[Mb-civic] Tomgram: Dilip Hiro on Playing the Democracy Card

[Michael Butler]

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Tomgram: Dilip Hiro on Playing the Democracy Card

This post can be found at http://www.tomdispatch.com/index.mhtml?pid=2268

Have we really almost rolled around -- yet again -- to the anniversary of
the invasion of Iraq, this time amid much Bush administration and neocon
self-congratulation, as well as media congratulations (grudging or
otherwise) for an Iraqi-election-inspired spread of democracy in the Middle
East? And what will we be congratulating ourselves on next year, when the
usefulness of "democracy" passes, oil prices continue to rise, and the war
in Iraq grinds on?

Right now, we're in "Arab Spring," "the Cedar revolution," "a mighty storm,"
and opinions on what's actually going on in the Middle East are varied
indeed. Youssef M. Ibrahim, a thoughtful former New York Times reporter,
writes from Dubai for the Washington Post:

    "Listen to the conversations in the cafes on the edge of the creek that
runs through this Persian Gulf city, and it is hard to believe that the
George W. Bush being praised by Arab diners is the same George W. Bush who
has been widely excoriated in these parts ever since he took officeŠ
Nowadays, intellectuals, businessmen and working-class people alike can be
caught lauding Bush's hard-edged posture on democracy and cheering his
handling of Arab rulers who are U.S. alliesŠ It's enough for someone like
me, who has felt that Bush's attitude toward the Mideast has been all wrong,
to wonder whether his idea of setting the Muslim house in order is right."

Or could it be, as Robert Kuttner suggested recently in the American
Prospect magazine, that democracy is indeed threatening to break out in the
Middle East, but no thanks to Bush? Or are the Bush people just using a new
"Arab Spring" logo to "rebrand" their failing efforts, as Naomi Klein
suggests in the Nation? ("Faced with an Arab world enraged by its occupation
of Iraq and its blind support for Israel, the US solution is not to change
these brutal policies; it is, in the pseudo-academic language of corporate
branding, to 'change the story.'")

Or is it possible, as conservative Toronto Sun columnist Eric Margolis
proposes, that the man responsible for springtime in Lebanon is not George
Bush, but Osama bin Laden, and that the democratic reforms breaking out in
American client states in the Middle East are mostly "pure sham"? Or could
it be that, in Lebanon at least, we've confused the urge of a significant
segment of the public to be free of an occupying force with "democracy."
After all, as Juan Cole writes at his Informed Comment website, "The
Lebanese have been having often lively parliamentary election campaigns for
decades. The idea that the urbane and sophisticated Beirutis had anything to
learn from the Jan. 30 process in Iraq is absurd on the face of it."

Or could it be that, as Seumas Milne writes in a fierce column in the
British Guardian:

    "The claim that democracy is on the march in the Middle East is a fraud.
It is not democracy, but the US military, that is on the marchŠ What has
actually taken place since 9/11 and the Iraq war is a relentless expansion
of US control of the Middle East, of which the threats to Syria are a part.
The Americans now have a military presence in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the UAE,
Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman and Qatar -- and in not one of those countries did an
elected government invite them in. Of course Arabs want an end to tyrannical
regimes, most of which have been supported over the years by the US, Britain
and France: that is the source of much anti-western Muslim anger. The
dictators remain in place by US licence, which can be revoked at any time --
and managed elections are being used as another mechanism for maintaining
pro-western regimes rather than spreading democracy."

At the very least, there can be little question that the Iraq invasion and
occupation has destabilized the region (as the neocons, who had long assumed
that chaos would be their ally, hoped it would). But the Bush administration
must know that genuinely free elections in its various client and allied
states would likely sweep Islamic parties, including in some places the
Muslim Brotherhood, into power. Not exactly a dream for them. So, in Iraq,
they created a "democracy" so weak (a gridlock-inducing two-thirds vote is
needed in the new National Assembly even to form a government) that it would
be unlikely to rule successfully over anything; while no administration
official spoke up when Tunisia's military strongman, in another U.S.-allied
regime, won re-election with 94.5% of the vote (a total that might have made
Saddam Hussein proud).

Less noted as well have been other destabilizing signs that might not serve
the Bush administration's story-line so admirably. For instance, the spread
of terrorism in Kuwait as well as Saudi Arabia (with Jordan waiting in the
wings), or the rise in the price of an AK-47 assault rifle in Lebanon from
$100 in the pre-Cedar Revolution days to $700 now -- a sign of the jitters
and, undoubtedly, of fears that the country's civil war might return. Or
what about another kind of "spreading" story: The Pentagon is set to
introduce Matrix, a new remote-controlled land-mine system, in democratic
Iraq by May. (These mines can evidently be set off by a soldier stationed at
a laptop computer miles away, based on blips registering on his screen -- a
surefire formula for democratic "collateral damage.")

