[Mb-civic] The Middle East Cauldron .. and Seymour Hersch on Iraq propects

[ean at sbcglobal.net]

http://fbc.binghamton.edu/148en.htm

Commentary No. 148, November 1, 2004

The Middle East Cauldron - The Next Five Years

by Immanuel Wallerstein

Whoever is President of the United States, the basic political dilemmas of
the Middle East will be the same in the coming five years. There are three
loci of crucial happenings and probable major shifts in the coming period:
Iraq, Iran, and Israel/Palestine.

The issue in Iraq that will have most impact on the future of Iraq, the
Middle East, and the world is when and under what circumstances U.S.
military forces will quit the country. At this point, the U.S. military
presence has come to be a surgical graft that the Iraqi body is rejecting,
and rejecting definitively. Sooner or later, U.S. forces will have to
leave entirely, including from the prospective permanent bases. There are
only three manners in which U.S. withdrawal can take place: as an early
autonomous decision of the U.S. government; at the later request of the
Iraqi authorities; or ultimately chased by Iraqi insurgents.

The first alternative is undoubtedly the one which would serve U.S.,
Iraqi, and world interests best. It is also the least likely to occur. The
U.S. president will find this impossible politically to do in 2005 or 2006
because it would be interpreted, first of all at home in the United
States, as a major political defeat for the United States. And it would
be. Antiwar sentiment in the United States is growing, but it is not yet
at the point where members of Congress would willingly endorse such a
move. Even those in the military who think the entire Iraqi invasion was a
grave error would regard withdrawal now as a slap in the face of the U.S.
military. And those leaders in other countries who have backed the U.S.
fully - Blair, Berlusconi, Howard - would equally be dismayed, because it
would have very negative political consequences for them in their
countries.

The second alternative - being asked to withdraw by the Iraqi government -
is more plausible. Of course, it depends to some extent on political
developments within Iraq. The elections of January may well take place,
even if participation in many areas will be fitful or even virtually
nonexistent. The elections are likely to take place because a number of
important actors are at the moment committed to them: the U.S. government;
the interim Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi; the Kurdish leaders; and
Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani, who sees the opportunity for a legislature
dominated by religious Shia.

But this does not ensure a legitimate regime after January. For one thing,
if the U.S. forces go into Fallujah, as they seem to intend to do, not
only will this guarantee Sunni non-participation in the elections but it
threatens to ignite new eruptions in Shia areas, now that Moqtada al-Sadr
has committed himself to full support of Fallujah resistance. And if,
despite such eruptions, the elections take place, it is by no means clear
whether Allawi would be able to consolidate his control of the central
government or would be displaced by a figure closer to al-Sistani and less
dependent on the United States.

But whatever the makeup of the Iraqi government in 2005, its prime and
most immediate concern will be to secure popular support and legitimation.
What can such a government offer a population that is unhappy with
American military presence, massively insecure because of the insurgency
and the U.S. response, and in great economic difficulty? Such a government
will have only two choices: moving much closer to the U.S. proconsul and
his military forces, or distancing itself considerably from them.

Closeness has not paid off thus far, either in deepening legitimacy or in
getting significant material support from the U.S. It follows that, at
some point, the likelihood is that the Iraqi government will turn against
the U.S. They will certainly be encouraged to do so, for different
reasons, by all their neighbors - Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Iran. Even
if they have deep reservations about each of these neighbors and their
governments, the pressures coming from them plus the pressures coming from
their populations plus the undoubtedly erratic behavior of the United
States will probably be enough for the Iraqi government to shift its basic
position vis-a-vis the United States.

But if they don't, because they fear an inability to survive without U.S.
military support, then it will be the insurgency that will grow stronger
and stronger, and become the de facto government of the country. When that
happens, Iraq is headed towards a Tet offensive scenario. And the U.S. may
have to evacuate its personnel from the Green Zone in helicopters. This
will be a far greater defeat than autonomous withdrawal in 2005.

Meanwhile, in Iran, the government will join the nuclear club in this same
period. Iran is a major power in the region, heir to a very ancient
civilization, a Shia state beside a largely Sunni Arab world, a country
surrounded by nuclear powers. It needs nuclear weapons to realize its full
weight as a regional power, and it will do what it takes to get them. It
has three obstacles in its path. The most public is the opposition of the
U.S. and the European Union to this breakdown in observance of the
non-proliferation treaty. This is the most public and the least important
obstacle, since in fact neither the U.S. nor the EU can do very much to
stop Iran.

There are two more serious obstacles. The first derives from Iran's
internal politics. The government in power has been losing popular support
and legitimacy for more than a decade because of its repressive and
fundamentalist politics. It is not that the opposition forces would really
be against Iran acquiring nuclear weapons but rather that, should they be
able to create turmoil, the government might not have the energy to move
forward on the nuclear front. However, at this point, the opposition seems
too weak politically to disrupt, and the government's strong stand on
nuclear weapons would probably be a popular move at home.

The third and most serious obstacle is the Israeli threat to bomb Iranian
nuclear facilities. There is little doubt that the Israeli government
would like to do that. There are however three questions about an Israeli
attack. Can Israel do it in such a way that the attack would really
cripple Iranian capacity? Can the Iranians retaliate in such a way that
Israel would really be hurt? And would world (including U.S.) opinion
swallow such an attack as they did the Israeli bombing of Iraq in 1981, or
would they react by turning Israel into a total pariah state?

