[Mb-civic] In the Kill Zone: Managing Facts Army Spun Tale Around Ill-fated Mission

[Michael Butler]

  Second in a two-part series. Go to Part I

  Go to Original

  In the Kill Zone: Managing Facts
  Army Spun Tale Around Ill-fated Mission
  By Steve Coll 
  The Washington Post

   Sunday 05 December 2004

 


Former Arizona Cardinals safety Pat Tillman volunteered for the war in
Afghanistan.
(Photos: Tuscon News / USA Today)

   Just days after Pat Tillman died from friendly fire on a desolate ridge
in southeastern Afghanistan, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command
released a brief account of his last moments.

  The April 30, 2004, statement awarded Tillman a posthumous Silver Star for
combat valor and described how a section of his Ranger platoon came under
attack.

  "He ordered his team to dismount and then maneuvered the Rangers up a hill
near the enemy's location," the release said. "As they crested the hill,
Tillman directed his team into firing positions and personally provided
suppressive fire ... Tillman's voice was heard issuing commands to take the
fight to the enemy forces."

  It was a stirring tale and fitting eulogy for the Army's most famous
volunteer in the war on terrorism, a charismatic former pro football star
whose reticence, courage and handsome beret-draped face captured for many
Americans the best aspects of the country's post-Sept. 11 character.

  It was also a distorted and incomplete narrative, according to dozens of
internal Army documents obtained by The Washington Post that describe
Tillman's death by fratricide after a chain of botched communications, a
misguided order to divide his platoon over the objection of its leader and
undisciplined firing by fellow Rangers.

  The Army's public release made no mention of friendly fire, even though at
the time it was issued, investigators in Afghanistan had already taken at
least 14 sworn statements from Tillman's platoon members that made clear the
true causes of his death. The statements included a searing account from the
Ranger nearest Tillman during the firefight, who quoted him as shouting
"Cease fire! Friendlies!" with his last breaths.

  Army records show Tillman fought bravely during his final battle. He
followed orders, never wavered and at one stage proposed discarding his
heavy body armor, apparently because he wanted to charge a distant ridge
occupied by the enemy, an idea his immediate superior rejected, witness
statements show.

  But the Army's published account not only withheld all evidence of
fratricide, but it exaggerated Tillman's role and stripped his actions of
their context. Tillman was not one of the senior commanders on the scene --
he directed only himself, one other Ranger and an Afghan militiaman, under
supervision from others. And witness statements in the Army's files at the
time of the press release describe Tillman's voice ringing out on the
battlefield mainly in a desperate effort, joined by other Rangers on his
ridge, to warn comrades to stop shooting at their own men.

  The Army's April 30 press release was just one episode in a broader Army
effort to manage the uncomfortable facts of Pat Tillman's death, according
to internal records and interviews.

  During several weeks of memorials and commemorations that followed
Tillman's death, commanders at his 75th Ranger Regiment and their superiors
hid the truth about friendly fire from Tillman's brother Kevin, who had
fought with Pat in the same platoon, but was not involved in the firing
incident and did not know the cause of his brother's death. Commanders also
withheld the facts from Tillman's widow, his parents, national politicians
and the public, according to records and interviews with sources involved in
the case.

  On May 3, Ranger and Army officers joined hundreds of mourners at a public
ceremony in San Jose, Calif., where Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), Denver
Broncos quarterback Jake Plummer and Maria Shriver took the podium to
remember Tillman. The visiting officers gave no hint of the evidence
investigators had collected in Afghanistan.

  In a telephone interview, McCain said: "I think it would have been helpful
to have at least their suspicions known" before he spoke about Tillman's
death in public. Even more, he said, "the family deserved some kind of
heads-up that there would be questions."

  McCain said yesterday that questions raised by Mary Tillman, Pat's mother,
about how the Army handled the case led him to meet twice earlier this fall
with Army officers and former acting Army secretary Les Brownlee to seek
answers. About a month ago, McCain said, Brownlee told him that the Pentagon
would reopen its investigation. McCain said that he was not certain about
the scope of the new investigation but that he believed it is continuing. A
Pentagon official confirmed that an investigation is underway, but Army
spokesmen declined to comment further.

  When she first learned that friendly fire had taken her son's life, "I was
upset about it, but I thought, 'Well, accidents happen,' " Mary Tillman said
in a telephone interview Sunday. "Then when I found out that it was because
of huge negligence at places along the way -- you have time to process that
and you really get annoyed."

  As memorials and press releases shaped public perceptions in May, Army
commanders privately pursued military justice investigations of several
low-ranking Rangers who had fired on Tillman's position and officers who
issued the ill-fated mission's orders, records show.