Meanwhile, cheering away for an Arab spring, the Bush administration is also
reportedly at work on the beginnings of a democratic winter in Latin
America. The British Financial Times reports that a new policy is being
formulated -- "at the request of President George W. Bush and Condoleezza
Rice" -- to "contain" Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. (Of course, the Bush
administration has already tried to overthrow the man -- a democratic coup
d'état, naturally.) Don't these Financial Times quotes from Roger
Pardo-Maurer, deputy assistant secretary for western hemisphere affairs at
the Department of Defense, sound familiar? "Chávez is a problem because he
is clearly using his oil money and influence to introduce his conflictive
style into the politics of other countriesŠ He's picking on the countries
whose social fabric is the weakest. In some cases it's downright
subversion." Don't they do a pretty reasonable job of describing the Bush
administration?

In addition to an Arabian Spring and a Latin Winter, it looks like we're
going to get a variety of bonus seasons: What about a UN Fall, thanks to the
nomination of John Bolton as our ambassador there? Or a long, hot World Bank
Summer, given the nomination of Paul Wolfowitz to be the bank's next head?
Or an Alaskan Thaw, thanks to the Senate's vote this week paving the way for
the opening of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to drilling.

When I consider the Iraq War and the Arab Spring, I can't help thinking of
the myth of Pandora. It seems, at least as Gustav Schwab tells the story in
his Gods and Heroes, Myths and Epics of Ancient Greece, that Zeus, angry at
Prometheus for stealing fire from the gods, had the fire-god Hephaestus
create a beautiful woman, Pandora ("she who has gifts from all"). Zeus then
sent her as a present to Prometheus's not-so-sharp brother, carrying a
tightly closed box the gods had filled with baleful "gifts" for humanity --
and you know the rest. When Pandora opened the box, all the ills that
humanity until then had avoided came tumbling out, leaving only one small
good thing at the bottom -- hope. Whether hope even made it out of the box
seems to depend on which version of the myth you read.

For the global gamblers of the Bush administration, Iraq was that box. When
they blasted its lid off, the resulting shock-and-awe blew back on everyone.
But at the bottom of the box, there's always that one small unpredictable
thing. Thank the Bush administration, if you will, for the mayhem of the
Middle East, but (as veteran journalist and Middle Eastern expert Dilip Hiro
makes clear in the piece that follows,) don't thank any American government
of recent times for an Arab spring, if it really comes. The historical
record tells us otherwise. Just thank the gods above, or luck, or our
natures, for the fact that, even amid mayhem, there's usually hope
somewhere; and that, despite every horror, there are usually human beings
ready to make some modest use of it. Tom

    Playing the Democracy Card
    How America Furthers Its National Interests in the Middle East
    By Dilip Hiro

    The United States flaunts the banner of democracy in the Middle East
only when that advances its economic, military, or strategic interests. The
history of the past six decades shows that whenever there has been conflict
between furthering democracy in the region and advancing American national
interests, U.S. administrations have invariably opted for the latter course.
Furthermore, when free and fair elections in the Middle East have produced
results that run contrary to Washington's strategic interests, it has either
ignored them or tried to block the recurrence of such events.

    Washington's active involvement in the region began in 1933 when
Standard Oil Company of California bid ten times more than the
British-dominated Iraq Petroleum Company for exclusive petroleum exploration
rights in Saudi Arabia's eastern Hasa province.

    As a leading constituent of Allied forces in World War II, the U.S. got
its break in Iran after the occupation of that country by the British and
the Soviets in August 1941. Eight months later President Franklin Roosevelt
ruled that Iran was eligible for lend-lease aid. In August 1943, Secretary
of State Cordell Hull said, "It is to our interest that no great power be
established on the Persian Gulf opposite the important American petroleum
development in Saudi Arabia."

    The emergence of Israel in 1948 added a new factor. Following its
immediate recognition of Israel, Washington devised a military-diplomatic
strategy in the region which rested on the triad of Saudi Arabia, Iran, and
the new state of Israel, with the overall aim of keeping Soviet influence
out of the Middle East. While each member of the troika was tied closely to
the U.S., and links between Iran and Israel became progressively tighter,
Saudi Arabia and Israel, though staunchly anti-Communist, remained poles
apart. Nonetheless, the overall arrangement remained in place until the
Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979.

