[Mb-civic] FW: M. Rubin on "Iraq and the Democratization of the Middle East"

[Golsorkhi]

------ Forwarded Message
From: Samii Shahla <shahla at thesamiis.com>
Date: Sun, 23 Oct 2005 15:26:18 -0400
Subject: M. Rubin on "Iraq and the Democratization of the Middle East"



Begin forwarded message:
> 
>  
> Iraq and the Democratization of the Middle East
> by Michael Rubin
> from La Rivoluzione Democratica Contro Il Terrorismo
> October 14, 2005
> http://www.meforum.org/article/780
> 
> This essay is the original English version of Michael Rubin's book chapter in
> La Rivoluzione Democratica Contro Il Terrorismo, edited by Fiamma Nirenstein
> (Rome: Panorama 2005).
> 
> Speaking before the National Endowment for Democracy on November 7, 2003,
> President George W. Bush argued that the Middle East was capable of democracy.
> "Are the peoples of the Middle East somehow beyond the reach of liberty?" he
> asked. "Are millions of men and women and children condemned by history or
> culture to live in despotismŠ? I, for one, do not believe it." he declared.
> 
> Many have ridiculed Bush's ideas. There is a tendency on both sides of the
> Atlantic to equate neoconservative moral clarity with, in the words of former
> French foreign minister Hubert Vedrine, "simplisme." Such questions are no
> longer academic, but rather of blood and treasure. More than 100,000 American
> troops remain in Iraq, with thousands more in Afghanistan. The U.S. government
> has expended billions of dollars, for both military operations and
> reconstruction.
> 
> As violence continues in Iraq, all sides agree that the conflict is about
> democracy. The White House has framed Iraq to be a battleground for democracy.
> On April 6, 2005, for example, Bush congratulated the newly-installed Iraqi
> government which he charged with "advancing Iraq's transformation from
> dictatorship to democracy." In an audio tape released on an Islamist internet
> site, terrorist leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi also indicated democracy to be at
> the center of his battle, albeit as the symbol of his enemy. Calling democracy
> "the big American lie," he declared, "A bitter war against democracy and all
> those who seek to enact it."
> 
> The Iraqi Success
> 
> As forces from beyond Iraq's borders transform the country into a test case
> for Arab democratization, Iraqis have hardly been passive players. Iraqis have
> embraced their newfound freedoms. At a political rally shortly before the
> elections, an Iraqi began crying. "This is the first time I've ever heard
> politicians campaign in Arabic," he explained. On January 30, 2005, more than
> eight million Iraqis braved bombs and bullets to cast their ballots in their
> first free elections in a half century.
> 
> The Iraqi elections were significant for several reasons. Egyptians, Syrians,
> Libyans and Tunisians might complain about their president, but they have no
> peaceful options by which they can change their leadership. Iraqis, though,
> turned out an incumbent at the ballot box. The British Foreign Office and the
> U.S. Central Intelligence Agency may have viewed interim Prime Minister Iyad
> Allawi favorably, but most Iraqis associated their leader with corruption,
> deteriorating security, and disdain for his Baathist past. Allawi's forfeiture
> of power in response to electoral rebuff was a watershed not only for Iraq,
> but also for the greater Arab world.
> 
> The Iraqi elections were remarkable for other reasons as well. The empowerment
> of Iraqi ShiŒites after eight decades of oppression was particularly
> important. Their rise to power is analogous to the enfranchisement of South
> African blacks after decades of Apartheid. Patriotic Union of Kurdistan leader
> Jalal Talabani's inauguration as president is equally significant. Talabani's
> assumption of power signaled that the Middle East's many peoples would no
> longer subordinate themselves to the chauvinistic rhetoric of Arab
> nationalism. His presidency reverberated not only among the Kurds of Syria and
> Iran, but also among the Berbers of Algeria, the Copts of Egypt, and the
> Dinkas of Sudan.
