[Mb-civic] FW: Spector in MEQ: "Washington and Cairo - Near the Breaking Point?"

[villasudjuan]

------ Forwarded Message
From: Kay Zafar <kzii at swbell.net>
Date: Mon, 08 Aug 2005 01:26:41 -0500
To: R Golsorkhi <grgolsorkhi at earthlink.net>, Eli Golsorkhi
<egolsorkhi at yahoo.com>, Kiddie ZAFAR <kiddie at zafar.co.uk>, Keu Zafar
<keuzafar at yahoo.com>, Amir-Teymour Golsorkhi <atgolsorkhi at yahoo.com>,
"Khozeimeh, Issa" <Issa.Khozeimeh at MWAA.com>, Parvis Khozeimeh-Alam
<apkaintl at hotmail.com>, Edward <ecma2 at earthlink.net>, Roozbeh Payevand
<Iranconsult at aol.com>, Reza Pezechkpour <reza at rezahome.com>,
"arrastegar at aol.com" <arrastegar at aol.com>, Goodarz Haydarzadeh
<goodarzh at aol.com>, Laddan Mina <MINATIGERLILY at aol.com>, Jon Simmons
<joneric.simmons at verizon.net>, Wanda  Lemon <leejoe1 at juno.com>, Dari Ansari
<daria at freshbrewgroup.com>
Subject: FW: Spector in MEQ: "Washington and Cairo - Near the Breaking
Point?"


-- 


> ------ Forwarded Message
> From: MEF News <mefnews at meforum.org>
> Reply-To: MEF News <mefnews at meforum.org>
> Date: Mon, 8 Aug 2005 02:04:15 -0400
> To: <kzii at swbell.net>
> Subject: Spector in MEQ: "Washington and Cairo - Near the Breaking Point?"
> 

> Washington and Cairo - Near the Breaking Point?
> by Samuel J. Spector
> Middle East Quarterly
> Summer 2005
> http://www.meforum.org/article/740
> 
> Where goes the U.S.-Egyptian alliance? Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's
> decision to bypass Cairo in her recent travels to Europe and the Middle East
> has highlighted official Washington's annoyance with Egyptian president Hosni
> Mubarak's regime. The immediate cause of dispute was the Egyptian government's
> arrest of opposition leader Ayman Nour. (See "Dissident Watch," this issue).
> But bilateral strains extend beyond this single incident.
> 
> At the root of tension is an exaggerated Egyptian sense of self-importance,
> coupled with the Mubarak government's inability to adjust to new realities.
> Egypt's world-view is based on its historical claim to Arab leadership. Cairo
> views any U.S. attempt to bolster Washington's relationship with other Arab
> states or to expand the United States' strategic partnership with Turkey and
> Israel as a threat to Egypt's traditional role as the linchpin of regional
> security.
> 
> As U.S. foreign policy has grown more reliant on Jordan, the new Iraqi
> government, and the Persian Gulf emirates, the Egyptian government has
> struggled to reassert its strategic relevance. But its attempt to regain its
> former influence has come at a time when the Bush administration has begun to
> challenge the Middle East's traditional authoritarian order. Whether Mubarak
> can adjust to the new reality is an open question.
> Roots of Egyptian Identity
> Modern Egypt's claim to leadership in the Middle East extends back to the
> early nineteenth century when the Ottoman military commander Muhammad ŒAli (r.
> 1805-48) battled Wahhabis in Arabia, conquered Sudan, and sent Egyptian troops
> into Syria, at one point even threatening to invade the Ottoman homeland in
> Anatolia. Any pretense that Egypt was just another Ottoman province
> evaporated. She had exerted herself as a dominant regional power. With the
> Ottoman sultan's acquiescence, Muhammad ŒAli's family assumed hereditary rule,
> holding the mantle of leadership in Cairo until Gamal Abdel Nasser's 1952
> revolution ended the monarchy.
> 
> Egypt's claim to leadership also rested on cultural self-identity. Until the
> early twentieth century, Egyptian identity was distinct from that of the
> Arabs.[1] <#_ftn1>  "Arabness" was then defined ethnically; only those who
> traced their roots back to the Arabian Peninsula called themselves Arabs. The
> Egyptians, with a civilization stretching back millennia, embraced a unique
> identity. Only in the 1930s, did the linguistic definition of an Arab begin to
> take hold; Arabs were those who spoke Arabic. At the same time, Egyptian
> intellectuals embraced Egypt-centered pan-Arabism. Muhammad ŒAli ŒAlluba
> (1875-1956), a prominent Egyptian intellectual of that period, spoke of
> Egypt's destiny "to bear the crown of all-Arab leadership" as well as "to
> fulfill its pan-Arab mission."[2] <#_ftn2>
> 
> The Arab League‹of which Egypt was a charter member‹viewed the Arabic language
> as a force capable of unifying as diverse a cultural, ethnic, and religious
> community as spanned the geographic expanse from Morocco to Somalia to Iraq.
> Such an attitude mirrored that of Sati' al-Husri (1880-1968), the Syrian
> ideologue of Arab nationalism, who contended that "every person who speaks
> Arabic is an Arab. Everyone who is affiliated with these people is an
> Arab."[3] <#_ftn3>  Almost overnight, the Arab world expanded from the Arabian
> Peninsula and Fertile Crescent to encompass all of North Africa, the Sudan,
> the Horn of Africa, and even distant Mauritania. Egypt became the fulcrum of
> the Arab world and Cairo its crossroads.
