[Mb-civic] SUGGESTED READ-FW: Will Washington Support Democracy inIran?

[Robin McNamara]

Right On Michael !

Peace
Robin
----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Michael Butler" <michael at michaelbutler.com>
To: "Civic" <mb-civic at islandlists.com>
Sent: Sunday, February 13, 2005 3:12 PM
Subject: [Mb-civic] SUGGESTED READ-FW: Will Washington Support Democracy 
inIran?


This is a worthwhile article about the current situation.
For certain the current regime in Iran was/is far more dangerous to world
security than Iraq ever was.
Planning a pushover our neocons sure blew it. They picked on the local bully
ignoring the monster.
Michael

------ Forwarded Message
From: Golsorkhi <grgolsorkhi at earthlink.net>
Date: Sun, 13 Feb 2005 14:06:52 -0500
To: <michael at michaelbutler.com>
Subject: FW: Will Washington Support Democracy in Iran?


------ Forwarded Message
From: Samii Shahla <shahla at thesamiis.com>
Date: Sat, 12 Feb 2005 17:07:39 -0500
Subject: Will Washington Support Democracy in Iran?

Will Washington Support Democracy in Iran?

by Michael Rubin
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs: Issue Brief
February 13, 2005
http://www.meforum.org/article/680
    ?
After a first term marked by schizophrenic Iran policy initiatives, the
Bush White House will soon develop a coordinated policy to promote
peaceful regime change in Iran. The Bush administration is heartened by
the apparent success of the Iraqi election and believes that Iranians
are ready to exert their democratic rights.
    ?
Bush policy is motivated by the grave and growing threat from the
Islamic Republic's nuclear weapons program, and the realization that
neither Iran nor the European Union are sincere in preventing Iran's
acquisition of nuclear weaponry. The Islamic Republic's potential
threat to American security emanates from Tehran's determination to
develop satellite launching capability which could well substitute as
an intercontinental ballistic missile delivery system as well as from
the regime's continued sponsorship of terrorists.
    ?
A new U.S. policy will also recognize that the dichotomy within Iran is
not one of reformers versus hardliners within the Islamic Republic, but
rather proponents of democracy versus proponents of theocracy. Even if
Iranian acquisition of nuclear capability is inevitable, the threat
comes from the nature of the regime rather than from the Iranian
people.
    ?
As hardline ideologues consolidate power in Tehran, Iran will mark a
number of important anniversaries which might spur ordinary people to
agitate against their government and for democracy as they call for a
new national referendum on the future of Iran.

A Stalemated Iran Policy

In his January 20, 2005, inaugural speech, President George W. Bush
declared, "America will not pretend that jailed dissidents prefer their
chains, or that women welcome humiliation and servitude." Less than two
weeks later, Bush argued in his State of the Union address that "the
victory of freedom in Iraq will...inspire democratic reformers from
Damascus to Tehran." Such statements are not mere rhetoric, but mark a
new willingness to advance democracy in Iran.

During Bush's first term in office, the U.S. government lacked an Iran
policy. The State Department, Pentagon, Central Intelligence Agency,
and Treasury Department twice failed to reach consensus on a National
Security Policy Directive. Neither then-National Security Advisor
Condoleezza Rice nor the President forced the issue. As a result,
American policy was schizophrenic. While Bush labeled Iran as part of
the "Axis of Evil" in his January 2002 State of the Union Address,
Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage described Iran as a
"democracy."1

With no clear White House policy direction, Senate Republicans likewise
took contradictory positions. While Arlen Specter (Pennsylvania) dined
with the Iranian ambassador to the United Nations,2 Sam Brownback
(Kansas) introduced an Iran Freedom and Democracy Support Act which
would have created a $50 million fund to support opposition satellite
stations and civil society.

State Department lawyers, meanwhile, argued that non-interference
clauses in the 1980 Algiers Accords, the agreement which had led to the
release of the U.S. embassy hostages, prohibited funding of opposition
media. Retired National Security Advisors, though, disputed the State
Department's line.3 In recent weeks, the White House legal office has
opined that nothing in the Accords prevents assistance to Iranian
democrats.

