offices were desperately seeking leads and suspects, and completely
depending on FBI HQ and its language units to provide them with needed
translated information, hundreds of translators were being told by their
administrative supervisors not to translate and to let the work pile up
(please refer to the CBS-60 Minutes transcript dated October 2002, and
provided to your investigators in January-February 2004). This issue has
been confirmed by the Senate Judiciary Committee (Please refer to Senator
Grassley and Senator Leahy's letters during the summer of 2002, provided to
your investigators in January-February 2004). This confirmed report has been
reported to be substantiated by the Department of Justice Inspector General
Report (Please refer to DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI Translation,
provided to you prior to the completion of your report). I provided your
investigators with a detailed and specific account of this issue and the
names of other witnesses willing to corroborate this. (Please refer to
tape-recorded 3.5 hours testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to your
investigators on February 11, 2004).

    Today, almost three years after 9/11, and more than two years since this
information has been confirmed and made available to our government, the
administrators in charge of language departments of the FBI remain in their
positions and in charge of the information front lines of the FBI's Counter
terrorism and Counterintelligence efforts. Your report has omitted any
reference to this most serious issue, has foregone any accountability what
so ever, and your recommendations have refrained from addressing this issue,
which when left un-addressed will have even more serious consequences. This
issue is systemic and departmental. Why did your report choose to exclude
this information and this serious issue despite the evidence and briefings
you received? How can budget increases address and resolve this misconduct
by mid-level bureaucratic management? How can the addition of a new
bureaucratic layer, "Intelligence Czar", in its cocoon removed from the
action lines, address and resolve this problem?

     Melek Can Dickerson, a Turkish Translator, was hired by the FBI after
September 11, and was placed in charge of translating the most sensitive
information related to terrorists and criminals under the Bureau's
investigation. Melek Can Dickerson was granted Top Secret Clearance, which
can be granted only after conducting a thorough background investigation.
Melek Can Dickerson used to work for a semi-legit organizations that were
the FBI's targets of investigation. Melek Can Dickerson had on going
relationships with two individuals who were FBI's targets of investigation.
For months Melek Can Dickerson blocked all-important information related to
these semi-legit organizations and the individuals she and her husband
associated with. She stamped hundreds, if not thousands, of documents
related to these targets as ' Not Pertinent.' Melek Can Dickerson attempted
to prevent others from translating these documents important to the FBI's
investigations and our fight against terrorism. Melek Can Dickerson, with
the assistance of her direct supervisor, Mike Feghali, took hundreds of
pages of top-secret sensitive intelligence documents outside the FBI to
unknown recipients. Melek Can Dickerson, with the assistance of her direct
supervisor, forged signatures on top-secret documents related to certain
9/11 detainees. After all these incidents were confirmed and reported to FBI
management, Melek Can Dickerson was allowed to remain in her position, to
continue the translation of sensitive intelligence received by the FBI, and
to maintain her Top Secret clearance. Apparently bureaucratic mid-level FBI
management and administrators decided that it would not look good for the
Bureau if this security breach and espionage case was investigated and made
public, especially after going through Robert Hanssen's case (FBI spy
scandal). This case (Melek Can Dickerson) was confirmed by the Senate
Judiciary Committee (Please refer to Senator Leahy and Grassley's letters
dated June 19 and August 13, 2002, and Senator Grassley's statement on
CBS-60 Minutes in October 2002, provided to your investigators in
January-February 2004). This Dickerson incident received major coverage by
the press (Please refer to media background provided to your investigators
in January-February 2004). According to Director Mueller, the Inspector
General criticized the FBI for failing to adequately pursue this espionage
report regarding Melek Can Dickerson ( Please refer to DOJ-IG report Re:
Sibel Edmonds and FBI Translation, provided to you prior to the completion
of your report). I provided your investigators with a detailed and specific
account of this issue, the names of other witnesses willing to corroborate
this, and additional documents. (Please refer to tape-recorded 3.5 hours
testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to your investigators on February 11,
2004). 