> 
> Max Rodenbeck, the chief Middle East correspondent for The Economist and a
> Cairo resident for much of his life, related the Cairene sense of cultural
> leadership in his 1999 book, Cairo: A City Victorious:
>> 
>> To 250 million Arabic-speakers and one billion Muslims, Cairo retains a
>> mystique, a stature, a reassuring gravity that no other city can match Š It
>> projects its own rhythms and language far and wide. The cassette-tape call to
>> prayer wafting over a Javanese village was most likely recorded by one of the
>> honey-tongued Koran reciters of Cairo. The music pulsing through the heat of
>> a Moroccan Kasbah came from here, too, as did the satellite-borne soap opera
>> enthralling a Kuwaiti financier's air-conditioned harem Š When Arabs think of
>> Cairo, they think of it as a repository of Arabness: the seat of the greatest
>> universities, the largest libraries, the biggest-circulation newspapers, the
>> most vibrant pop culture.[4] <#_ftn4>
> 
> Army colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser subscribed to the idea of Egyptian centrality,
> which he saw as both a political and military responsibility. Nasser not only
> sent Egyptian troops to combat Israel, but he also intervened in the Yemeni
> civil war. Like Muhammad ŒAli more than a century before, Nasser sought not
> only to lead but also dominate other Arab states. "We, and only we, are
> impelled by our environment and are capable of performing this [leadership]
> role,"[5] <#_ftn5>  he wrote. Accordingly, Nasser disparaged the 1955
> Turco-Iraqi pact, the core of the Cold War security arrangement that would
> grow into the Baghdad pact, which he labeled a plot to "destroy Egypt's
> prestige and position in [the] Arab world."[6] <#_ftn6>
> 
> The pattern continued through subsequent decades. For much of this period,
> Egypt placed itself at the forefront of the Arab world's confrontation with
> Israel. Egypt's early battlefield victories in the 1973 Yom Kippur War against
> Israel enabled Egypt to reassert the prestige it feared had been damaged
> following the crushing defeat of 1967. With the 1978 Camp David accords and a
> peace treaty between Israel and Egypt the following year, President Anwar
> al-Sadat bolstered Egypt's position within the United States governments'
> Middle Eastern strategic framework, elevating his country to become
> Washington's principal ally in the Arab world, as well as the key to Arab
> normalization of ties with Israel.
> 
> But with the end of the Cold War, and especially events of more recent years,
> the situation has changed. Iran is on the verge of going nuclear. Yasir Arafat
> is dead, and Saddam Hussein in prison. More than 100,000 U.S. troops are in
> Iraq. The U.S. military maintains bases in Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab
> Emirates. Despite such changes, the Egyptian leadership still sees itself as
> the most important state in the Arab world, if not in the entire Middle East.
> Speaking at the inauguration of the Council on Egyptian-American Relations in
> March 2000, Egyptian foreign minister Amr Moussa stated that "historically,
> America's recognition of Egypt's centrality in Middle East politics and
> developments lies at the heart of our partnership," adding that "for the last
> two decades, it [the U.S.-Egyptian relationship] has been the driving force
> behind regional peace, stability, and prosperity."[7] <#_ftn7>  This
> assessment changed very little over the five years that followed. In March
> 2005, the current Egyptian foreign minister, Ahmed Aboul Gheit, asserted that
> "Egypt is a lighthouse for the Middle East," while adding that he was certain
> that the U.S. government fully appreciated everything that Egypt brought to
> the bilateral relationship.[8] <#_ftn8>
> 
> The U.S. commitment to Egypt has amounted in financial terms to approximately
> US$50 billion in military and economic assistance since the signing of an
> Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty in 1979‹second only to the aid to Israel. Since
> that time, successive U.S. administrations have viewed Egypt as a key promoter
> of regional stability and moderation. David Welch, U.S. ambassador to Egypt
> between 2001 and 2005, in the weeks prior to the 9-11 attacks described
> Washington's ties to Cairo as "the centerpiece of our foreign policy in the
> Arab world."[9] <#_ftn9>
> 
> Bilateral ties have been both political and military. Soon after the Camp
> David accords, Egypt and the United States inaugurated the "Bright Star" joint
> military exercise, conducted every two years. Ten years later, Cairo played a
> key role in persuading Arab states to join the international coalition to
> liberate Kuwait.[10] <#_ftn10>  During that conflict, Egypt acceded to U.S.
> requests to permit the transit of a U.S. nuclear carrier task force through
> the Suez Canal.[11] <#_ftn11>  An Egyptian reinforced infantry division of
> 30,000 troops‹the second-largest military contingent involved in the allied
> campaign‹entered western Kuwait in February 1991 during operations to liberate
> that country.[12] <#_ftn12>  As a reward for Egypt's cooperation with the
> Desert Shield military operations, in November 1990, President George H.W.
