[Mb-civic] FW: A good next step in Iran: restore diplomatic ties (
? )
Golsorkhi
grgolsorkhi at earthlink.net
Thu Jan 6 06:58:05 PST 2005
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From: Samii Shahla <shahla at thesamiis.com>
Date: Wed, 5 Jan 2005 19:06:46 -0500
Subject: A good next step in Iran: restore diplomatic ties ( ? )
The Christian Science Monitor
January 06, 2005
A good next step in Iran: restore diplomatic ties
By Pat M. Holt
WASHINGTON - An early test for President Bush in his second term is
likely to be multiple problems in Iran. There is a dispute between Iran
and the International Atomic Energy Agency over Iranian development of
nuclear fuels. The US and its European allies (Britain, France, and
Germany) are not agreed on what to do. The Bush administration thinks
the Europeans are too soft. The Europeans think the US is too hard. On
another problem, Iraq and Jordan say that Iran is intervening in the
Iraqi elections scheduled for Jan. 30.
Through all of this, Iran is and has been divided between
fundamentalist and moderate Muslims. It began with a 1921 coup staged
by Reza Pahlavi, an officer in the Persian Cossack Brigade. By 1925, he
had consolidated the army's loyalty, improved public order, and
proclaimed himself shah. He negotiated improved terms with Britain on
an oil concession dating from 1901. Educational and judicial reforms
deprived the Muslim clergy of much of its influence. Divorce laws were
liberalized, and women were no longer required to wear the veil. When
Reza Shah Pahlavi turned to Germany to counteract Russian influence, he
was overthrown by an Anglo-Soviet invasion in 1941. He was succeeded by
his son, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, who turned out also to be a social
reformer.
Enter Muhammad Mossadeq, a popular nationalist politician and member of
the Majlis, the Iranian parliament. In March 1951, the Majlis passed a
bill sponsored by Mossadeq nationalizing the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.
The shah appointed Mossadeq prime minister. The British and Americans
saw the nationalization as a threat to other Western oil companies
throughout the Middle East. As Mossadeq's power grew, the shah's
declined. When the shah went into exile in August 1953, the CIA and its
British counterpart, MI6, organized street mobs fueled with an abundant
supply of small-denomination bills, and drove Mossadeq from office. The
shah returned.
He was no less a social reformer than before, but this time a
hard-fisted one. He cleared the way for land reform and introduced
profit-sharing in industry. He allowed cultural symbols of
modernization such as movie houses and women in Western dress (even
blue jeans) on the street.
President Nixon sent CIA Director Richard Helms to Tehran as
ambassador. The CIA, along with the Israeli intelligence service
Mossad, helped organize SAVAK, the shah's no-nonsense intelligence
service. The US Embassy acquiesced in the shah's insistence that it
rely on SAVAK for internal Iranian intelligence, forgoing independent
reporting. SAVAK agents spied on Iranian students in American
universities. Large sums were spent on American military and police
equipment. When conservative Muslims protested social reforms and
modernization programs, the shah cracked down. Protests became violent
and so did the police.
Each major collision was reported in the Western press. Newspaper
stories clearly indicated that the shah's days were numbered. These
stories were apparently not read in the intelligence community or White
House, where there is a tendency to discount anything that may be
common knowledge but is not stamped TOP SECRET. Thus, the CIA in August
1978 stated: "Iran is not in a revolutionary or even a
'prerevolutionary' situation." The Defense Intelligence Agency in
September 1978: The shah "is expected to remain actively in power over
the next 10 years." President Carter at a press conference Dec. 12,
1978: "I fully expect the shah to maintain power in Iran." In February
1979, the shah was overthrown by a radical fundamentalist Muslim
regime. In November 1979 mobs seized the American Embassy in Tehran and
held the staff there hostage until January 1981.
Here was an intelligence failure comparable to that leading to 9/11.
Gary Sick, the National Security Council staff officer for Iran in
1979, explained it as "not so much a failure of sources or observation
or data as a structural inadequacy of the system."
Iran's moderates have since gained enough power to elect a president,
but the conservative clergy limits what he can do. It is in the US
national interest that the moderates prevail. The chances for this are
better in Iran than anywhere else in the Middle East. This would give
Bush what he wanted, but probably won't get, in Iraq, and at a much
cheaper price.
A good first step would be to restore diplomatic relations. This would
do more than provide a channel for communications. It would establish a
US presence, including business and cultural institutions.
Pat M. Holt is former chief of staff of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. He wrote the book 'Secret Intelligence and Public Policy: A
Dilemma of Democracy.'
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Copyright © 2005 The Christian Science Monitor. All rights reserved.
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