> 
> While Iraqi political leaders took almost three months to form a government
> after elections, this was no setback. No Iraqi party among the 111 contesting
> the election won a majority, although the ShiŒite-dominated United Iraqi
> Alliance, itself a loose coalition of religious and secular parties, won a
> plurality with 48 percent of the vote. The shared victory necessitated
> formation of a coalition. This is itself a milestone for the Arab world.
> Unlike every other Arab country, Iraq will not be under the grasp of a single
> ruler or party. Rather, major constituencies will have to negotiate rather
> than impose.
> 
> Willingness to compromise is already evident in the Constitutional drafting
> committee. ShiŒites, Sunnis, and Christians actively debate such charged
> issues as the exclusivity of Islam as a source of legislation and the role of
> religion in society and federalism. Constitutional deliberations may be
> contentious, but they demonstrate the willingness of a variety of political
> factions to settle disputes through negotiation rather than violence.
> 
> Many in the American and European foreign policy establishments argued that
> Iraqis would be incapable of addressing the constitution peacefully. In a
> November 25, 2003 New York Times essay, for example, Leslie Gelb, president
> emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations and a doyen of the American
> foreign policy establishment counseled the division of Iraq into three
> independent states along ethnic and sectarian lines because of his belief that
> "Kurds and Sunnis are unlikely to accept ShiŒite control, no matter how
> democratically achieved."
> 
> Despite the pessimism of armchair pundits, Iraqi politicians have
> painstakingly negotiated such hot-button religious issues such as whether
> family law should remain under civil law or instead be adjudicated in
> religious courts. While many Iraqi politicians favor the supremacy of
> religious judges over marriage, divorce, and inheritance, Iraqi women's groups
> have served as a check on the excesses of their legislators. Accountability
> has come to Iraq.
> 
> As contentious as discussions about Islam within Iraq's constitutional
> convention have been debates about federalism. Iraqi Kurds insist not only
> that a new constitution enshrine the virtual autonomy they have enjoyed since
> 1991 in the three governorates of northern Iraq, but also an extension of
> their federal region to encompass the oil fields of Kirkuk, the farmlands and
> orchards of Sinjar, and borderlands south of the Hamreen Mountains.
> Non-Kurdish politicians have balked not only at Kurdish expansionism, but also
> at Kurdish leader Masud Barzani's insistence that the Kurdistan region become
> a no-go area for the Iraqi army, and that Kurdish militia alone man border and
> customs posts along the region's borders with Turkey, Syria, and Iran. Debates
> may be heated, but they are peaceful. Neither Arabs nor Kurds are culturally
> incapable of democracy.
> 
> Iraqi politicians sometimes threaten boycotts and storm out of meetings, but
> such actions are not a sign of failure so much as the brinkmanship of
> politics. Many Iraqis politicians privately confide that their threats are
> often calculated to draw a response from the American embassy, which tends to
> reward intransigence and posturing. Parliamentary discord is not always a sign
> of failure; sometimes, it can be a sign that democracy is starting to sink its
> roots in the Fertile Crescent.
> 
> Despite doomsday predictions of civil war, terrorists atrocities have failed
> to spark significant sectarian strife. Rather, Iraqis have consistently defied
> the predictions of American and European pundits who insist that Iraqis are
> culturally incapable of upholding the same standards of freedom, civil
> liberty, and political participation as do peoples outside the Arab world.
> 
> The willingness of Iraqis to remain stoic in the face of adversity and
> simultaneously embrace democracy is a monument to the desire for freedom and
> liberty across the Middle East. The growth of satellite television channels
> and the internet has brought the Iraqi experience into almost every Arab
> living room and tea house. In Cairo, SanaŒa, and Algiers, ordinary residents
> can watch the progress of Iraq's political rebirth. Stations like Al-Jazeera
> and al-Arabiya may seek to color their coverage with their own political
> biases, but Arabs suffering through dictatorships can nevertheless witness
> contested elections and a rebirth of political rights. The spread of the
> internet has also made the vibrant debates on the editorial pages of Iraqi
> papers like az-Zaman and al-Mutamar accessible to those whose local papers
> filter news through a myriad of government censors.