> Bush signed into law Section 592 of the Iraq Sanctions Act (Public Law
> 101-513), which provided for the cancellation of Egypt's $6.7 billion military
> debt. In the decade that followed, Egyptian consumption of American arms
> increased, and Egypt implemented a number of joint U.S.-Egyptian military
> partnerships, co-producing components for the Abrams (M1A1) tank and repairing
> aging U.S. military equipment.[13] <#_ftn13>
> 
> Mubarak publicly opposed the liberation of Iraq but nevertheless granted U.S.
> Central Command transit rights for troops and material through the Suez
> Canal,[14] <#_ftn14>  a passage that became far more important after the
> Turkish parliament refused the Pentagon permission to open a northern front
> against Iraq. While the Suez Canal remains the quickest transit point for U.S.
> military assets bound for the Persian Gulf region, it also serves as a major
> international oil route,[15] <#_ftn15>  thus guaranteeing Egypt's heightened
> strategic relevance into the twenty-first century.
> 
> These factors‹along with the fact that with a population of over 75 million,
> one out of every three Arabs is Egyptian‹have only heightened the Egyptian
> government's perception of itself as a pivotal state, indispensable, if not an
> "equal partner" with Washington in the Arab world.[16] <#_ftn16>  Events,
> however, have undercut the basis for Egypt's self-perception, causing the gap
> between the Egyptian political elites' static policy and Washington to grow.
> Is Egypt Relevant?
> While U.S. policymakers have long viewed both Egypt and Turkey as linchpins of
> regional security, the emergence of an Israeli-Turkish entente heightened
> Egyptian fears that its leadership was under assault.[17] <#_ftn17>  Ankara's
> efforts to assert its strategic relevance to the West have been troubling to
> the Arab world in general[18] <#_ftn18>  and Egypt in particular. The
> Jordanian government's willingness to act independently of pan-Arab pressures
> and enter into a trilateral military partnership with Turkey and Israel only
> exacerbated Egyptian anxiety, leading one veteran Egyptian diplomat to label
> the 1990s a period of great "fragmentation" in the Arab world.[19] <#_ftn19>
> Egyptian columnist Abdel-Azim Hammad asserted that the Israeli-Turkish
> strategic partnership "jeopardizes peace and stability and contravenes Egypt's
> plans for a collective regional security scheme."[20] <#_ftn20>  Indeed, while
> U.S. shipping might still rely on the Suez Canal, Ankara's agreement to allow
> the U.S. Air Force to use the Incirlik Air Force Base in Turkey obviated any
> need for Egyptian overflight permission for U.S. pilots en route to the
> Persian Gulf. Egypt might still be important, but throughout the 1990s, it was
> no longer an indispensable strategic ally.
> 
> In the aftermath of 9-11, Egyptian support for the global war on terrorism has
> at best been lukewarm. While the Egyptian government did allow some
> intelligence sharing with U.S. agencies, it failed to send Egyptian troops to
> join the U.S.-led military coalition in Afghanistan,[21] <#_ftn21>  something
> the Turkish government did despite its own political squabbles with
> Washington. While official frustration with the degree of Egyptian support for
> the war on terrorism has been muted, disagreements arising from the U.S.
> invasion of Iraq have been much more difficult to contain.
> 
> For many years, the Mubarak regime was at the forefront of Arab countries
> seeking rapprochement with Iraq and a softening of United Nations
> sanctions.[22] <#_ftn22>  A month after 9-11, Egyptian minister of foreign
> affairs Ahmed Maher told an audience at the American University of Cairo that
> the Egyptian government was "against any [U.S.] attack against any Arab
> country."[23] <#_ftn23>  A year later, as preparations for war were underway,
> Mubarak told students in Alexandria, "If you strike Iraq and kill the people
> of Iraq while Palestinians are being killed by Israel Š not one Arab leader
> will be able to control the angry outbursts of the masses."[24] <#_ftn24>
> Shortly before the fall of Baghdad unleashed a burst of euphoria in the Iraqi
> street, Mubarak warned that the war in Iraq would produce 100 bin Ladens.[25]
> <#_ftn25> 
> 
> As the Iraq campaign progressed, the Egyptian political elite remained firm in
> their conviction that their pivotal role remained unscathed. Abdel Moneim
> SaŒid ŒAly, head of the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in
> Cairo, for example, said, "I don't think that Bahrain and Qatar can take the
> place of Egypt and Saudi Arabia. America will realize that in major crises it
> needs Saudi Arabia and Egypt."[26] <#_ftn26>  Many Egyptian policymakers and
> analysts urged Cairo to take a dominant role in Iraq's postwar
> reconstruction.[27] <#_ftn27>  Mubarak's decision to host the November 2004
> Sharm el-Sheikh summit of foreign ministers of Iraq's neighbors was a tacit
> admission that, having failed to prevent the United States from going to war,
> his best chance of influencing events was by positioning Egypt to be part of
> the solution.[28] <#_ftn28>
> 
> Just as Egypt flirted with obstructionism in regard to U.S. efforts to address
> the regional threat posed by Saddam Hussein and the slow erosion of United
> Nations sanctions, throughout the 1990s, Mubarak has also sought to bolster
> Egypt's regional importance at the expense of Arab-Israeli peace. If it could
> not be at the center of the peace process, then it would undermine it. In 1994
> and 1995, Cairo used international forums and regional meetings to isolate and
