[Mb-civic] FW: Fall '04 MEQ on "Iran's Al-Qaeda Link"

[Golsorkhi]

------ Forwarded Message
From: Samii Shahla <shahla at thesamiis.com>
Date: Tue, 18 Jan 2005 13:48:00 -0500
Subject: Fall '04 MEQ on "Iran's Al-Qaeda Link"



Begin forwarded message:

>
> Iran's Al-Qaeda Link: What the 9-11 Commission Found
>
> Middle East Quarterly
> Fall 2004
> http://www.meforum.org/article/670
>
> While the State Department's Patterns of Global Terrorism‹2003 report
> [1] labeled Iran "the most active state sponsor of terrorism in 2003,"
> the Bush administration has yet to agree on a national security
> presidential directive to define U.S. policy toward the Islamic
> Republic.[2] Meanwhile, Tehran continues to edge closer to nuclear
> capability.[3]
>
> The following are excerpts from the 9/11 Commission Report, an
> unclassified version of which was released to the public on July 22,
> 2004.[4] The commission interviewed more than 1,000 people in ten
> countries and conducted an unprecedented review of U.S. intelligence.
> Among its findings, excerpted below, was evidence of a significant and
> continuing relationship between al-Qaeda and the Islamic Republic of
> Iran.‹The Editors
>
> Iran and Khobar Towers‹1996
>
> On June 26, 1996, a truck bomb ripped through an apartment complex in
> Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing nineteen U.S. servicemen. In 1997, the
> Washington Post reported that the Saudi Hezbollah operatives suspected
> of carrying out the attack were associated with Brigadier Ahmad
> Sharifi, an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commander.[5] In
> passing, the 9-11 Commission reiterated the likelihood that Iranian
> officials played a major role in attacking U.S. forces:
>
> In June 1996, an enormous truck bomb detonated in the Khobar Towers
> residential complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, that housed U.S. Air
> Force personnel. Nineteen Americans were killed, and 372 were wounded.
> The operation was carried out principally, perhaps exclusively, by
> Saudi Hezbollah, an organization that had received support from the
> government of Iran. While the evidence of Iranian involvement is
> strong, there are also signs that al Qaeda played some role, as yet
> unknown.[6]
>
> Did Iran Train Al-Qaeda?
>
> Between 1991 and 1996, Osama bin Laden lived in Sudan where he was
> protected by Hassan Abdullah at-Turabi, the leader of Sudan's National
> Islamic Front, an Islamist movement. According to the 9-11 Commission,
> Sudanese officials facilitated meetings between al-Qaeda operatives
> and Iranian officials, a relationship which blossomed into tactical
> training:
>
> Turabi sought to persuade Shiites and Sunnis to put aside their
> divisions and join against the common enemy. In late 1991 or 1992,
> discussions in Sudan between al Qaeda and Iranian operatives led to an
> informal agreement to cooperate in providing support‹even if only
> training‹for actions carried out primarily against Israel and the
> United States. Not long afterward, senior al Qaeda operatives and
> trainers traveled to Iran to receive training in explosives. In the
> fall of 1993, another such delegation went to the Bekaa Valley in
> Lebanon for further training in explosives as well as in intelligence
> and security. Bin Ladin reportedly showed particular interest in
> learning how to use truck bombs such as the one that had killed 241
> U.S. Marines in Lebanon in 1983. The relationship between al Qaeda and
> Iran demonstrated that Sunni-Shia divisions did not necessarily pose
> an insurmountable barrier to cooperation in terrorist operations.[7]
>
> Did Iran Aid Terrorist Transit?
>
> In 1996, after the Taliban seized power, Osama bin Laden relocated to
> Afghanistan where he established a number of terrorist training camps.
> Al-Qaeda training attracted a steady stream of young Islamists, many
> of whom transited Iran. While Iranian border officials normally stamp
> passports, they made an exception for many Al-Qaeda terrorists. The
> 9-11 Commission explained how this facilitated Al-Qaeda operations:
>
> Certain al Qaeda members were charged with organizing passport
> collection schemes to keep the pipeline of fraudulent documents
> flowing. To this end, al Qaeda required jihadists to turn in their
> passports before going to the front lines in Afghanistan. If they were
> killed, their passports were recycled for use. The operational mission
> training course taught operatives how to forge documents. Certain
> passport alteration methods, which included substituting photos and
> erasing and adding travel cachets, were also taught. Manuals
> demonstrating the technique for "cleaning" visas were reportedly
> circulated among operatives. Mohammed Atta [a 9-11 hijacker] and
> Zakariya Essabar [an Al-Qaeda member whose U.S. visa was rejected,
> preventing him from participating in the 9-11 hijackings] were
> reported to have been trained in passport alteration. The purpose of
> all this training was twofold: to develop an institutional capacity
> for document forgery and to enable operatives to make necessary
> adjustments in the field. It was well-known, for example, that if a
> Saudi traveled to Afghanistan via Pakistan, then on his return to
> Saudi Arabia his passport, bearing a Pakistani stamp, would be
> confiscated. So operatives either erased the Pakistani visas from
> their passports or traveled through Iran, which did not stamp visas
> directly into passports.[8]
>
> Iranian Support for the 9/11 Terrorists
>
> Iranian support for Al-Qaeda continued to increase, even as Clinton
> administration officials sought to extend an olive branch to the
> Islamic Republic.[9] The 9-11 Commission documented at length Iran's
> continuing assistance to Al-Qaeda and recommended that the U.S.
> government further investigate Iranian links to Al-Qaeda:
