[Mb-civic] FW: Rubin in The Forward: "Bush Marches Into a Second Term, His Agenda Set by Mideast Foes"

[Golsorkhi]

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From: Samii Shahla <shahla at thesamiis.com>
Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2005 12:09:07 -0500
Subject: Rubin in The Forward: "Bush Marches Into a Second Term, His Agenda
Set by Mideast Foes"



Bush Marches Into a Second Term, His Agenda Set by Mideast Foes

by Michael Rubin
The Forward
January 28, 2005
http://www.meforum.org/article/674

Last week, George W. Bush took the oath of office and began his second
term. With 150,000 troops still in Iraq, Iran developing nuclear
weapons and new leadership in the Palestinian Authority, the Middle
East will continue to dominate White House attention.

To what extent will Bush's second term be different from his first? For
better or worse, not much.

Pundits who keep a scorecard of second-term appointments forget three
factors: First, this president remains firm in his views. When he
speaks about freedom, liberty and democracy, he is sincere. Second, the
rank-and-file of not only the CIA, but also of the State Department and
even many in the Pentagon, are hostile to the president's Middle East
policies.

During Bush's first term, the National Security Council failed to
impose discipline either upon policy process or execution. There is no
indication that the second term will be any different. Hostile
bureaucrats and lack of discipline lead to both stonewalling ‹ such as
with Bush's democracy initiatives ‹ and policy vacuums. Third and most
importantly, the actions of adversaries rather than the initiatives of
Washington remain the dominant factor in shaping policy.

Iraq is a case in point. Months before the June 28, 2004, dissolution
of the Coalition Provisional Authority, Ambassador L. Paul Bremer's
dictates had ceased to be relevant to most Iraqis. By day, Iraqi
politicians might go through the motions of consultation with American
diplomats, but at night, in smoky Baghdad parlors far from the Green
Zone, the Iraqis would cement deals and stake out positions. It was the
Iraqi leaders who led the drive for sovereignty, dragging a petulant
Bremer behind. While the Americans ‹ myself included ‹ pushed for
administrative federalism based upon Iraq's 18 governates, Kurdistan
Democratic Party leader Masud Barzani steadfastly filibustered and
threatened until Washington relented.

Policy initiatives subject to fierce debate in Washington will fall by
the wayside after Iraqis elect their government. Diplomats and
intelligence officials still trumpet reconciliation for Baathists.
General David Petraeus embraced the reintegration of Baathists into key
political and security positions. There are more than 900 senior
Baathists in the Interior Ministry alone. Re-Baathification might have
pleased Jordan and Saudi Arabia, but Iraqis are furious. They correlate
Washington's reconciliation policy with the growth of the insurgency.
The State Department might force a Sunni strategy but, after elections,
Iraq will simply toss it aside.

Regardless of the State Department trial balloons, there will be no
quick withdrawal from Iraq. Iraq's neighbors all wanted the United
States to succeed militarily and fail politically. Their reasons vary:
All but Iran fear consolidation of Shiite power. Turkey, Iran and Saudi
Arabia worry about a federalist precedent. Iran dreads both democracy
and Shiite voices it cannot control emanating from holy cities it does
not possess. Both Tehran and Damascus see American withdrawal as an
existential threat. Should there be any significant American pullout,
Bush would be freer to deploy them against Iran and Syria. Iraq's
neighbors will accordingly lend passive if not active support to the
insurgents to maintain a low-level conflict in Iraq. American forces
may redeploy outside the cities, but they will be needed in Iraq for a
long time to come.

With regard to Iran, the second Bush administration will replicate the
mistakes of the first. The State Department will carry the day with a
renewed effort to engage, and the Islamic Republic will be just as
willing to accede. Still more last chances allow Iran to run down the
clock toward nuclear capability, something which the clerical
leadership considers key to maintaining power.

Secretary of State nominee Condoleezza Rice is disinclined to assist
the Iranian people in their quest for freedom. Her opposition to both
Ukrainian independence and the Red Army's withdrawal from Eastern
Europe is legendary. Scratch Rice and Brent Scowcroft, the former
national security adviser who has served as Rice's mentor, oozes out.
Given a choice, Rice favors stability over liberty.

Regardless, engagement will fail for the simple reason that the
problems are more ideological than political. The Islamic Republic
predicates its existence on hatred of America and denial of Israel's
right to exist. Iran's continuing support for Al Qaeda, continued
Revolutionary Guard consolidation of power, and hardliners set to
triumph in Iran's June 2005 presidential elections all increase the
likelihood that Iranian-backed terrorists will conduct an operation
that would leave Bush little choice but to respond. Recent American
requests to station U-2 reconnaissance aircraft in Turkey should be a
warning to Tehran.

Pundits have more hope with the Arab-Israeli conflict. The State
Department is already leading the charge to restart Israeli-Palestinian
peace talks. Ultimately, they will fail.

While the Israeli government may want peace, the Palestinian leadership
values the process more. If aid again fills Palestinian coffers and
Palestinian officials are again welcomed in the White House, why make
peace? There is neither indication that states like Saudi Arabia, Syria
and Iran will cease supporting Palestinian terrorism, nor that the new
Palestinian leadership has the will to abandon terrorism, especially
since any final status agreement would mean accepting the reality that
there would be no right of Palestinian return to Israel.

Some scenarios, however, would be better than others. Perhaps the worst
option for the United States would be Prime Minister Sharon's
withdrawal from Gaza. Televised images of Hezbollah or Hamas flags
flying over former Jewish settlements would reinvigorate the insurgency
in Iraq and justify terrorism for decades more.

Bush may be a visionary. Overcoming both bureaucratic resistance and
defeatist foreign policy elites, he freed both Afghanistan and Iraq of
odious regimes. He retains moral clarity and remains committed to
introducing democracy to the region. But the path will remain rough and
the process bumpy.

Most professional diplomats treat Bush with disdain; in Baghdad, they
did not hesitate to make their personal views known to foreign
counterparts. Large-scale initiatives like the Middle East Partnership
Initiative will likely fall flat, not because the program lacks
importance, but rather because there is insufficient desire among
professional diplomats to see it succeed.

When the White House inserts political appointees into Foggy Bottom,
career Foreign Service officers up to the assistant secretary level
simply channel information and decisions away from them. Bush's
policies not only threat the status quo on which professional
diplomats' careers have been built, but also the relationships with
Arab elites upon which many cash in after retirement. Dissidents like
Fathi El-Jahmy remain in jail in Libya. Assistant Secretary of State
William Burns has refused to predicate future negotiations with Libyan
strongman Muammar Gadhafi upon this dissident's release.

The rollercoaster ride will continue. Bush's second term might not
bring Arab democracy, but it will not revert to pre-September 11
realism either. Bush's second-term team may welcome engagement and the
peace process, but they cannot escape the reality of the adversaries
they face, nor can they expect to make concessions to terrorism and
blackmail without engendering more. It will be a rough ride. There will
be many obstacles ‹ many thrown up by Bush's own team ‹ but there will
be no turning back.

Michael Rubin, a former political adviser to the Coalition Provisional
Authority in Iraq, is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise
Institute and editor of the Middle East Quarterly.

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