> weaken Israel.[29] <#_ftn29>  Having been excluded from the process leading to
> the 1994 establishment of diplomatic relations between Israel and Jordan,
> Mubarak criticized the agreement.[30] <#_ftn30>  Rather than use Egyptian
> offices to make a positive contribution to peace elsewhere, Mubarak's pressure
> contributed to the scuttling of Moroccan and Qatari plans to establish full
> diplomatic ties with Israel in the mid-1990s.[31] <#_ftn31>
> 
> While taking a mildly rejectionist line toward Arab-Israeli rapprochement, the
> Egyptian government has sought to position itself as the mediator for disputes
> within the Arab and Muslim world. In 1998, Mubarak personally shuttled between
> Damascus and Ankara to defuse the threat of military confrontation over Syrian
> backing for the Kurdistan Worker's Party (Partiya Karkerana Kurdistan, or
> PKK).[32] <#_ftn32>  Then-Egyptian foreign minister Amr Moussa likewise worked
> to ease tension between Algeria and Morocco and also between Syria and the
> Palestinian Authority. However, the Egyptian government has taken an unhelpful
> stance with regard to Syrian occupation of Lebanon, failing even to support
> U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559. During a surprise visit to Damascus in
> September 2004, Mubarak and Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad reportedly adopted a
> joint stance rejecting any outside interference in matters of Lebanese
> sovereignty and internal affairs while linking any progress on the matter to
> Israeli withdrawal from all Syrian and Lebanese territory.[33] <#_ftn33>  By
> trying to broaden the discussion of Lebanese sovereignty to other Arab
> territories held by Israel, Egypt's stance was pan-Arab in both scope and
> tone. The Egyptian government's push for annual Arab summit meetings was
> Cairo's attempt to cement its leadership position.[34] <#_ftn34>
> 
> Yet rather than strengthen its position as the United States' indispensable
> ally, Mubarak's attempt to revive pan-Arabism antagonized Washington. Former
> assistant secretary of state Martin Indyk, for example, observed that Cairo
> tended to reinforce Arafat's stubborn tendencies, thereby obstructing progress
> in talks with Israel.[35] <#_ftn35>  As in the Taba meeting in the final days
> of the Clinton presidency, or in the Sharm el-Sheikh summit in June 2003, the
> Egyptian government only worked to advance the peace process when it could
> host summits and show itself at the center of the process.
> 
> The pattern continues. In the aftermath of Iraq's liberation, Mubarak has
> redoubled his efforts to position Egypt as the key to regional settlement by
> trying to link resolution of the Iraqi insurgency to the Israeli-Palestinian
> conflict. At the end of an April 2004 summit with President Bush in Crawford,
> Texas, Mubarak declared, "Egypt has pioneered the path of peace in the region
> for over twenty-five years and will continue to assume its responsibilities
> for peace today."[36] <#_ftn36>
> 
> Has Egypt's strategy worked? The peace process is again active. At first
> glance, Cairo has regained some relevance by assuming a more constructive role
> in the renewed Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Egyptian foreign minister
> Ahmed Aboul Gheit visited Israel in late 2004, and Mubarak's uncharacteristic
> remark in December 2004 that if the Palestinians "can't achieve progress in
> the time of the current prime minister [Ariel Sharon], it will be difficult to
> make any progress in peace," raised hopes that Cairo would no longer encourage
> Palestinian intransigence. Western diplomats have welcomed Egypt's subsequent
> engagement with both Israel and Palestinian leaders.[37] <#_ftn37>
> 
> But recent Egyptian moves may have less to do with a sincere desire for peace
> than for averting outcomes harmful to Egyptian interests, such as the
> emergence of a Palestinian mini-state in Gaza controlled by Hamas or Islamic
> Jihad in the political and security vacuum following disengagement.[38]
> <#_ftn38>  Egypt's short-term cooperation with Israel over post-Gaza
> withdrawal security may have less to do with Egyptian altruism and more to do
> with Cairo's fear of either political turmoil in Gaza or the empowerment of
> Islamists there.[39] <#_ftn39>
> Is Egypt out of Step with the New Middle East?
> While the Egyptian government has reversed course from the obstructionism of
> the 1990s, a shifting milieu has prevented Cairo from assuming the domineering
> position it seeks. Egypt's lofty regional ambitions stand quite in contrast to
> the sad reality of its economic circumstances. Although Egypt, with the
> largest population of any Arab country, ranked only behind Saudi Arabia and
> the United Arab Emirates in gross domestic product in 2003, it ranks near the
> bottom of the Arab League states in terms of its per capita income.[40]
> <#_ftn40>  Since the brief period of economic growth in the middle and
> late-1990s, regional challenges compounded by uncertainty in the government's
> economic management have undermined business and consumer confidence and
> slowed growth.[41] <#_ftn41>  Economic growth has fallen to an average of just
> 2.2 percent in 2002-3 and 2003-4.[42] <#_ftn42>  While official figures placed
> Egyptian unemployment at 9.9 percent in 2002-3, the true figure is probably
> double that.[43] <#_ftn43>  Additionally, Egypt has possessed an external
> trade deficit, almost without interruption, for more than half a century.[44]
> <#_ftn44>  Cairo may have ambitions of regional political domination, but its
> economy undermines such pretensions.