> 
> The Cedar Revolution
> 
> Already, Iraq's elections have had an impact beyond its borders. Less than two
> months after Iraqis marched to the polls, Lebanese citizens arose to demand
> the same rights to exercise democracy. The spark for Lebanon's Cedar
> Revolution was the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.
> 
> Across their sectarian and political spectrum, Lebanese saw a Syrian hand
> behind Hariri's murder. Syrian troops had occupied Lebanon for almost thirty
> years. In 1989, the TaŒif Accord ended Lebanon's 15-year civil war, but
> Western governments turned a blind eye to continued Syrian domination of
> Lebanon for the sake of that country's stability.
> 
> Syrian motivations were far from altruistic. Generations of Syrian politicians
> have refused to recognize Lebanese independence, instead insisting that
> Lebanon is simply a part of Greater Syria. In August 1972, Syrian president
> Hafez al-Assad declared, "Syria and Lebanon are a single country." The failure
> of the Assad regime to adhere to diplomatic formality underlined Syrian
> ambitions. Damascus did not maintain an embassy in Beirut because first Hafez
> al-Assad and then his son and successor Bashar did not wish to signal even
> implicit recognition of Lebanese independence.
> 
> With a combination of military occupation, an omnipresent security service,
> paid proxies, and outright political interference, the Syrian government
> managed to keep Lebanese nationalists in check. In August 2004, the Syrian
> government demonstrated its disdain for Lebanese sovereignty when Syrian
> President Bashar al-Assad sought to have the Lebanese constitution amended to
> enable Syrian client Emile Lahoud to serve a third term as president. Hariri
> balked at this proposal. According to the United Nations fact-finder, Assad
> warned Hariri that his opposition to Lahoud would be "tantamount to opposing
> Assad himself."
> 
> Outraged by Hariri's assassination, and casting aside fear of retaliation from
> Syrian security services and their proxies, ordinary Lebanese citizens poured
> into the streets of Beirut to demand democracy and a withdrawal of Syrian
> forces. With international pressure ratcheting up, Assad withdrew his army
> from Lebanon in May 2005. A month later, the Lebanese people
> triumphed--temporarily at least--when Lebanon's parliament picked as their
> Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, a close associate to Hariri and a Lebanese
> nationalist unwilling to take Syrian orders without question.
> 
> As in Iraq, events in Lebanon can transcend borders. Lebanon's greatest export
> has always been its people. In Saudi Arabia, the Lebanese Diaspora is the
> bedrock of the business class. In Jeddah, it is these Lebanese who have
> agitated for greater democratic rights, not on behalf of an external ideology,
> but rather on behalf of a concept which has become native to Lebanon and,
> therefore, to the Arab world.
> 
> The Cedar Revolution can diffuse throughout the region in other ways as well.
> Lebanon is a cultural Mecca for the Arab world. From Rabat to Riyadh, young
> Arab men and women ogle singers in Lebanese music videos which compete for
> their attention with dour religious programming. While mosque preachers might
> condemn the West and its materialism, Lebanon glories in it. In coffee shops
> and private homes, residents of far more repressive countries will see the
> relative freedom which Lebanese now enjoy. What happens in Beirut is felt
> throughout the region, especially among Arab youth.
> 
> Is European Policy an Impediment to Arab Democracy?
> 
> While 24 million Iraqis and four million Lebanese embrace democracy, their new
> found freedoms are fragile, and the permanence of the transition uncertain.
> The triumph of democracy is far from inevitable, though. Whether motivated by
> ideology or love of power, many individuals and segments of society seek to
> see the democratic wave evaporate. Zarqawi may seek to intimidate through
> violence while Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak works to constrain dissent
> through the mechanisms of state, but both share the common objective to crush
> dissent.