     Today, more than two years since the Dickerson incident was reported to
the FBI, and more than two years since this information was confirmed by the
United States Congress and reported by the press, these administrators in
charge of FBI personnel security and language departments in the FBI remain
in their positions and in charge of translation quality and translation
departments' security. Melek Can Dickerson and several FBI targets of
investigation hastily left the United States in 2002, and the case still
remains uninvestigated criminally. Not only does the supervisor facilitating
these criminal conducts remain in a supervisory position, he has been
promoted to supervising Arabic language units of the FBI's Counterterrorism
and Counterintelligence investigations. Your report has omitted these
significant incidents, has foregone any accountability what so ever, and
your recommendations have refrained from addressing this serious information
security breach and highly likely espionage issue. This issue needs to be
investigated and criminally prosecuted. The translation of our intelligence
is being entrusted to individuals with loyalties to our enemies. Important
'chit-chats' and 'chatters' are being intentionally blocked. Why did your
report choose to exclude this information and these serious issues despite
the evidence and briefings you received? How can budget increases address
and resolve this misconduct by mid-level bureaucratic management? How can
the addition of a new bureaucratic layer, "Intelligence Czar", in its cocoon
removed from the action lines, address and resolve this problem?

     Over three years ago, more than four months prior to the September 11
terrorist attacks, in April 2001, a long-term FBI informant/asset who had
been providing the bureau with information since 1990, provided two FBI
agents and a translator with specific information regarding a terrorist
attack being planned by Osama Bin Laden. This asset/informant was previously
a high-level intelligence officer in Iran in charge of intelligence from
Afghanistan. Through his contacts in Afghanistan he received information
that: 1) Osama Bin Laden was planning a major terrorist attack in the United
States targeting 4-5 major cities, 2) the attack was going to involve
airplanes, 3) some of the individuals in charge of carrying out this attack
were already in place in the United States, 4) the attack was going to be
carried out soon, in a few months. The agents who received this information
reported it to their superior, Special Agent in Charge of Counterterrorism,
Thomas Frields, at the FBI Washington Field Office, by filing "302" forms,
and the translator translated and documented this information. No action was
taken by the Special Agent in Charge, and after 9/11 the agents and the
translators were told to 'keep quiet' regarding this issue. The translator
who was present during the session with the FBI informant, Mr. Behrooz
Sarshar, reported this incident to Director Mueller in writing, and later to
the Department of Justice Inspector General. The press reported this
incident, and in fact the report in the Chicago Tribune on July 21, 2004
stated that FBI officials had confirmed that this information was received
in April 2001, and further, the Chicago Tribune quoted an aide to Director
Mueller that he (Mueller) was surprised that the Commission never raised
this particular issue with him during the hearing (Please refer to Chicago
Tribune article, dated July 21, 2004). Mr. Sarshar reported this issue to
your investigators on February 12, 2004, and provided them with specific
dates, location, witness names, and the contact information for that
particular Iranian asset and the two special agents who received the
information (Please refer to the tape-recorded testimony provided to your
investigators during a 2.5 hours testimony by Mr. Sarshar on February 12,
2004). I provided your investigators with a detailed and specific account of
this issue, the names of other witnesses, and documents I had seen. (Please
refer to tape-recorded 3.5 hours testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to
your investigators on February 11, 2004). Mr. Sarshar also provided the
Department of Justice Inspector General with specific information regarding
this issue ( Please refer to DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI
Translation, provided to you prior to the completion of your report).

    After almost three years since September 11, many officials still refuse
to admit to having specific information regarding the terrorists' plans to
attack the United States. The Phoenix Memo, received months prior to the
9/11 attacks, specifically warned FBI HQ of pilot training and their
possible link to terrorist activities against the United States. Four months
prior to the terrorist attacks the Iranian asset provided the FBI with
specific information regarding the 'use of airplanes', 'major US cities as
targets', and 'Osama Bin Laden issuing the order.' Coleen Rowley likewise
reported that specific information had been provided to FBI HQ. All this
information went to the same place: FBI Headquarters in Washington, DC, and
the FBI Washington Field Office, in Washington DC. Yet, your report claims
that not having a central place where all intelligence could be gathered as
one of the main factors in our intelligence failure. Why did your report
choose to exclude the information regarding the Iranian asset and Behrooz
Sarshar from its timeline of missed opportunities? Why was this significant
incident not mentioned; despite the public confirmation by the FBI,
witnesses provided to your investigators, and briefings you received
directly? Why did you surprise even Director Mueller by refraining from
asking him questions regarding this significant incident and lapse during
your hearing (Please remember that you ran out of questions during your
hearings with Director Mueller and AG John Ashcroft, so please do not cite a
'time limit' excuse)? How can budget increases address and resolve these
problems and failure to follow up by mid-level bureaucratic management at
FBI Headquarters? How can the addition of a new bureaucratic layer, "
Intelligence Czar", in its cocoon removed from the action lines, address and
resolve this problem?