> 
> The tension between ambition and reality contributes to the tense relationship
> between Mubarak's regime and an increasingly cynical Egyptian public. At a
> time when Washington feared Cairo's vulnerability to Islamist insurgency, the
> White House was willing to forgive Mubarak's domestic oppression. But with
> both the JamaŒat al-Islamiya and Egyptian Islamic Jihad deflated, at least
> since the apex of the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. diplomats need not treat their
> Egyptian counterparts with kid gloves. With the establishment of relations
> between Israel and Jordan, the formalization of the Palestinian Authority, and
> the general amelioration of Arab rejectionism elsewhere, a number of different
> Arab officials are willing to talk directly to their Israeli counterparts. As
> a result, Egypt has become less essential to U.S. diplomacy. Finally, whereas
> before the 1990s, Egypt and, perhaps to some extent Oman, were the only Arab
> military partners upon which the United States could depend in the Cold War's
> uncertainty, today the Cold War is over, and U.S. Central Command has at its
> disposal naval bases in Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, a recently
> completed base in Qatar, and perhaps a dozen new installations in Iraq. Even
> Egypt's geographical importance has been marginalized by shifting threats and
> a new U.S. base in Djibouti from which is accessible all of southern Arabia,
> the Sudan, and the Horn of Africa.
> 
> With Washington less reliant on Mubarak for its diplomacy, the Cold War over,
> and subsequent fears of an Islamist takeover receded, the U.S. government has
> much more maneuverability to press for internal reform and the long-term
> stability which representative government can bring. Mubarak had a rude
> awakening in 2002 after Egyptian security forces imprisoned dual U.S.-Egyptian
> citizen and civil society advocate Saad Eddin Ibrahim. Perhaps in the past,
> Washington would have been content to express diplomatic displeasure but not
> to withhold carrots or wield sticks. But, in a letter to Mubarak, Bush
> threatened to stop new aid to Egypt.[45] <#_ftn45>  While he did not mention
> the nearly $2 billion in U.S. assistance Egypt receives annually, the very
> precedent of withholding aid carried with it an implied threat. U.S. pressure
> clearly paid off. Several months later, Egyptian authorities released Ibrahim
> and dropped all charges against him.[46] <#_ftn46>
> 
> If Egyptian policymakers thought the Ibrahim incident was a one-time
> occurrence, perhaps brought to the fore only by Ibrahim's U.S. citizenship,
> they were wrong. In the aftermath of 9-11, the Bush administration calculated
> that the dangers of alienation of the Arab street outweighed the benefits of
> nurturing friendly dictatorships. In December 2002, the State Department
> unveiled its Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) that emphasized civil
> society, economic reforms, political participation, and development as part of
> a broader U.S. public diplomacy effort in the Middle East.[47] <#_ftn47>
> 
> The Egyptian government was dismissive of the program. Foreign Minister Ahmed
> Maher questioned the timing of the initiative and expressed bewilderment that
> Washington would prioritize MEPI over resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian
> conflict, an entanglement over which Cairo could wield its influence and which
> did not threaten the interests of the Egyptian autocracy.[48] <#_ftn48>
> 
> Was Washington, through its promotion of democracy, undermining the
> foundations of Mubarak's legitimacy and weakening Egypt's regional standing?
> Pro-government journalists among Al-Ahram Weekly's staff leveled such charges
> at a 2003 roundtable with the U.S. ambassador. In response to a record of U.S.
> statements on democratization in the past, as well as denials from both
> countries that their relationship was embroiled in crisis, Al-Ahram Weekly
> staff member, Gamal Essam el-Din alleged, "You said you are not interfering,
> but by making these statements you are exerting some kind of psychological
> pressure on the people here, and they think this is part of the crisis in the
> relationship."[49] <#_ftn49>
> 
> Ambassador Welch retorted,
>> 
>> Maybe you find that particularly uncomfortable if it [these statements on
>> democracy] comes from foreign political leaders Š sometimes those views, even
>> if they are meant to be positive and encouraging, may get dismissed because
>> of where they came from. If you interpret that as psychological pressure, I'm
>> sorry, but your interpretation is not our intention. Our intention is to
>> encourage, and yes, to promote change.[50] <#_ftn50>
> 
> Egyptian policymakers had been turning a deaf ear to hints of growing White
> House displeasure with Mubarak. In November 2003, Bush spoke about freedom and
> democracy after Iraq to the National Endowment for Democracy. He called on
> Egypt to play a leadership role in the democratization of the region.[51]
> <#_ftn51>  The speech signaled a new reality. While the Egyptian government
> sought to maneuver itself into a position of predominance using 1980s-style
> Realpolitik, the Middle East had moved on.
> 
> The disconnect between U.S. and Egyptian goals has only widened since. The
> democratic wave of early 2005 in Ukraine, Iraq, and Lebanon has alarmed the
> Egyptian elite. Influencing diplomacy abroad is one thing, but enacting
> internal reform quite another. The quasi-official Egyptian media made no
> secret of Cairo's disdain for democratization in Iraq and, by implication,
> elsewhere. Al-Ahram, for example, suggested that elections would only
> "exacerbate the sectarian and ethnic fissures that are already threatening to
> tear Iraq apart."[52] <#_ftn52>  Two weeks later, its editors suggested that
> empowerment of Iraqi ShiŒites and Kurds might lead "the disgruntled Sunnis of
> Iraq [to] step up their resistance to the new status quo in Iraq."[53]
> <#_ftn53> 
> 
> The drive to democratize has heightened awareness of Egypt's political
> stagnation, at home and abroad. Politically, Cairo is frozen in time by its
> authoritarian regime. Egyptian officials and opinion leaders, many dependent
> upon the patronage of Mubarak, have responded to Bush's democracy initiatives
> as if the very foundations of their country's legitimacy were under assault.