    Besides pursuing the common aim of countering Soviet advances in the
region overtly and covertly, each member of this troika had a special
function. Being contiguous with the Soviet Union, Iran under the Shah helped
the Pentagon by providing it with military bases. By inflicting a lightning
defeat on Egypt and Syria -- then aligned with Moscow -- in June 1967,
Israel proved its military value to the U.S. This strengthened Washington's
resolve to get Israel accepted by its Arab neighbors, a policy it had
adopted in 1948 and implemented soon after, even though it meant subverting
democracy in Syria.

    In March 1949, following Brig.-General Husni Zaim's promise to make
peace with Israel, the CIA helped him mount a military coup against a
democratically elected government in Syria. After Zaim had signed a truce
with Israel on July 20, he tried to negotiate a peace treaty with it through
American officials. A month later, however, he was ousted by a group of
military officers and executed. The military rule that Washington triggered
lasted five years albeit under different generals.

    As the possessor of the largest reserves of petroleum in the region,
Saudi Arabia helped the U.S. and its Western allies by keeping oil prices
low. Furthermore, as a powerful and autocratic monarchy Saudi Arabia played
a leading role in helping to suppress democratic movements in the small,
neighboring, oil-rich Gulf States.

    American clout increased when Britain -- the dominant foreign power in
the region for a century and a half -- withdrew from the Gulf in 1971. The
British withdrawal allowed the U.S. to expand its regional role as the four
freshly independent Gulf States -- Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates,
and Oman -- struggled to adjust to the new reality. But instead of
pressuring these sheikhdoms to institute democracy, Washington either opted
for secret defense agreements with them or let the House of Saud implement
an anti-democratic agenda in the region unhindered.

    The Saudi Anti-Democratic Mission

    In 1962, during a severe crisis in the House of Saud, Crown Prince
Faisal promised political reform, especially the promulgation of a written
constitution specifying a Consultative Council, with two-thirds of its
members elected. But when he ascended the throne two years later he reneged
on his promise.

    Washington said nothing. It also remained silent when Riyadh helped
suppress democracy in neighboring countries.

    After its independence from Britain in 1961, Kuwait acquired a
constitution which specified a National Assembly elected on a franchise
limited to males belonging to families domiciled in Kuwait since 1921 -- in
other words, about a fifth of adult citizens. Despite its limited nature,
the Assembly evolved into a popular forum for expressing the aspirations and
grievances of several important constituencies. Stung by criticism of
official policies by its representatives, and encouraged by the Saudi
monarch, Kuwaiti Emir Sabah ibn Salim al Sabah suspended the Assembly in
1976, accusing it of "malicious behavior," and then dissolved it. Its
revival in 1981 lasted a mere five years.

    At no point did Washington criticize the ruler's undemocratic actions.

    Since 1992, when limited parliamentary elections were restored, voters
have returned more Islamist MPs than pro-Western liberals. Emir Jabar ibn
Ahmad al Sabah's efforts to extend the vote to women have failed, while he
has made no move to extend the vote to the remaining four-fifths of adult
male citizens -- nor has America pressured him to do so. He and the
Americans fear, of course, that a universal adult male franchise would
bolster the strength of the Islamist bloc in the Assembly.

    Bahrain: Limited Democracy Derailed

    In Bahrain, Saudi Arabia's anti-democratic mission melded with America's
military needs. Bahrain became independent in August 1971. Its constitution,
drafted by a constituent assembly (half nominated, half elected on a limited
franchise), specified a National Assembly of 42 deputies, 30 of whom were to
be elected on a restricted franchise. The first Assembly convened in
December 1972 while Saudi Arabia watched warily.

    As in Kuwait, however, the elected representatives criticized the
government, angering the ruler, Shaikh Isa al Khalifa. This -- combined with
pressure from Riyadh -- led the Emir to dissolve the Assembly in August 1975
and suspend the constitution.

    Once again, Washington said nothing about the quashing of limited
democracy in Bahrain. Why? In 1971, after the Pentagon leased naval
facilities previously used by the British, Bahrain became the headquarters
of the American Middle East Force. In 1977, the ruler extended the
US-Bahraini agreement; and in 1995 Bahrain became the headquarters of the
U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet.

    Jordan: An Election Law Altered by Decree

    Jordan provides another telling example of how American administrations
have dealt with democracy in the Middle East. In an uncommonly free and fair
election in November 1989, the Islamic Action Front (IAF), the political
wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, won 32 seats in the 80-member House of
Representatives. It joined the government and ran five ministries.

    During the 1990 Kuwait crisis which culminated in the 1991 Gulf War, the
Jordanian king took into account popular opinion, both inside and outside
parliament, which was opposed to joining the US-led alliance against Iraq,
and advocated a negotiated solution to the crisis. By so doing, he acted as
a constitutional monarch.