  Army records show that Col. James C. Nixon, the 75th Ranger Regiment's
commander, accepted his chief investigator's findings on the same day, May
8, that he was officially appointed to run the case. A spokesman for U.S.
Central Command, or CENTCOM, which is legally responsible for the
investigation, declined to respond to a question about the short time frame
between the appointment and the findings.

  The Army acknowledged only that friendly fire "probably" killed Tillman
when Lt. Gen. Philip R. Kensinger Jr. made a terse announcement on May 29 at
Fort Bragg, N.C. Kensinger declined to answer further questions and offered
no details about the investigation, its conclusions, or who might be held
accountable.

  Army spokesmen said last week that they followed standard policy in
delaying and limiting disclosure of fratricide evidence. "All the services
do not prematurely disclose any investigation findings until the
investigation is complete," said Lt. Col. Hans Bush, chief of public affairs
for the Army Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg. The Silver Star
narrative released on April 30 came from information provided by Ranger
commanders in the field, Bush said.

  Kensinger's May 29 announcement that fratricide was probablecame from an
executive summary supplied by Central Command only the night before, he
said. Because Kensinger was unfamiliar with the underlying evidence, he felt
he could not answer questions, Bush said.

  For its part, Central Command, headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base in
Tampa, handled the disclosures "in accordance with [Department of Defense]
policies," Lt. Cmdr. Nick Balice, a command spokesman, said in an e-mail on
Saturday responding to questions. Asked specifically why Central Command
withheld any suggestion of fratricide when Army investigators by April 26
had collected at least 14 witness statements describing the incident, Balice
wrote in an e-mail: "The specific details of this incident were not known
until the completion of the investigation."

  The U.S. military has confronted a series of prominent friendly fire cases
in recent years, in part because hair-trigger technology and increasingly
lethal remote-fire weapons can quickly turn relatively small mistakes into
deadly tragedies. Yet the military's justice system has few consistent
guidelines for such cases, according to specialists in Army law.
Decision-making about how to mete out justice rests with individual unit
commanders who often work in secret, acting as both investigators and
judges. Their judgments can vary widely from case to case.

  "You can have tremendously divergent outcomes at a very low level of
visibility," said Eugene R. Fidell, president of the National Institute of
Military Justice and a visiting lecturer at Harvard Law School. "That does
not necessarily contribute to public confidence in the administration of
justice in the military. Other countries have been moving away" from systems
that put field commanders in charge of their own fratricide investigations,
he said.

  In the Tillman case those factors were compounded by the victim's
extraordinary public profile. Also, Tillman's April 22 death was announced
just days before the shocking disclosure of photographs of abuse by U.S.
soldiers working as guards in Iraq's Abu Ghraib prison. The photos ignited
an international furor and generated widespread questions about discipline
and accountability in the Army.

  Commemorations of Tillman's courage and sacrifice offered contrasting
images of honorable service, undisturbed by questions about possible command
or battlefield mistakes.

  Whatever the cause, McCain said, "you may have at least a subconscious
desire here to portray the situation in the best light, which may not have
been totally justified."

  Working in private last spring, the 75th Ranger Regiment moved quickly to
investigate and wrap up the case, Army records show.

  Immediately after the incident, platoon members generated after-action
statements and investigators working in Afghanistan gathered logs, documents
and e-mails. The investigators interviewed platoon members and senior
officers to reconstruct the chain of events. By early May, the evidence made
clear in precise detail how the disaster unfolded.

  On patrol in Taliban-infested sectors of Afghanistan's Paktia province,
Tillman's "Black Sheep" platoon, formally known as 2nd Platoon, A Company,
2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, became bogged down because of a broken
Humvee. Lt. David Uthlaut, the platoon leader, recommended that his unit
stay together, deliver the truck to a nearby road, then complete his
mission. He was overruled by a superior officer monitoring his operations
from distant Bagram, near Kabul, who ordered Uthlaut to split his platoon,
with one section taking care of the Humvee and the other proceeding to a
village, where the platoon was to search for enemy guerrillas.

  Steep terrain and high canyon walls prevented the two platoon sections
from communicating with each other at crucial moments. When one section
unexpectedly changed its route and ran into an apparent Taliban ambush while
trapped in a deep canyon, the other section from a nearby ridge began firing
in support at the ambushers. As the ambushed group broke free from the
canyon, machine guns blazing, one heavily armed vehicle mistook an allied
Afghan militiaman for the enemy and poured hundreds of rounds at positions
occupied fellow Rangers, killing Pat Tillman and the Afghan.