     Over two years ago, and after two 'unclassified' sessions with FBI
officials, the Senate Judiciary Committee sent letters to Director Mueller,
Attorney General Ashcroft, and Inspector General Glenn Fine regarding the
existence of unqualified translators in charge of translating high level
sensitive intelligence. The FBI confirmed at least one case: Kevin Taskesen,
a Turkish translator, had been given a job as an FBI translator, despite the
fact that he had failed all FBI language proficiency tests. In fact, Kevin
could not understand or speak even elementary level English. He had failed
English proficiency tests and did not even score sufficiently in the target
language. Still, Kevin Taskesen was hired, not due to lack of other
qualified translator candidates, but because his wife worked in FBI
Headquarters as a language proficiency exam administrator. Almost everybody
in FBI Headquarters and the FBI Washington Field Office knew about Kevin.
Yet, Kevin was given the task of translating the most sensitive terrorist
related information, and he was sent to Guantánamo Bay to translate the
interrogation of and information for all Turkic language detainees (Turkish,
Uzbeks, Turkmen, etc.). The FBI was supposed to be trying to obtain
information regarding possible future attack plans from these detainees, and
yet, the FBI knowingly sent unqualified translators to gather and translate
this information. Further, these detainees were either released or detained
or prosecuted based on information received and translated by unqualified
translators knowingly sent there by the FBI. Senator Grassley and Senator
Leahy publicly confirmed Kevin Taskesen's case ( Please refer to Senate
letters and documents provided to your investigators in January-February
2004). CBS-60 Minutes showed Kevin's picture and stated his name as one of
the unqualified translators sent to Guantánamo Bay, and as a case confirmed
by the FBI ( Please refer to CBS-60 Minutes transcript provided to your
investigators). Department of Justice Inspector General had a detailed
account of these problems ( Please refer to DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel Edmonds
and FBI Translation, provided to you prior to the completion of your
report). I provided your investigators with a detailed and specific account
of this issue and the names of other witnesses willing to corroborate this.
( Please refer to tape-recorded 3.5 hours testimony by Sibel Edmonds,
provided to your investigators on February 11, 2004).

    After more than two years since Kevin Taskesen's case was publicly
confirmed, and after almost two years since CBS-60 Minutes broadcasted
Taskesen's case, Kevin Taskesen remains in his position, as a sole Turkish
and Turkic language translator for the FBI Washington Field Office. After
admitting that Kevin Taskesen was not qualified to perform the task of
translating sensitive intelligence and investigation of terrorist
activities, the FBI still keeps him in charge of translating highly
sensitive documents and leads. Those individuals in the FBI's hiring
department and those who facilitated the hiring of unqualified translators
due to nepotism/cronyism are still in those departments and remain in their
positions. Yet, your report does not mention this case, or these chronic
problems within the FBI translation departments, and within the FBI's hiring
and screening departments. The issue of accountability for those responsible
for these practices that endangers our national security is not brought up
even once in your report. This issue, as with others, is systemic and
departmental. Why did your report choose to exclude this information and
these serious issues despite the evidence and briefings you received? How
can budget increases address and resolve the intentional continuation of
ineptitude and incompetence by mid-level bureaucratic management? How can
the addition of a new bureaucratic layer, "Intelligence Czar", in its cocoon
removed from the action lines, address and resolve this problem?