> 
> The stance of Europe and the United States can tip the balance from
> dictatorship to democracy. While credit for Lebanese reforms lies primarily in
> the courage of the Lebanese, joint Franco-American pressure upon the Syrian
> government ensured that the Cedar Revolution has space to take root. When the
> West embraces stability instead of democracy, dictators triumph. One of the
> greatest impediments to Middle Eastern democracy lies not in the Arab world or
> Iran, but rather in the cynicism of European and American bureaucrats.
> 
> Throughout the 1980s, the West viewed Iraqi President Saddam Hussein as a
> bulwark against Islamist radicalism. At the time, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini
> was actively seeking to export revolution throughout the region. While London,
> Paris, and Washington may have viewed Baathist Iraq as the lesser of two
> evils, their short-term willingness to ignore Saddam Hussein's excesses not
> only undermined the democratic ambitions of millions of Iraqis, but also
> undercut long-term regional stability.
> 
> Iraqis interpret the December 20, 1983 handshake between then-Special Envoy
> Donald Rumsfeld and Saddam Hussein not as a diplomatic nicety, but rather as
> an endorsement by Washington of the Iraqi regime's oppression of ShiŒites and
> Kurds.
> 
> European political and commercial engagement with Saddam Hussein also
> backfired. West German firms, with Bonn's acquiescence, sold chemicals to the
> Iraqi government which Saddam's regime later used to massacre Iraqi Kurds in
> Halabja and elsewhere. Many Kurds retain bitter feelings toward Germany as a
> result. Iraqis also are cognizant that the French government sold the Iraqi
> dictators conventional weapons used to kill far more civilians than have died
> during the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. Many Iraqis suspect
> that French and Russian opposition to their liberation had more to do with
> French firms' commercial contracts in Iraq than with any concerns about
> international law. Within Iraq, the United Nations' reputation is likewise
> soiled. Iraqis do not forgive Secretary-General Kofi Annan's February 24, 1998
> comment, "Can I trust Saddam Hussein? I think I can do business with him,"
> especially as revelations consider to surface regarding the United Nations'
> corruption at their expense.
> 
> The distrust for Western realpolitik is not limited to the political elite.
> Rather, it permeates Iraqi society. The day after U.S. Secretary of State
> Colin Powell unveiled in 2001 a "smart sanctions" proposal which American
> officials said would ease pressure on ordinary Iraqis, an illiterate Iraqi
> farmer asked, "Why do they talk about war crimes one day, and reward Saddam
> the next?" Western diplomats, human rights activists, and academics may have
> believed they were ameliorating the burden of sanctions on ordinary Iraqis
> while maintaining pressure on Saddam's regime, but Iraqis living under
> dictatorship interpreted the move not as an olive branch toward them, but
> rather as a reward for the dictator.
> 
> The illiterate farmers were right. When U.S. troops rolled into Baghdad, they
> occupied a palace complex on the Tigris River. First General Jay Garner and
> then Ambassador L. Paul Bremer established their office in the cavernous,
> marble Republican Palace. Huge crystal chandeliers dangled in the hallway.
> Gold inscriptions of Saddam Hussein's sayings were engraved into the wall
> above the dining hall. Hundreds of U.S. diplomats, aid workers, and
> intelligence officials occupy the building. While many journalists have
> described the palace and its characteristics, few mention that, having been
> bombed to ruins in 1991, it was rebuilt entirely under sanctions. Whatever
> their intentions, the easing of sanctions strengthened Saddam's hand.
> 
> Engagement and amelioration failed. Had the West taken a harder line toward
> Saddam Hussein--perhaps even supporting the 1991 uprising in which Iraqis
> seized 14 of 18 governorates in the course of two weeks--then democracy might
> have taken root much quicker at a cost far less prohibitive.
> 
> The Failure of Critical Engagement
> 
> Nowhere has engagement failed so starkly as with Europe's dialogue with Iran.
