[Mb-civic] What Are We Holding Together? - Peter W. Galbraith = Washington Post Op-Ed

[William Swiggard]

What Are We Holding Together?

By Peter W. Galbraith
Monday, November 7, 2005; Page A21

Although it was certainly not his intention, George W. Bush broke up 
Iraq when he ordered the invasion in 2003. The United States not only 
removed Saddam Hussein, but it also smashed, and later dissolved, the 
institutions that enabled Iraq's Sunni Arab minority to rule the 
country: the army, the security services and the Baath Party. Kurdistan, 
free from Hussein's rule since 1991, moved to consolidate its de facto 
independence. Iraq's Shiites, suppressed since the founding of the Iraqi 
state, have created a theocracy in southern Iraq and have no intention 
of allowing a central government in Baghdad to roll it back. Iraq's new 
constitution merely ratifies this result.

There is no reason to mourn the passing of the unified Iraqi state. For 
Iraq's 80-year history, Sunni Arab dictators held the country together 
-- and kept themselves in power -- with brutal force that culminated in 
Hussein's genocide against the Kurds and mass killings of Shiites. As a 
moral matter, Iraq's Kurds are no less entitled to independence than are 
Lithuanians, Croatians or Palestinians. And if Iraq's Shiites want to 
run their own affairs, or even have their own state, on what democratic 
principle should they be denied? If the price of a unified Iraq is 
another dictatorship, it is too high a price to pay.

Iraq's Kurds, Shiites and Sunni Arabs do not share the common values and 
aspirations that are essential to building a unified state. The 
country's Kurds are avowedly secular and among the most pro-American 
people in the world. Almost unanimously they want nothing to do with 
Iraq. Iraq's Shiites, whether we like it or not, have voted 
overwhelmingly for pro-Iranian religious parties. Iraq's Sunni Arabs, 
through their own choice, boycotted the constitutional assembly. Some of 
the leaders who claim to speak for the Sunnis say they want a unified 
state, though it seems their real concern is that they no longer rule 
Iraq. Even if it had been done competently, American-led nation-building 
could not overcome these divisions.

The constitution accommodates all three groups. Each can have its own 
region. Except for a few matters in the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
federal government, regional law prevails. Thus Kurdistan can continue 
to be secular while the Shiites can create an Islamic state in southern 
Iraq if their constituents so choose. Regions can have their own 
militaries and control part of their water and oil resources.

Logic would suggest that once they come to terms with the fact that they 
no longer rule Iraq, the Sunni Arabs will realize that the 
constitutional framework actually protects them from domination by the 
Shiite majority. It does not leave the Sunni Arabs penniless as some 
fear; they get a proportionate share of Iraq's oil revenue. But 
Kurdistan and the Shiite south will manage new oil fields in their own 
regions. When the Sunni Arabs were in charge, they used Iraq's oil to 
finance their own development -- and the destruction of Kurdistan and 
the south. The Kurds and Shiites will not let this happen again.

The United States should focus now not on preserving the unity of Iraq 
but on avoiding a spreading civil war. The constitution resolves the 
issues of oil, territory and control of the central government that 
might intensify conflict. Engaged diplomacy will be required to make 
these provisions work, especially with regard to the territorial dispute 
between Kurdistan and Arab Iraq over the ethnically mixed province of 
Kirkuk. A referendum will decide its status by Dec. 31, 2007. Meanwhile, 
the United States should promote a special regime for Kirkuk with 
entrenched power-sharing for all communities, so as to make the 
referendum's outcome as painless as possible for the losers.

Iraq's political settlement can pave the way for a coalition exit. 
Foreign forces have no security role in Kurdistan and only a minimal one 
in the south. In the Sunni areas, the focus should be on developing a 
regional army that is aligned with moderate political elements. While 
the Bush administration pretends there is an Iraqi army today, it 
actually consists of homogenous Kurdish, Shiite or Sunni Arab battalions 
loyal not to the civilian authorities in Baghdad but to their respective 
communities.

It is hard to win hearts and minds in the Sunni Arab areas when the 
Iraqi troops fighting there are seen not as fellow citizens but as alien 
Kurds and Shiites. There are tribes and other Sunni Arabs willing to 
fight the terrorists, but not as collaborators. The coalition could base 
its forces in Kurdistan, where the population would welcome them and 
where they can be ready to move in case the Sunni Arab military proves 
unable or unwilling to take on the terrorists.

As Iraq divides, the problem of Baghdad becomes central. Religiously and 
ethnically mixed, Baghdad is already the front line of the sectarian war 
between Sunnis and Shiites. Kurdistan's departure from Iraq -- which 
seems inevitable in the not-too-distant future -- will not greatly 
affect the city, but the separation of Sunni Arabs and Shiites into 
independent states would cause havoc. Fortunately, this is much less 
likely, especially if federal arrangements work.

As Yugoslavia broke up in 1991, the first Bush administration put all 
its diplomatic muscle into a doomed effort to hold the country together, 
and it did nothing to stop the coming war. We should not repeat that 
mistake in Iraq.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/06/AR2005110601014.html?nav=hcmodule
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