> When an early proposal for the Broader Middle East and North Africa democracy
> initiative was leaked to the press prior to the June 2004 Group of Eight
> summit in Sea Island, Georgia, Mubarak said he was "furious" about being
> dictated to by others.[54] <#_ftn54>
> 
> Expression of the Mubarak regime's pique has not been a one-time occurrence.
> In March 2005, Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit slammed a Bush speech extolling
> democratizing trends in the Middle East, insisting that for the "so-called
> democratic endeavor, the pace will be set by Egypt and the Egyptian people and
> only the Egyptian people. The Egyptian people will not accept what we call
> trusteeship."[55] <#_ftn55>  Indicating the growing gulf in U.S.-Egyptian
> relations was that fact that Aboul Gheit's comments were not too different
> from those expressed by Hezbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah himself
> during the large March 8 pro-Syrian demonstration in Beirut. Responding to
> Bush's dual calls for democratic reform and the implementation of U.N.
> Security Council resolutions binding on Syria, Nasrallah asked tauntingly,
> "Isn't this Western democracy? The majority is rejecting Resolution 1559,"
> while adding, "I want to tell Americans, do not interfere in our internal
> affairs. Let your ambassador relax in his embassy and leave us alone."[56]
> <#_ftn56> 
> 
> Demonstrating Egypt's inflated sense of its own indispensability, Aboul Gheit
> added that "the need for Egypt to be a friend of the United States is
> something I'm sure people in Washington value very much."[57] <#_ftn57>
> Increasingly, though, he is wrong. The State Department will seldom speak ill
> of any relationship, but the Congress has been less sanguine. Senator Mitch
> McConnell, a senior member of the Senate Republican leadership and chairman of
> the appropriations subcommittee on foreign operation, expressed his deep
> frustration with Egypt in an April 2004 editorial in The Washington Post,
> declaring that "it is past time President Mubarak demonstrated the courage and
> commitment to lead Egypt into a new era of freedom and prosperity. To do
> anything less will only strengthen the hands of extremists."[58] <#_ftn58>
> 
> There is little reason for optimism for real political reform. A report by the
> Carnegie Endowment for International Peace's Democracy and Rule of Law Project
> concluded that, despite Mubarak's rhetoric, the Egyptian government continues
> to consolidate its power. Among the obstacles cited by its author, Amr
> Hamzawy, were the regime's undemocratic nature and the structural weakness and
> laws obstructing the functioning of opposition parties and movements.[59]
> <#_ftn59> 
> 
> Rather than prepare for a democratic future, Mubarak appears to be grooming
> his son Gamal for power.[60] <#_ftn60>  Mubarak's arrest of opposition leader
> Ayman Nour in January 2005 only reinforced doubts. Many commentators saw it as
> a preemptive strike against political dissent.[61] <#_ftn61>  Secretary of
> State Condoleezza Rice's decision to cancel an expected February 2005 visit to
> Egypt was attributed to a lack of reform initiatives in that country, a
> shortcoming highlighted by Nour's imprisonment.[62] <#_ftn62>
> 
> In the immediate wake of Rice's cancellation, Mubarak proposed unprecedented
> changes to Egypt's electoral laws, "giving the chance for political parties to
> run for the presidential elections and providing guarantees that allow more
> than one candidate for the people to choose among them with their own
> will."[63] <#_ftn63>  While Nour was eventually freed on bail, it is unclear
> whether Mubarak's call for a constitutional amendment permitting
> multi-candidate presidential elections arose out of a "full conviction of the
> need to consolidate efforts for more freedom and democracy,"[64] <#_ftn64>  as
> he claimed, and whether Mubarak's newfound democratic conviction will overcome
> his desire to stay in power. As long as the ruling National Democratic Party
> retains a virtual monopoly on the exercise of both executive and legislative
> powers, the chance for a democratic breakthrough remains slim.
> Conclusions
> For more than two decades, U.S. policymakers have viewed Egypt as an
> invaluable ally in Washington's effort to ensure regional stability and
> moderation. Yet, with faithfulness to Cairo's historical mission as the heart
> and soul of the Arab world guiding its behavior for the past half-century,
> Egypt has consistently sought to quash any challenge to its role as the Arab
> world's paramount broker of moderation and stability. To Cairo's
> decisionmakers, such goals take a back seat to preventing the emergence of any
> new order‹including democratization‹that Egypt cannot dominate. As long as
> democracy promotion remains a major component of U.S. policy, diplomatic
> conflagrations between Cairo and Washington are likely to become not the
> exception, but the rule. A change at the top will likely not soothe relations.
> Democratic reforms notwithstanding, any successor to Mubarak is unlikely to
> shift Egyptian national priorities away from its claim to be the regional
> power broker. To do so would betray the attitude of Egyptian exceptionalism
> that has driven successive leaders to perpetuate a sometimes deleterious sense
> of national glory.