New National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley's decision to remove
Richard Haass protégé Meghan O'Sullivan from the Iran portfolio (she
retains her position as senior director for Iraq at the National
Security Council) also bodes well for a more activist policy,
especially as the new National Security team again reviews Washington's
policy - or lack thereof - toward Tehran. O'Sullivan had long been both
dismissive of Iranian dissidents and a proponent of engaging the
Islamic Republic.



Why Now?

The Bush administration's new focus on Iran is a reflection not only of
the President's sincere conviction that the Iranian people deserve
freedom and liberty, but also of the belief that the United States
cannot live with a nuclear Islamic Republic of Iran. While many
European officials and American academics describe Iranian politicians
like former president and current Expediency Council chairman 'Ali
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani as a pragmatist,4 U.S. policymakers do not
dismiss his December 14, 2001, threats to initiate a nuclear first
strike against Israel,5 nor do they dismiss as rhetoric banners reading
"Israel must be uprooted and erased from history," draped over
medium-range Shihab-3 missiles in a September 22, 2003, military
parade.6

The Islamic Republic's potential threat to American security is just as
serious, though, both because of Tehran's determination to develop
satellite launching capability which could well substitute as an
intercontinental ballistic missile delivery system,7 and because of the
regime's continued sponsorship of terrorists. American officials
continue to blame Iranian intelligence for planning the 1996 bombing of
an American military barracks in Khobar, Saudi Arabia.8 The 9/11
Commission's bipartisan intelligence review found that the Iranian
regime lent passive support to many of the 9/11 hijackers, between
eight and ten of whom transited Iran in the year before the attack.9
Washington also takes seriously reports that Iranian authorities have
sheltered senior al-Qaeda figures in Revolutionary Guard bases near the
Caspian town of Chalus.10

While some editorialists and politicians argue that Washington should
support the diplomacy of the European Union troika of London, Paris and
Berlin, many European diplomats and analysts privately acknowledge that
they believe Tehran's acquisition of a nuclear bomb to be inevitable, a
tacit admission that European diplomacy is a charade. American
officials may not be so blunt, but many believe their European
counterparts care more about the preservation of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty than they do about Iran going nuclear. If the
European Union allows the Islamic Republic to negotiate acquisition of
nuclear capability, then they need not admit the emptiness of the
current non-proliferation regime.

Even if Iran's acquisition of the bomb is inevitable, to American
strategists, the question is not whether the United States can live
with a nuclear Iran, but rather whether the United States can live with
a nuclear Islamic Republic of Iran. To many Bush administration
officials, the danger is not necessarily that the Islamic Republic
would use its nuclear weapon against the United States, but rather that
the feeling of immunity from retaliation that a nuclear capability
might lend regime ideologues would lead to an increase in terrorism in
the Middle East and Europe, and violent attempts to subvert Iraq and
Afghanistan. Iranian authorities, for example, ignored numerous Turkish
diplomatic demarches, and only scaled back support for Kurdistan
Workers Party [PKK] terrorists operating in Turkey after the Turkish
Air Force bombed the Iranian border town of Piranshahr.11 Had the
Islamic Republic enjoyed a potential nuclear retaliation capability,
Turkish authorities could likely have not forced an abandonment of
Tehran's PKK support. Meanwhile, American authorities are increasingly
concerned by the resurgence of the Revolutionary Guards within the
Islamic Republic's political class. Revolutionary Guard influence has
been most recently evidenced by their effective veto of Turkish
commercial involvement in the communications sector and Tehran's new
airport.12

Such concerns - and the unwillingness to assume that regime ideologues
will not try to act upon their deeply-held beliefs about the United
States and Israel - are responsible for the current debate about the
efficacy of military action. While targeted strikes on nuclear and
ballistic missile sites might not eliminate the Islamic Republic's
capability, the question is whether they could delay Tehran's nuclear
ambitions beyond the lifespan of the Islamic Republic.