     In October 2001, approximately one month after the September 11 attack,
an agent from a (city name omitted) field office, re-sent a certain document
to the FBI Washington Field Office, so that it could be re-translated. This
Special Agent, in light of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, rightfully believed
that, considering his target of investigation (the suspect under
surveillance), and the issues involved, the original translation might have
missed certain information that could prove to be valuable in the
investigation of terrorist activities. After this document was received by
the FBI Washington Field Office and retranslated verbatim, the field agent's
hunch appeared to be correct. The new translation revealed certain
information regarding blueprints, pictures, and building material for
skyscrapers being sent overseas. It also revealed certain illegal activities
in obtaining visas from certain embassies in the Middle East, through
network contacts and bribery. However, after the re-translation was
completed and the new significant information was revealed, the unit
supervisor in charge of certain Middle Eastern languages, Mike Feghali,
decided NOT to send the re-translated information to the Special Agent who
had requested it. Instead, this supervisor decided to send this agent a note
stating that the translation was reviewed and that the original translation
was accurate. This supervisor stated that sending the accurate translation
would hurt the original translator and would cause problems for the FBI
language department. The FBI agent requesting the retranslation never
received the accurate translation of that document. I provided your
investigators with a detailed and specific account of this issue, the name
and date of this particular investigation, and the names of other witnesses
willing to corroborate this. (Please refer to tape-recorded 3.5 hours
testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to your investigators on February 11,
2004). This information was also provided to the Department of Justice
Inspector General (Please refer to DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI
Translation, provided to you prior to the completion of your report).

    Only one month after the catastrophic events of September 11; while many
agents were working around the clock to obtain leads and information, and to
investigate those responsible for the attacks, those with possible
connections to the attack, and those who might be planning possible future
attacks; the bureaucratic administrators in the FBI's largest and most
important translation unit were covering up their past failures, blocking
important leads and information, and jeopardizing on going terrorist
investigations. The supervisor involved in this incident, Mike Feghali, was
in charge of certain important Middle Eastern languages within the FBI
Washington Field Office, and had a record of previous misconducts. After
this supervisor's several severe misconducts were reported to the FBI's
higher-level management, after his conducts were reported to the Inspector
General's Office, to the United States Congress, and to the 9/11 Commission,
he was promoted to include the FBI's Arabic language unit under his
supervision. Today this supervisor, Mike Feghali, remains in the FBI
Washington Field Office and is in charge of a language unit receiving those
chitchats that our color-coded threat system is based upon. Yet your report
contains zero information regarding these systemic problems that led us to
our failure in preventing the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In your report, there
are no references to individuals responsible for hindering past and current
investigations, or those who are willing to compromise our security and our
lives for their career advancement and security. This issue, as with others,
is systemic and departmental. Why does your report choose to exclude this
information and these serious issues despite all the evidence and briefings
you received? Why does your report adamantly refrain from assigning any
accountability to any individuals responsible for our past and current
failures? How can budget increases address and resolve these intentional
acts committed by self-serving career civil servants? How can the addition
of a new bureaucratic layer, "Intelligence Czar", in its cocoon removed from
the action lines, address and resolve this problem?

     The latest buzz topic regarding intelligence is the problem of sharing
information/intelligence within intelligence agencies and between
intelligence agencies. To this date the public has not been told of
intentional blocking of intelligence, and has not been told that certain
information, despite its direct links, impacts and ties to terrorist related
activities, is not given to or shared with Counterterrorism units, their
investigations, and countering terrorism related activities. This was the
case prior to 9/11, and remains in effect after 9/11. If Counterintelligence
receives information that contains money laundering, illegal arms sale, and
illegal drug activities, directly linked to terrorist activities; and if
that information involves certain nations, certain semi-legit organizations,
and ties to certain lucrative or political relations in this country, then,
that information is not shared with Counterterrorism, regardless of the
possible severe consequences. In certain cases, frustrated FBI agents cited
'direct pressure by the State Department,' and in other cases 'sensitive
diplomatic relations' is cited. The Department of Justice Inspector General
received detailed and specific information and evidence regarding this issue
( Please refer to DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI Translation,
provided to you prior to the completion of your report). I provided your
investigators with a detailed and specific account of this issue, the names
of other witnesses willing to corroborate this, and the names of certain
U.S. officials involved in these transactions and activities. ( Please refer
to tape-recorded 3.5 hours testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to your
investigators on February 11, 2004).