> 
> In March 2000, then-Egyptian foreign minister Amr Moussa stated that
> differences between the United States and Egypt on certain issues are to be
> expected. "After all, America is a global power with international interests,"
> he said. "Egypt, meanwhile, is a regional power whose interests are closely
> linked to the heart of the Arab and Muslim worlds, the African continent, and
> the Mediterranean. So, it is only normal that our perspectives on certain
> issues be different."[65] <#_ftn65>
> 
> Moussa's words are just as true today as they were five years ago when they
> were uttered. Egyptian and U.S. national interests may overlap, but they need
> not be identical to enable a fruitful partnership to exist. Yet, the critical
> question now is whether their differences have grown to such a degree that
> they overrule the possibility of a mutually-beneficial U.S.-Egyptian bilateral
> relationship continuing into the future.
>> 
>> Samuel J. Spector is a research analyst at the Long-Term Strategy Project in
>> Cambridge, Massachusetts.
> 
> [1] <#_ftnref1>  Martin Kramer, "Arab Nationalism: Mistaken Identity,"
> Daedalus, Summer 1993, pp. 171-206; Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski,
> Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs: The Search for Egyptian Nationhood (New York:
> Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 3-20.
> [2] <#_ftnref2>  Elie Podeh, The Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World: The
> Struggle over the Baghdad Pact, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995), p. 31.
> [3] <#_ftnref3>  Quoted in William L. Cleveland, The Making of an Arab
> Nationalist: Ottomanism and Arabism in the Life and Thought of Sati' al-Husri
> (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 127.
> [4] <#_ftnref4>  Max Rodenbeck, Cairo: The City Victorious (New York: Alfred
> A. Knopf, 1999), p. 18. For an Egyptian study of their identity, see Jamal
> ad-Din Mahmud Hamdan, Shakhsiyat Misr: Dirasah fi Œabqariyat al-makan (Cairo:
> Maktabat an-Nahdah al-Misriyah, 1970), pp. 471-514.
> [5] <#_ftnref5>  Gamal Abdel Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution
> (Buffalo: Smith, Keynes and Marshall, 1959), p. 78.
> [6] <#_ftnref6>  Podeh, The Quest for Hegemony, p. 196.
> [7] <#_ftnref7>  Amr Moussa, "The Egyptian-American Partnership: An Investment
> in the Future Stability and Prosperity of the Middle East
> <http://www.sis.gov.eg/online/html2/o260320d.htm> ," inauguration of the
> Council on Egyptian-American Relations, Washington, D.C., Mar. 26, 2000.
> [8] <#_ftnref8>  The Washington Post, Mar. 10, 2005.
> [9] <#_ftnref9>  Al-Ahram Weekly (Cairo), Aug. 16-22, 2001.
> [10] <#_ftnref10>  Abdel Moneim Said Aly and Robert H. Pelletreau,
> "U.S.-Egyptian Relations," Middle East Policy, June 2001, p. 49.
> [11] <#_ftnref11>  Ibid.
> [12] <#_ftnref12>  Clyde R. Mark, "Egypt-United States Relations,"
> Congressional Research Service (IB93087), Apr. 2, 2003, p. 10.
> [13] <#_ftnref13>  Ibid., pp. 10-1.
> [14] <#_ftnref14>  The Washington Post, Apr. 1, 2003.
> [15] <#_ftnref15>  Mohamed Kadry Said, "Potential Egyptian Contribution to a
> Security Framework in the Gulf," Middle East Policy, Fall 2004, p. 66.
> [16] <#_ftnref16>  Al-Ahram Weekly, June 24-30, 1999.
> [17] <#_ftnref17>  Alan Makovsky, "Turkish-Israeli Cooperation, the Peace
> Process, and the Region
> <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=1074> ," Policywatch,
> no. 195, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Apr. 26, 1996.
> [18] <#_ftnref18>  Michel Naufal, ed., Al-'Arab wa al-Atrak fi'-l-ŒAlam
> al-Mutahayir (Beirut: Markaz ad-Dirasat as-Strategiya wa Bahooth wa
> at-Towthiq, 1993), p. 9.
> [19] <#_ftnref19>  Salah Bassiouni, "Misr wa't-Turkiya: Hisabat Siyasiya wa
> AqaŒiya," Auraq ash-Sharq al-Awsat (Cairo), Nov. 1998-Mar. 1999, p. 54.
> [20] <#_ftnref20>  Abdel-Azim Hammad, "Egypt and Turkey Restore Equilibrium,"
> Al-Ahram Weekly, Dec. 17-23, 1998.
> [21] <#_ftnref21>  Al-Ahram Weekly, Oct. 11-17, 2001.
> [22] <#_ftnref22>  Steven A. Cook, "Egypt‹Still America's Partner?
> <http://www.meforum.org/article/58> " Middle East Quarterly, June 2000, pp.
> 3-13.
> [23] <#_ftnref23>  Al-Ahram Weekly, Oct. 11-17, 2001.
> [24] <#_ftnref24>  The Times (London), Aug. 28, 2002.
> [25] <#_ftnref25>  The Washington Post, Apr. 1, 2003.
> [26] <#_ftnref26>  Financial Times (London), Oct. 22, 2003.