I doubt Israel can cripple Iran because I believe that Iran has scattered
its facilities already enough to prevent this. I also doubt that the
Iranians could retaliate with sufficient strength to hurt Israel
seriously. But the weak point for Israel is world opinion. Israel has
already lost a lot of legitimacy in the last four years, and this could be
the last straw. The world's geopolitics are quite different today than in
1981. The lesson of South Africa is that it is politically extremely
difficult to survive as a pariah state.

Finally, there is Israel/Palestine. Israel has tied its fate to that of
the United States in the Middle East. A defeat for the United States is a
defeat for Israel. At the moment, Sharon is trying the ploy of a
unilateral Gaza withdrawal which would enable him effectively to foreclose
a meaningful Palestinian state on the West Bank. But it doesn't seem to be
working. Hamas is unalterably hostile and unappeased. And the Palestine
Authority, which might have been willing to negotiate such an arrangement,
has been excluded from its implementation, and therefore has to be
ultra-reserved as well. In any case, Arafat may well die soon, and once
that happens, the PLO may splinter into many parts, to the probable
benefit of Hamas.

Meanwhile, among the Israelis, the refusal of the right-wing settlers to
envisage even this tiny concession has led to a virtual split in the Likud
party, and an implicit threat of total implosion of the Jewish state. Gaza
withdrawal will never really come about. But in the process of trying to
do it, Sharon might reunite the Palestinians and fatefully divide the
Israeli body politic in ways that have never occurred up to now. And this
division among the Israelis themselves might be the final blow to their
political strength within the United States. Israel/Palestine might
finally lose its status as an untouchable U.S. political issue and become
a matter of public debate within the United States. This would bode ill
for Israel's survival.

***

Globe and Mail    Friday, October 29, 2004

Forget winning, just draw up an exit strategy

As Nov. 2 nears, the reporter who broke Abu Ghraib story offers Kerry
advice on Iraq

By Brian Milner

If Democratic challenger John Kerry manages to unseat President George
Bush in next week's election, he's going to have stop talking about
winning the war in Iraq and start figuring out how to get out of the mess
created by the Bush administration -- and that will mean withdrawing
troops and talking to the insurgents, rather than trying to wipe them out.

That bit of advice comes from famed U.S. investigative journalist and
author Seymour Hersh, who does, indeed, think Mr. Kerry will emerge
victorious.

"What Kerry says publicly is useless," says Mr. Hersh, who has devoted his
energy in recent years to exposing the yawning chasm between the words and
actions of the Bush administration.

"If Kerry gets in, nobody will be talking about cutting and running. But
that's what's going to happen. Nobody wants to use those words, because
they're politically untenable. Maybe we don't run, but we certainly cut --
because we cannot sustain this."

As to how the United States should extricate itself, Mr. Hersh is less
clear. He calls for an international conference on Iraq's future that
would include the Europeans, Syria and Iran. He warns that replacing U.S.
forces with troops thought more neutral and respectful of Muslim
traditions will not solve the problem, because they would soon become
targets themselves.

"What has to happen is that we have to come to terms with where we are and
start talking to the insurgents. It's impossible for Bush to even
countenance that. But I don't think you're going to resolve this without a
lot more bloodshed unless you talk to the people who actually control the
country."

Should Mr. Bush win a second term, he will maintain the current policy in
Iraq, including a military solution designed to crush the insurgency, and
this will have serious long-term repercussions for the United States, Mr.
Hersh says.

He sees greater risks of terrorist incidents against U.S. citizens at home
and abroad if extremists can make the case that there is no difference
between the American people and the leaders they choose.

"With Kerry, at least you know you get a president who can listen. Right
now, this guy [Mr. Bush] can't admit a mistake. If he's re-elected, he's
got to go ahead. He's incapable psychologically of acknowledging where he
is on this war."

Mr. Hersh, the 67-year-old staff writer with The New Yorker magazine who
uncovered the Abu Ghraib prison-abuse scandal, has never been shy about
speaking out. But he usually confines himself to what he knows and has
proved.

Now, though, he has taken to the lecture circuit, including an appearance
in Toronto this week, and even one on Jon Stewart's satirical The Daily
Show, because, he says, he is so concerned about the impact of the
administration's Iraq policy on his country's future. The White House has
consistently denied Mr. Hersh's assertions and attacked his reliance on
unnamed sources, but he has a well-earned reputation as a careful and
accurate reporter.

Mr. Hersh is a Democrat, but he says some of his best sources are
conservatives in government and the military who are dismayed by the way
Mr. Bush and his senior officials have ignored evidence or advice that
contradicts their thinking.

"This is a war that could put us in jeopardy," Mr. Hersh says rapidly
between sips of Diet Coke. "In the last month or so, I've been getting out
there and really yapping because I'm so worried about where we are. It's
sort of a moral issue now. You just can't be quiet."

His latest book, Chain of Command, lays the blame for what has gone
wrong both with the war on terrorism and the attempt to impose democracy
in Iraq -- at the feet of an ideological President and a small group of
uncompromising advisers, including Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who
ignored all objections from military and intelligence experts.

It was this group that secretly laid the groundwork for the war as early
as February, 2002, and dismissed those, including senior military and
intelligence officers, who disagreed with the evidence they marshalled or
the tactics they insisted on using.

Iraq is different from all previous U.S. wars, Mr. Hersh says, his voice
rising in excitement, because it really is a crusade led by true believers
convinced that the road to ending terrorism goes through Baghdad, and that
a democratic Iraq will serve as a beacon for other Middle East countries
to follow.

"It's beyond astonishing" that so many Americans still believe they are
getting the straight goods from the Bush administration, he says. But
then, he adds, 70 million Americans don't believe in evolution.

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/ArticleNews/TPStory/LAC/20041029/HE
RS H29/International/Idx




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