[Mb-civic] Now for the counter-revolution

Michael Butler michael at michaelbutler.com
Fri Mar 11 11:07:39 PST 2005



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Now for the counter-revolution
Mar 10th 2005
>From The Economist print edition


Lebanese who welcome Syrian occupation confront those who abhor it

AP
AP


IT IS not a new question: it is, in fact, the very question that sparked the
civil war that tore the country apart. A speaker at one of many giant
rallies in Beirut put it simply. Is Lebanon to stand with Syria at the heart
of Arabism, or is it to join what he called ³the Israeli-American project²?

Just last week, the answer looked clear. Tens of thousands of flag-waving
Lebanese took to the streets to demand an end to Syrian meddling, the
withdrawal of its troops and justice for the killers of Rafik Hariri, the
political strongman whose assassination last month looked to many like
Syria¹s handiwork. The pro-Syrian government abruptly resigned. Shaken by
the rare show of unity between Lebanon¹s main Sunni Muslim, Christian and
Druze parties and isolated by international opprobrium, Syria grudgingly
announced that it would pull back its forces. Lebanon, it seemed, was to be
the next Ukraine. Freed from Syria¹s yoke, it would return to its
pre-civil-war status as a beacon of democratic light in a dim region.

This week, the answer looked less clear, as Syria¹s allies recovered their
balance. The most powerful of these by far, the Shia party-cum-militia
Hizbullah, called out a demonstration that dwarfed previous displays of
people power. In a rock-concert setting, with the vast throng roused by such
stirring songs as ³America, Mother of Terror², Hizbullah¹s charismatic
leader, Hassan Nasrallah, declared resoundingly that this was not Ukraine.
Lebanon would never renounce resistance to Israel.

His supporters, many of them black-shirted or veiled, working-class Shias,
presented a stark contrast to the young, jeans-clad and largely Christian
anti-Syrian protesters who had enlivened Lebanese television screens for the
previous month. Hizbullah¹s turnout of 500,000 was a blunt reminder of the
changing demographics that have made the once-marginalised Shias the largest
of the country¹s sects. And not only are they well-organised, they are
armed. Hizbullah¹s 20,000-strong militia was exempted from the general
disarmament agreed by other parties at the conclusion of the civil war in
1990.

Hizbullah¹s muscle-flexing has strengthened Syria¹s hand. On Thursday March
10th, Lebanon¹s collaborationist president, Emile Lahoud, reappointed as
prime minister the similarly pro-Syrian Omar Karami, whose government
resigned last month, but who was renominated by parliament this week. Mr
Karami said that he will now try to bring opposition figures into a
government of national unity. If they refuse, he warned, ³it means we are
heading to destruction.²

Mr Lahoud's reinstatement of the old prime minister has, predictably, gone
down badly in western capitals; so too has his decision to ignore a key
demand by the opposition, to dismiss the heads of Lebanon¹s tainted security
forces. More ominously, incidents of intimidation have begun to multiply,
including threats and gunshots aimed at suspected opposition supporters.

Yet optimism survives. The pro- and anti-Syrian camps are less polarised
than they may appear. Both declare the importance of Lebanese sovereignty.
Even Mr Nasrallah accepts the need for Syrian troops to leave. Both camps
say they forswear the use of force and are committed both to the principles
of democracy and to the Taif Accords, the agreement that ended the war by
reapportioning powers among the country¹s 18 religious confessions.

In fact, only one issue really divides them. A UN Security Council
resolution passed last year calls not only for Syrian withdrawal, but also
for disbanding all local militias. To many Lebanese, tired of their country
being an occasional punch-bag for Israel, this obviously includes
Hizbullah¹s ³resistance² forces. But to other Lebanese who share Hizbullah¹s
view of Israel as a mortal threat, the maintenance of an armed deterrent is
non-negotiable.

Hizbullah is popular because its fighters humiliated Israel, forcing an end
to its 22-year occupation of southern Lebanon in 2000. Many Lebanese share
the general Arab view that Israel and America seek regional hegemony. The
crushing of the Palestinian intifada, America¹s Iraqi adventure, the
pressure it has applied to Iran and Syria and its promotion of democracy are
all seen as part of this ³project². Abandoning Lebanon¹s ³resistance² would
thus be seen as part of a wider capitulation.

Yet even Hizbullah must eventually realise that times have changed. Syria,
the linchpin of Arab resistance, is economically, militarily and
strategically weak, not to mention ideologically bankrupt. All other Arab
governments, many Palestinians and a good half of the Lebanese are weary of
resisting what is, ultimately, the rest of the world¹s desire for peace.
Perhaps what Lebanon needs is a formula that allows it to retain its Arabism
while being part of that dreaded American project.



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