> For more than a decade, the European Union has sought to engage Tehran, both
> in diplomatic discussion and with trade. At a time when oil prices were low,
> European Union trade subsidized the Iranian economy. Between 2000 and 2003,
> European Union-Iran trade increased from $12 billion to $20 billion. But
> rather than encourage reform, European trade convinced Tehran that it would
> not be held accountable for its behavior. The Islamic Republic's application
> of capital punishment increased in proportion with European trade. European
> officials remained silent even as the regime's judiciary publicly hanged
> minors such as 16-year-old Atefe Rajabi, convicted in August 2004 of "acts
> incompatible with chastity" after a trial in which court officials denied her
> legal representation.
> 
> Many European leaders say that their engagement policy bolsters reform.
> European Union External Affairs Commission Chris Patten, for example, said,
> "Everybody who supports the reform process in Iran will welcome the steps we
> have taken." He was wrong. Iranian reformists subsequently issued a statement
> condemning the European Union's "mercantilist policy" toward Iran. Iranians
> reject the Western peace and human rights activists who argue that dialogue
> and trade bring reform. Europeans may complain of American unilateralism in
> the Middle East, but from both a Washington perspective and from the Middle
> Eastern street, the European Left's embrace of dictators has undercut its
> credibility.
> 
> The reasons for ordinary Iranians' rejection of the European engagement are
> many. In 1997, Iranians elected Muhammad Khatami to be the fifth president of
> the Islamic Republic. European leaders, journalists, and parliamentarians
> embraced the new leader as a symbol of reform as had initially many Iranians.
> But while Iranians had a realistic sense of their president and his failings,
> European officials whitewashed his record. Officials like Chris Patten, Jack
> Straw, and Gerhard Schroder ignored the fact that, during Khatami's tenure as
> minister of culture, he banned 600 books. According to the memoirs of Grand
> Ayatollah Hossein ŒAli Montazeri, once Khomeini's deputy, it was during
> Khatami's tenure as the Islamic Republic's ideological guardian that the
> ruling council summarily executed 3,000 prisoners deemed politically
> irredeemable. While Iranians struggled with a figurehead they had determined
> to be insincere in his desire for reform, European officials ignored his
> record and embraced Khatami, thereby casting aside more authentic proponents
> of dissent and reform.
> 
> The courage of dissidents is the catalyst upon which reform rests. In Iran,
> many Western officials have ignored dissidents, undercutting their standing
> and morale. Tim Guildimann, for example, served as Switzerland's ambassador to
> Tehran between 1999 and 2004, in which capacity he also represented American
> interests. During his tenure, he became a staunch advocate for Western
> rapprochement with the Islamic Republic. In meetings with U.S. officials and
> at Track II talks, he would speak about his contacts with former president and
> Expediency Council chairman ŒAli Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and other senior
> regime officials. But, upon his retirement, he could not name a single
> dissident with whom he had met in his five years in Iran.
> 
> While Guildimann symbolizes missed opportunities, far more deleterious to the
> cause of democracy was Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage who, in a
> February 2003 interview, labeled Iran a "democracy," even as Iranians
> protested the Guardian Council's disqualification of hundreds of
> office-seekers.
> 
> Despite the lack of Western support for Iranian democracy, events in Iraq have
> emboldened Iran's citizenry. When Iraqis of various economic, sectarian, and
> political backgrounds agreed to a Transitional Administrative Law which
> enshrined basic political rights, protestors in both Iran and Syria demanded
> equivalent rights. As the Iraqi Kurds work to enshrine federalism into Iraq's
> new constitution, Iranian Kurds are agitating for the same privileges.
> 
> It is not just Iran's ethnic minorities that have grown bold in their pursuit
> of democracy. Iran boasts more than 100,000 active weblogs, making Persian the
> third-most common blogging language after English and French. As Iraqis pursue
> new freedoms irrespective of the controversy in European circles as to how
> they were won, Iranian bloggers have juxtaposed Iraq's newfound rights with
> their own restrained freedoms, and have become increasingly outspoken in their
> demands for democracy. The bloggers' activities have struck at the regime's
> insecurities. Iranian authorities have responded, launching a crackdown which
> has landed leading bloggers like Arash Sigarchi, Shahram Rafihzadeh, and
> Rozbeh Mir Ebrahimi in prison.