  Investigators had to decide whether low-ranking Rangers who did the
shooting had followed their training or had fired so recklessly that they
should face military discipline or criminal charges. The investigators also
had to decide whether more senior officers whose decisions contributed to
the chain of confusion around the incident were liable.

  Reporting formally to Col. Nixon in Bagram on May 8, the case's chief
investigator offered nine specific conclusions, which Nixon endorsed,
according to the records.

  Among them:
    €      The decision by a Ranger commander to divide Tillman's 2nd
Platoon into two groups, despite the objections of the platoon's leader,
"created serious command and control issues" and "contributed to the
eventual breakdown in internal Platoon communications." The Post could not
confirm the name of the officer who issued this command.
    €      The A Company commander's order to the platoon leader to get
"boots on the ground" at his mission objective created a "false sense of
urgency" in the platoon, which, "whether intentional or not," led to "a
hasty plan." That officer's name also could not be confirmed by The Post.
    €      Sgt. Greg Baker, the lead gunner in the Humvee that poured the
heaviest fire on Ranger positions "failed to maintain his situational
awareness" at key moments of the battle and "failed" to direct the firing of
the other gunners in his vehicle.
    €      The other gunners "failed to positively identify their respective
targets and exercise good fire discipline. . . . . . . Their collective
failure to exercise fire discipline, by confirming the identity of their
targets, resulted in the shootings of Corporal Tillman."

  The chief investigator appeared to reserve his harshest judgments for the
lower-ranking Rangers who did the shooting rather than the higher-ranking
officers who oversaw the mission. While his judgments about the senior
officers focused on process and communication problems, the chief
investigator wrote about the failures in Baker's truck:

  "While a great deal of discretion should be granted to a leader who is
making difficult judgments in the heat of combat, the Command also has a
responsibility to hold its leaders accountable when that judgment is so
wanton or poor that it places the lives of other men at risk."

  Gen. John P. Abizaid, CENTCOM's commander in chief, formally approved the
investigation's conclusions on May 28 under an aide's signature and
forwarded the report to Special Operations commanders "for evaluation and
any action you deem appropriate to incorporate relevant lessons learned."

  The field investigation's findings raised another question for Army
commanders: Were the failures that resulted in Pat Tillman's death serious
enough to warrant administrative or criminal charges?

  In the military justice system, field officers such as Nixon, commander of
the 75th Ranger Regiment, can generally decide such matters on their own.

  In the end, one member of Tillman's platoon received formal administrative
charges, four others -- including one officer -- were discharged from the
Rangers but not from the Army, and two additional officers were reprimanded,
Lt. Col. Bush said. He declined to release their names, citing Privacy Act
restrictions.

   Baker left the Rangers on an honorable discharge when his enlistment
ended last spring, while others who were in his truck remain in the Army,
said sources involved in the case.

  Military commanders have occasionally leveled charges of involuntary
manslaughter in high-profile friendly fire cases, such as one in 2002 when
Maj. Harry Schmidt, an Illinois National Guard pilot, mistakenly bombed
Canadian troops in Afghanistan. But in that case and others like it,
military prosecutors have found it difficult to make murder charges stick
against soldiers making rapid decisions in combat.

  And because there is no uniform, openly published military case law about
when friendly fire cases cross the line from accident to crime, commanders
are free to interpret that line for themselves.

  The list of cases in recent years where manslaughter charges have been
brought is "almost arbitrary and capricious," said Charles Gittins, a former
Marine who is Schmidt's defense lawyer. Gittins said that senior military
officers tend to focus on low-ranking personnel rather than commanders. In
Schmidt's case, he said, "every single general and colonel with the
exception of Harry's immediate commander has been promoted since the
accident." Schmidt, on the other hand, was ultimately fined and banned from
flying Air Force jets.

  Short of manslaughter, the most common charge leveled in fratricide is
dereliction of duty, or what the military code calls "culpable inefficiency"
in the performance of duty, according to military law specialists. This
violation is defined in the Pentagon's official Manual for Courts-Martial as
"inefficiency for which there is no reasonable or just excuse."

  In judging whether this standard applies to a case such as Tillman's
death, prosecutors are supposed to decide whether the accused person
exercised "that degree of care which a reasonably prudent person would have
exercised under the same or similar circumstances."

  Even if a soldier or officer is found guilty under this code, the
punishments are limited to demotions, fines and minor discipline such as
extra duty.

  Records in the Tillman case do not make clear if Army commanders
considered more serious punishments than this against any Rangers or
officers, and, if so, why they were apparently rejected.

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  Washington Post staff writer Josh White contributed to this report.

 

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