    After almost three years the American people still do not know that
thousands of lives can be jeopardized under the unspoken policy of
'protecting certain foreign business relations.' The victims family members
still do not realize that information and answers they have sought
relentlessly for over two years has been blocked due to the unspoken
decisions made and disguised under 'safeguarding certain diplomatic
relations.' Your report did not even attempt to address these unspoken
practices, although, unlike me, you were not placed under any gag. Your
hearings did not include questions regarding these unspoken and unwritten
policies and practices. Despite your full awareness and understanding of
certain criminal conduct that connects to certain terrorist related
activities, committed by certain U.S. officials and high-level government
employees, you have not proposed criminal investigations into this conduct,
although under the laws of this country you are required to do so. How can
budget increases address and resolve these problems, when some of them are
caused by unspoken practices and unwritten policies? How can a new
bureaucratic layer, "Intelligence Czar", in its cocoon removed from the
action lines, override these unwritten policies and unspoken practices
incompatible with our national security?

     I know for a fact that problems regarding intelligence translation
cannot be brushed off as minor problems among many significant problems.
Translation units are the frontline in gathering, translating, and
disseminating intelligence. A warning in advance of the next terrorist
attack may, and probably will, come in the form of a message or document in
foreign language that will have to be translated. That message may be given
to the translation unit headed and supervised by someone like Mike Feghali,
who slows down, even stops, translations for the purpose of receiving budget
increases for his department, who has participated in certain criminal
activities and security breaches, and who has been engaged in covering up
failures and criminal conducts within the department, so it may never be
translated in time if ever. That message may go to Kevin Taskesen, or
another unqualified translator; so it may never be translated correctly and
be acted upon. That message may go to a sympathizer within the language
department; so it may never be translated fully, if at all. That message may
come to the attention of an agent of a foreign organization who works as a
translator in the FBI translation department, who may choose to block it; so
it may never get translated. If then an attack occurs, which could have been
prevented by acting on information in that message, who will tell family
members of the new terrorist attack victims that nothing more could have
been done? There will be no excuse that we did not know, because we do know.

     I am writing this letter in light of my direct experience within the
FBI's translation unit during the most crucial times after the 9/11
terrorist attacks, in light of my first hand knowledge of certain problems
and cases within the Bureau's language units, and in light of what has
already been established as facts. As you are fully aware, the facts,
incidents, and problems cited in this letter are by NO means based upon
personal opinion or un-verified allegations. As you are fully aware, these
issues and incidents were found confirmed by a Senior Republican Senator,
Charles Grassley, and a Senior Democrat Senator, Patrick Leahy. As you know,
according to officials with direct knowledge of the Department of Justice
Inspector General's report on my allegations, 'none of my allegations were
disproved.' As you are fully aware, even FBI officials 'confirmed all my
allegations and denied none' during their unclassified meetings with the
Senate Judiciary staff over two years ago. However, neither your
commission's hearings, nor your commission's five hundred sixty seven-page
report, nor your recommendations include these serious issues, major
incidents, and systemic problems. Your report's coverage of FBI translation
problems consists of a brief microscopic footnote (Footnote #25). Yet, your
commission is geared to start aggressively pressuring our government to
hastily implement your measures and recommendations based upon your
incomplete and deficient report.

     In order to cure a problem, one must have an accurate diagnosis. In
order to correctly diagnose a problem, one must consider and take into
account all visible symptoms. Your Commission's investigations, hearings,
and report have chosen not to consider many visible symptoms. I am
emphasizing 'visible', because these symptoms have been long recognized by
experts from the intelligence community and have been written about in the
press. I am emphasizing 'visible' because the few specific symptoms I
provided you with in this letter have been confirmed and publicly
acknowledged. During its many hearings your commission chose not to ask the
questions necessary to unveil the true symptoms of our failed intelligence
system. Your Commission intentionally bypassed these severe symptoms, and
chose not to include them in its five hundred and sixty seven-page report.
Now, without a complete list of our failures pre 9/11, without a
comprehensive examination of true symptoms that exist in our intelligence
system, without assigning any accountability what so ever, and therefore,
without a sound and reliable diagnosis, your commission is attempting to
divert attention from the real problems, and to prescribe a cure through
hasty and costly measures. It is like attempting to put a gold-lined
expensive porcelain cap over a deeply decayed tooth with a rotten root,
without first treating the root, and without first cleaning/shaving the
infected tooth.

     Respectfully,

     Sibel D. Edmonds

     CC: Senate Judiciary Committee
    CC: Senate Intelligence Committee
    CC: House Government Reform Committee
    CC: Family Steering Committee
    CC: Press

  

  -------

   Jump to TO Features for Tuesday August 3, 2004   


 © Copyright 2004 by TruthOut.org