Are Iranians Ready for Democracy?

The best option from an American point of view would be a peaceful
transition of power leading to an Iranian abandonment of the Islamic
Republic's more threatening convictions. The relevant question
therefore becomes whether the Iranian people are ready for democracy
and, if so, when they might rise up and demand real rather than
cosmetic rights. No one in Washington seeks to use military force to
oust the Iranian regime, and rumors that the U.S. government even
considered lending support to the Mujahidin al-Khalq are without basis.
Democracy advocates within the Bush administration are likely to ask
whether they can take any actions which would catalyze the Iranian
people's ability to replicate last year's peaceful revolutions in
Georgia and the Ukraine.

Both anecdotal and statistical evidence indicate the Iranian people are
ready for change. While some outside analysts continue to speak of a
dichotomy between hardliners and reformers, most Iranians now accept
that the political tension within Iran is between regime and dissident.
On December 6, 2004, students heckled Mohammad Khatami, chanting "Shame
on you" and "Where are your promised freedoms?"13

In August 2002, the Tarrance Group, a professional polling outfit,
conducted a survey of Iranian public opinion. They randomized the last
four digits of every Tehran telephone exchange, and surveyed residents
rich and poor. Just 21 percent of the statistically-representative
sample of more than 500 people said that the Guardian Council
represented the will of the Iranian people, while only 19 percent
supported a politically-active clergy. The poll also found significant
economic malaise, perhaps motivating the disillusionment with their
leadership. Only 16 percent felt that their economic situation had
improved during the Khatami years, while 68 percent said their family's
financial situation had declined since the Islamic Revolution.14

A quarter century of theocracy has moderated the Iranian people. While
studying in Iran in 1996 and 1999, many Iranians told me they supported
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini less out of an endorsement of his views
than out of a reaction to the dictatorship of the Shah. While American
and European intellectuals may criticize Bush's "Axis of Evil" rhetoric
as simplistic, the fact remains that there is a correlation between
Bush's moral clarity and the willingness of Iranians to take to the
street, as they did en masse in July 1999,15 October 2001,16 November
2002,17 and July 2003,18 and at a number of more localized
demonstrations.19



Historic Opportunity: The Call for a Referendum

Iranians, inheritors of a 2,500-year-old culture, are far more
historically aware than many in the West. Recent democratic
developments in Iran coincide with a number of symbolic anniversaries.
December 2005 marks the hundredth anniversary of the start of Iran's
Constitutional Revolution when merchants, liberals, clergy, and
nationalists rose up to demand basic rights in the face of an
autocratic ruler. After a year of struggle, the Shah granted the
Iranian people a constitution. In December 2006, Iranians may ask why
their forefathers had rights today's Iranians no longer enjoy.

On April 1, 2004, Iranians marked a more recent anniversary - the
25-year anniversary of Khomeini's declaration of an Islamic Republic.
On that day, Khomeini announced the results of a referendum asking a
simple question: "Do you want an Islamic Republic." Ninety-eight
percent of Iranian voters said "Yes." "By casting a decisive vote in
favor of the Islamic Republic," Khomeini told an enthusiastic crowd,
"you have established a government of divine justice." Increasingly,
though, a growing and disparate number of Iranian groups are suggesting
that Iran is ready for a new referendum.20 Many Iranians suggest a
simple question, "Theocracy or democracy." The Tarrance Group poll
found that 71 percent of Iranians would favor such a poll.21 While it
is not likely that the Islamic Republic's leadership would ever consent
to an internationally-supervised referendum - they understand the
contempt with which most of their charges view them - such a referendum
would better focus international attention on the fundamental issue of
the Islamic Republic's lack of legitimacy and moral bankruptcy.