> 
> The bloggers are only the tip of the iceberg: Many other Iranians have cast
> aside fear of the authority's repression to agitate for change. Imprisoned
> journalist Akbar Ganji, for example, suffering on a hunger strike smuggled a
> letter from prison declaring, "If I die, Supreme Leader Ayatollah ŒAli
> Khamenei will be responsible for my death since the Prosecutor General is
> directly answerable to him. I have protested against the absolute powers given
> to the Supreme Leader as they contradict the principles of democracy."
> 
> Ganji's willingness to risk life for democracy may be a direct consequence of
> the willingness of some Western officials to stand up for democracy.
> Responding to his deteriorating health, the White House issued a statement on
> July 12, 2005, declaring, "Mr. Ganji is sadly only one victim of a wave of
> repression and human rights violations engaged in by the Iranian regime. His
> calls for freedom deserve to be heard." If European leaders joined Bush's
> call, the balance might shift in Iran from tyranny to freedom.
> 
> Sacrificing Palestinian Democracy
> 
> Iran is not the only example of European embrace of stability at the cost of
> democracy. From the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, American, European,
> and Israeli officials supported a Palestinian dictatorship on the logic
> believing that a strongman could better deliver Palestinians to a peace accord
> with Israel. The strategy failed. Palestine Liberation Organization chairman
> Yasir Arafat refused to abandon terrorism, seeing violence as both a
> negotiating tactic and, when applied against Palestinian civilians, a method
> to enforce discipline. The European Union, meanwhile, provided ten million
> euros monthly to subsidize Palestinian Authority salaries. Patten insisted
> that "the EU has not seen any hard evidence that the EU funds have been
> misused to finance terrorism," but former Federal Bureau of Investigations
> analyst Matt Levitt found that Arafat regularly exaggerated his needs by
> thirty percent, doctored exchange rates to net his terror fund 16 cents of
> every euro dispensed by Brussels, and even applied EU salary subsidies to fund
> Fatah, a group responsible for shootings and suicide bombings.
> 
> History has underlined the failure of the West's embrace of Palestinian
> dictatorship. At Camp David II, Arafat failed to accept the peace deal agreed
> to by his own negotiators and refused to propose his own plan. Instead, the
> Palestinian Authority planned an intifada in order to pressure Israel to make
> concessions. On August 24, 2000, several weeks before Likud leader Ariel
> Sharon visited the Temple Mount, Palestinian Authority Justice Minister Frieh
> Abu Middein declared, "Violence is near, and the Palestinian people are
> willing to sacrifice even 5,000 casualties." Imad al-Faluji, the Palestinian
> communication minister, told a Palestinian radio program that "Arafat ordered
> preparations for the current intifada immediately after the Camp David summit,
> as part of the negotiating process with Israel."
> 
> Violence culminated in 2002, when Palestinian suicide bombers struck Israeli
> buses, cafes, and nightclubs almost daily. Sharon ordered Israeli troops into
> the West Bank, routing Palestinian terror cells but drawing howls of protest
> from European and American diplomats alike. Many officials called on the White
> House to council restraint and encourage a re-engagement between Israeli
> officials and the Palestinian leader. Bush refused traditional diplomacy and
> declared that democracy should be a precursor for peace. On June 24, 2002, he
> declared, "If liberty can blossom in the rocky soil of the West Bank and Gaza,
> it will inspire men and women around the globe who areŠequally entitled to the
> benefits of democratic government." Despite some subsequent wobbling over the
> Road Map, the Bush administration stayed generally true to the principles
> enunciated by the President. Arafat remained in isolation, unwilling to
> embrace real democracy, until his November 2004 death.
> 
> What followed was an indication that the Bush emphasis on democracy was
> neither naïve nor impractical. With Arafat gone, and Saddam Hussein's
> subsidies for suicide bombing severed, Palestinians seized an opportunity for
> a political rebirth.