>
> While in Sudan, senior managers in al Qaeda maintained contacts with
> Iran and the Iranian-supported worldwide terrorist organization
> Hezbollah, which is based mainly in southern Lebanon and Beirut. Al
> Qaeda members received advice and training from Hezbollah.
> Intelligence indicates the persistence of contacts between Iranian
> security officials and senior al Qaeda figures after bin Ladin's
> return to Afghanistan. Khallad [bin Attash, a high-level Al-Qaeda
> operative[10]] has said that Iran made a concerted effort to
> strengthen relations with al Qaeda after the October 2000 attack on
> the USS Cole, but was rebuffed because bin Ladin did not want to
> alienate his supporters in Saudi Arabia. Khallad and other detainees
> have described the willingness of Iranian officials to facilitate the
> travel of al Qaeda members through Iran, on their way to and from
> Afghanistan. For example, Iranian border inspectors would be told not
> to place telltale stamps in the passports of these travelers. Such
> arrangements were particularly beneficial to Saudi members of al
> Qaeda. Our knowledge of the international travels of the al Qaeda
> operatives selected for the 9/11 operation remains fragmentary. But we
> now have evidence suggesting that 8 to 10 of the 14 Saudi "muscle"
> operatives traveled into or out of Iran between October 2000 and
> February 2001.
>
> In October 2000, a senior operative of Hezbollah visited Saudi Arabia
> to coordinate activities there. He also planned to assist individuals
> in Saudi Arabia in traveling to Iran during November. A top Hezbollah
> commander and Saudi Hezbollah contacts were involved. Also in October
> 2000, two future muscle hijackers, Mohand al Shehri and Hamza al
> Ghamdi, flew from Iran to Kuwait. In November, Ahmed al Ghamdi
> apparently flew to Beirut, traveling‹perhaps by coincidence‹on the
> same flight as a senior Hezbollah operative. Also, in November, Salem
> al Hazmi apparently flew from Saudi Arabia to Beirut.
>
> In mid-November, we believe, three of the future muscle hijackers,
> Wail al Shehri, Waleed al Shehri, and Ahmed al Nami, all of whom had
> obtained their U.S. visas in late October, traveled in a group from
> Saudi Arabia to Beirut and then onward to Iran. An associate of a
> senior Hezbollah operative was on the same flight that took the future
> hijackers to Iran. Hezbollah officials in Beirut and Iran were
> expecting the arrival of a group during the same time period. The
> travel of this group was important enough to merit the attention of
> senior figures in Hezbollah.
>
> Later in November, two future muscle hijackers, Satam al Suqami and
> Majed Moqed, flew into Iran from Bahrain. In February 2001, Khalid al
> Mihdhar may have taken a flight from Syria to Iran, and then traveled
> further within Iran to a point near the Afghan border.
>
> KSM [Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the alleged mastermind of the 9-11
> attacks who is now in custody[11]] and [Ramzi] Binalshibh [an al Qaeda
> operative captured in Pakistan a year after the attacks who
> acknowledged a planning role[12]] have confirmed that several of the
> 9/11 hijackers (at least eight, according to Binalshibh) transited
> Iran on their way to or from Afghanistan, taking advantage of the
> Iranian practice of not stamping Saudi passports. They deny any other
> reason for the hijackers' travel to Iran. They also deny any
> relationship between the hijackers and Hezbollah.
>
> In sum, there is strong evidence that Iran facilitated the transit of
> al Qaeda members into and out of Afghanistan before 9/11, and that
> some of these were future 9/11 hijackers. There also is circumstantial
> evidence that senior Hezbollah operatives were closely tracking the
> travel of some of these future muscle hijackers into Iran in November
> 2000. However, we cannot rule out the possibility of a remarkable
> coincidence‹that is, that Hezbollah was actually focusing on some
> other group of individuals traveling from Saudi Arabia during this
> same time frame, rather than the future hijackers.
>
> We have found no evidence that Iran or Hezbollah was aware of the
> planning for what later became the 9/11 attack. At the time of their
> travel through Iran, the al Qaeda operatives themselves were probably
> not aware of the specific details of their future operation.
>
> After 9/11, Iran and Hezbollah wished to conceal any past evidence of
> cooperation with Sunni terrorists associated with al Qaeda. A senior
> Hezbollah official disclaimed any Hezbollah involvement in 9/11. We
> believe this topic requires further investigation by the U.S.
> government.[13]
>
> [1] Patterns of Global Terrorism‹2003 (Washington, D.C.: Secretary of
> State and the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. State Department,
> Apr. 2004).
> [2] Los Angeles Times, Sept. 12, 2004.
> [3] "A Turning Point? George W. Bush, John Kerry and American Policy
> toward Iran," John R. Bolton, under secretary of state for arms
> control and international security, address to the Hudson Institute,
> Washington, D.C., Aug 17, 2004.
> [4] 9-11 Commission Report (Washington, D.C.: The National Commission
> on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, July 22, 2004).
> [5] The Washington Post. June 28, 1997.
> [6] "The Foundation of the New Terrorism," 9-11 Commission Report, p.
> 60.
> [7] Ibid., p. 61.
> [8] "Al Qaeda Aims at the American Homeland," ibid., p. 169.
> [9] Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, remarks before the
> American-Iranian Council, Mar. 17, 2000.
> [10] The Christian Science Monitor, Apr. 19, 2004.
> [11] "Progress Report on the Global War on Terrorism," White House,
> Sept. 2003.
> [12] CNN.com, Sept. 17, 2002.
> [13] "The Attack Looms," 9-11 Commission Report, pp. 240-1.
>


------ End of Forwarded Message