Into this tinderbox was inserted the success of Iraq's January 30,
2005, elections, that country's first free poll in a half century. It
is a juxtaposition Iranians - many of whom believe themselves to be
culturally superior to their Arab neighbors - cannot miss. In June
2005, Iranians will march to the polls to elect a president. Under the
terms of the Islamic Republic's constitution, the new president will
have only limited power and will remain subordinate to the unelected
Supreme Leader, Ayatollah 'Ali Khameini. While the unelected Guardian
Council in Iran severely limits the choice of candidates in Iran,
Iranians have already noted the full range of candidates allowed to
compete in Iraq's elections. Many European, American, and Arab
commentators sought to correlate voter turnout with election legitimacy
in Iraq. The same standards might be applied to Iran, where many
Iranians may choose to stay home as Iranian pilgrims in Iraq estimated
that 80 percent of their compatriots did during the February 2004
Majlis elections.

After four years of policy ambiguity, the Bush administration will
finally make a concerted approach to change the status quo in Iran.
European officials may calculate they can live with a nuclear Islamic
Republic of Iran, but they are wrong. If the current regime goes
nuclear, Iran will unleash a new and potentially devastating wave of
terrorism which will end any hope for stabilization in Iraq and
Afghanistan, and peace in the Middle East. The White House is right to
pursue democratization as a solution. Europe would be wise to hope for
its success because the alternative for Washington might not be
acceptance of a nuclear Iran, but rather military action.
---
Michael Rubin, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute,
is editor of the Middle East Quarterly. He served as an Iran and Iraq
staff advisor to the Office of the Secretary of Defense between 2002
and 2004.

Notes

1. Robin Wright, "U.S. Now Views Iran in More Favorable Light; a Top
Official Makes a Distinction between the regime in Tehran and those of
fellow 'axis of evil' members North Korea and Iraq," Los Angeles Times,
February 14, 2003.
2. Robin Wright, "Activity Heats Up as U.S. and Iran Flirt with Closer
Ties," Washington Post, February 1, 2004.
3. Michael Ledeen, "Act on Iran," Wall Street Journal, October 23, 2002.
4. Reuel Marc Gerecht, "Going Soft on Iran," Weekly Standard, March 8,
2004.
5. Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, December 14, 2001.
6. Ron Kampeas, "As Palestinian Picture Improves, Ominous Signs About
Iranian Nukes," Jewish Telegraphic Agency, November 22, 2004.
7. "Iranian 'Sputnik' Could be Trojan Horse for Tehran's Ballistic
Missile Program," Aviation Week Group, November 28, 2004.
8. The 9-11 Commission Report, p. 60.
9. The 9-11 Commission Report, p. 240. Also see: "Iran's Link to
al-Qaeda: What the 9-11 Commission Found," Middle East Quarterly (Fall
2004).
10. "Nearly 400 al-Qaeda members and other terror suspects in Iran,"
Agence France Presse, July 15, 2004.
11. "Iran Accuses Turkish Jets of Bombing its Territory," Associated
Press, July 18, 1999.
12. Karl Vick, "Politics on Collision Course at Shuttered Iranian
Airport," Washington Post, August 10, 2004.
13. "Students Heckle Iranian President," BBC News, December 6, 2004;
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4072887.stm
14. Public Opinion Survey in Iran, August 23-28, 2002, Tarrance Group.
15. "Fateful Moment in Iran," New York Times, July 14, 1999.
16. "Tehran Gripped by Pro-Western Street Violence," Independent,
October 27, 2001.
17. "Iranian Student Protestors Call Referendum on Hard-Line Rulers,"
New York Times, November 29, 2002.
18. "Student Leaders Seized by Vigilantes in Iran," New York Times,
July 10, 2003.
19. See reporting, for example, of the Student Movement Coordination
Committee for Democracy in Iran, www.daneshjoo.org
20. Eli Lake, "Iranian Democrats Establish a United Front," New York
Sun, December 7, 2004.
21. Public Opinion Survey in Iran, August 23-28, 2002, Tarrance Group.

---
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