    Instead of praising this welcome democratic development, the
administration of George Herbert Walker Bush pilloried Hussein as "a dwarf
king." Unable to stand the pressure, King Hussein crawled back into
Washington's fold after the 1991 Gulf War. To thwart the possibility of the
IAF emerging as the leading party in the next election, he altered the
election law by decree. In quietly applauding his action, the elder Bush's
administration showed its cynical disregard for democracy.

    Egypt: Supporting the Autocrat

    While King Hussein manipulated the Jordanian political system with some
sophistication to achieve the result he wanted, President Anwar Sadat of
Egypt blatantly used the government machinery and state-run media to produce
a pre-ordained electoral result to endorse his signing of the U.S.-brokered
bilateral peace treaty with Israel in 1978-79 after he had broken ranks with
the Arab League.

    The depth and durability of popular antipathy towards peace with Israel,
while it continues to occupy the Palestinian Territories, is highlighted by
the fact that a quarter-century after the peace treaty, relations between
the two neighbors remain cold. While remaining firmly under American
tutelage, President Husni Mabarak has continued to spurn offers to visit Tel
Aviv.

    As in Jordan, the Muslim Brotherhood, the oldest political party in the
Middle East and long outlawed in Egypt, offers a credible challenge to the
semi-dictatorship of Mubarak (in power since 1981). His regime has continued
to be the second largest recipient of the U.S. aid after Israel under both
Democratic and Republican Presidents.

    Several months ago, Mubarak mused that democracy in Egypt would mean
Muslim Brotherhood rule over the country. The key question now is: Will
Mubarak -- who recently agreed to hold the Presidential election scheduled
for September through "direct, secret balloting" instead of simply
rubber-stamping his sole candidacy in a stage-managed referendum -- let the
Brotherhood challenge him?

    The answer will come in the wording with which Article 76 of the
constitution will be amended and passed by a Parliament dominated by
Mubarak's National Democratic Party. At present, it specifies a single
presidential candidate, endorsed by at least two-thirds of parliamentary
deputies, to be offered to the voters for approval.

    Yemen: Rebuffing Democracy

    Another victim of the way American administrations have placed their
narrow interests above any program to democratize the Middle East was Yemen.
Ever since the creation of Republic of Yemen, following the union of North
Yemen and South Yemen in 1991, the country has had a multiparty political
system. Indeed, since North Yemen had been governed by the General People's
Congress and South Yemen by the Yemen Socialist Party, a peaceful
unification could only come about through the creation of a multi-party
system.

    In April 1993, the government organized the first general election on
the Arabian Peninsula based on universal suffrage. It was for a 301-member
House of Representatives and the Presidency. This historic event went
unnoticed in the United States where the Clinton administration continued to
rebuff the Yemeni government because of its insistence on an Arab solution
to the 1990-91 Kuwait crisis and its negative vote on United Nations
Security Council Resolution 678 authorizing military action against Iraq.

    Encouraged by the Yemeni election, six Saudi human rights activists --
professors, judges, and senior civil servants -- established the Committee
for the Defense of Legitimate Rights (CDLR) in Saudi Arabia. It demanded
political reform in the kingdom, including elections based on universal
suffrage. Government persecution followed, including job dismissals and
arrests. Prof. Muhammad al Masaari, the head of the CDLR, managed to flee
first to Yemen, and then to Britain.

    Yet Washington did not protest.

    Now George W. Bush loudly applauds the local elections held recently in
the Saudi Kingdom. His administration ignores the fact that only half of the
seats were even open for contest, and so distrustful were Saudi citizens of
their government's electoral promise that only a quarter of eligible voters
even bothered registered. Women were, of course, barred from voting.

    By contrast, Bush endlessly laments the absence of freedom for the
people of Iran, which his Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice recently
described as "a totalitarian state." These statements run counter to the
facts. Since the 1979 revolution in that country, the Islamic regime has
held seven parliamentary, eight presidential, and two local elections -- as
well as four Assembly of Experts polls -- all of them multi-candidate and
based on universal suffrage with a voting age of 15.

    What explains this blatant myopia? While practicing an Islamic version
of democracy, Iran is actively opposing the economic, military, and
strategic ambitions of America in the region.

    Actually, the historic pattern of American administrations in the Middle
East -- downgrading democracy at the expense of narrow national interests --
is in line with what the United States has been practicing in Central and
South America for a much longer period -- a phenomenon that has gone largely
unnoticed in the United States itself.

    Dilip Hiro is the author of The Essential Middle East: A Comprehensive
Guide (Caroll & Graf) and Secrets and Lies: Operation "Iraqi Freedom" and
After (Nation Books).

Copyright 2005 Dilip Hiro

A printed version of this article will appear in Middle East International,
no. 746.

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posted March 17, 2005 at 8:25 am
     
             
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