> [27] <#_ftnref27>  Said, "Potential Egyptian Contribution to a Security
> Framework in the Gulf," p. 70.
> [28] <#_ftnref28>  The New York Times, Nov. 23, 2004.
> [29] <#_ftnref29>  Gerald Steinberg, "Cairo's Anti-Israel Campaign," The
> Jerusalem Post, Nov. 25, 1994.
> [30] <#_ftnref30>  The Jerusalem Post, Nov. 25, 1994.
> [31] <#_ftnref31>  The Jerusalem Report, Sept. 24, 2001.
> [32] <#_ftnref32>  Al-Ahram Weekly, Dec. 3-9, 1998.
> [33] <#_ftnref33>  The Daily Star (Beirut), Sept. 16, 2004.
> [34] <#_ftnref34>  Al-Ahram Weekly, Feb. 24-Mar. 1, 2000.
> [35] <#_ftnref35>  Martin Indyk, "Back to the Bazaar," Foreign Affairs,
> Jan./Feb. 2002, pp. 75-88.
> [36] <#_ftnref36>  White House, news release
> <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/04/20040412-3.html> , Crawford,
> Texas, Apr. 12, 2004.
> [37] <#_ftnref37>  Ben Fishman, "Analyzing the Thaw in Egyptian-Israeli
> Relations <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2208> ,"
> Policy Watch, no. 931, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Dec. 20,
> 2004.
> [38] <#_ftnref38>  Ha'aretz (Tel Aviv), June 6, 2004.
> [39] <#_ftnref39>  Ibid.
> [40] <#_ftnref40>  "Egypt: Country Profile 2004," The Economist Intelligence
> Unit (London: The Economist Group, 2004), in "Comparative Economic Indicators,
> 2003," bar charts, "Gross Domestic Product (US$ bn)" and "Gross Domestic
> Product per Head (US$ Œ000)," front matter.
> [41] <#_ftnref41>  Ibid., p. 35.
> [42] <#_ftnref42>  Ibid.
> [43] <#_ftnref43>  Ibid., p. 37.
> [44] <#_ftnref44>  Ibid., p. 51.
> [45] <#_ftnref45>  The New York Times, Aug. 16, 2002.
> [46] <#_ftnref46>  Ibid., Mar. 19, 2003.
> [47] <#_ftnref47>  "Middle East Partnership Initiative: Building Hope for the
> Years Ahead <http://mepi.state.gov/mepi/> ," U.S. Department of State, Dec.
> 12, 2002.
> [48] <#_ftnref48>  Edward S. Walker, "Gloomy Mood in Egypt and Saudi Arabia:
> Fear that America's Standing in the Region May Not Survive Current U.S.
> Policies toward Iraq, Terrorism, and the Peace Process," Middle East Institute
> Policy Brief, Dec. 12-19, 2002.
> [49] <#_ftnref49>  Al-Ahram Weekly, Dec. 18-24, 2003.
> [50] <#_ftnref50>  Ibid.
> [51] <#_ftnref51>  Remarks
> <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-2.html>  at the
> twentieth anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy, United States
> Chamber of Commerce, Washington, D.C., Nov. 6, 2003.
> [52] <#_ftnref52>  Al-Ahram Weekly, Feb. 3-9, 2005.
> [53] <#_ftnref53>  Ibid., Feb. 17-23, 2005.
> [54] <#_ftnref54>  The New York Times, June 6, 2004.
> [55] <#_ftnref55>  The Washington Post, Mar. 10, 2005.
> [56] <#_ftnref56>  Ibid; CNN.com, Mar. 8, 2005.
> [57] <#_ftnref57>  The Washington Post, Mar. 10, 2005.
> [58] <#_ftnref58>  Mitch McConnell, "Š Needs a U.S. Push," The Washington
> Post, Apr. 7, 2004.
> [59] <#_ftnref59>  Amr Hamzawy, "The Continued Cost of Political Stagnation in
> Egypt," Policy Outlook, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Feb. 2005,
> p. 1.
> [60] <#_ftnref60>  Daniel Sobelman, "Gamal Mubarak, President of Egypt?
> <http://www.meforum.org/article/27> " Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2001, pp.
> 31-40.
> [61] <#_ftnref61>  The Washington Post, Mar. 15, 2005.
> [62] <#_ftnref62>  Ibid., Feb. 27, 2005.
> [63] <#_ftnref63>  Ibid.
> [64] <#_ftnref64>  Ibid.
> [65] <#_ftnref65>  Moussa, "The Egyptian-American Partnership
> <http://www.sis.gov.eg/online/html2/o260320d.htm> ."
> 
> To unsubscribe from the MEF News list, go to
> http://www.meforum.org/unsubscribe.php
> To subscribe to the MEF News list, go to http://www.meforum.org/subscribe.php
> To receive alerts of MEF staff media appearances, please sign up for the MEF
> Alerts mailing list at: http://www.meforum.org/subscribe.php
> 
> You may freely forward this information, but on condition that you send the
> text as an integral whole along with complete information about its author,
> date, and source.
> 


------ End of Forwarded Message


------ End of Forwarded Message

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: http://www.islandlists.com/pipermail/mb-civic/attachments/20050808/0feae6eb/attachment-0001.htm