> 
> In January 2005, Palestinians marched to the polls. Their contest was neither
> as free nor fair as the Iraqi elections, for the Palestinian Liberation
> Organization retained an iron grip during the campaign on bureaucracy,
> security, and media. Nevertheless, the Palestinian elections were far freer
> than any that had preceded them.
> 
> Jordanian columnist Salameh Nematt voiced a linkage acknowledged more in the
> Arab street than in Europe. Commenting in the pan-Arabic daily al-Hayat on
> November 25, 2004, he wrote, "It is outrageous and amazing that the first free
> and general elections in the history of the Arab nation are to take place in
> January: in Iraq, under the auspices of American occupation, and in Palestine,
> under the auspices of the Israeli occupation."
> 
> Democracy Unbound
> 
> Democracy has taken root in the Middle East. Sparked by the Iraq war, Arab
> columnists debate the meaning of democracy, the nature of reform, and the
> parameters of dissent. While the ultimate expression of Middle Eastern
> democracy is uncertain, the change sparked by Bush's belief in democracy as a
> pillar of foreign policy continues to reverberate throughout the region.
> 
> His actions demonstrate his seriousness. On August 15, 2002, Bush warned
> Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak that the U.S. would not supply Egypt with new
> foreign aid in response to the jailing by an Egyptian kangaroo court of a
> leading democracy activist. It is the White House, and not traditional NGOs,
> that is leading the drive to cool relations between the United States and the
> Saudi autocracy, despite continued American dependence on oil. The era of
> cynical realpolitik is over, and the age of principle has begun.
> 
> The age of dictatorship and autocracy should pass. Their representatives
> should not be toasted in the West regardless of their oil wealth. Diplomats
> and policymakers can smugly dismiss the notion that men and women around the
> globe are entitled to the benefits of democracy, despite the rejoicing of
> Afghans, Iraqis, Lebanese, and the growing chorus of Iranians and Palestinians
> demanding freedom.
> 
> European Commission officials; daiquiri diplomats, and armchair academics have
> lost the morale high ground. Their policies have done irreparable harm to
> those suffering at the hands of dictators and terrorists. Engaging dictators
> may be easy in the short-term, but it undercuts democracy and ensures future
> trouble. Europe might chide American unilateralism, but the United States
> should not abandon the defense of liberty, even if it means going it alone.
> 
> While Western critics have condemned Operation Iraqi Freedom as a cause of
> terrorism rather than a spark for democracy, evidence suggests otherwise.
> Terrorism directed against Western targets pre-dated the occupation of Iraq.
> The democratic wave sweeping across the Middle East did not. Even in the most
> autocratic of societies, emboldened dissidents have challenged dictators. In
> Damascus, for example, Aktham Naisse openly called for the repeal of the
> Emergency Laws upon which the Syrian regime derives dictatorial power. In
> Libya, Fathi el-Jahmi, a former provincial official, demanded openly that
> Muammar Qadhafi hold contested elections. In Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen,
> dissidents have called for electoral reform.
> 
> The democratic wave is fragile, though. Libyan security has returned Fathi
> el-Jahmi to prison. Aktham Naisse is out on bail. Hosni Mubarak continues to
> harass opposition candidates with spurious lawsuits and arbitrary detention.
> On July 20, 2005, Yemeni troops opened fire on protestors, killing 16. But,
> despite the dangers, across the Middle East dissidents and ordinary citizens
> alike are courageously confronting dictators and demanding democracy.
> 
> The forces unleashed by the U.S. campaign in Iraq have swept across the
> region. Many in the West, distrustful of Bush and angry at the process which
> led to the Iraq war, are willing to sacrifice the Middle Eastern liberty upon
> the altar of their own political animosity. They may point to the latest car
> bombing and argue that the White House has open Pandora's Box. They need not
> be right.
> 
> In Iraq and Lebanon, ordinary citizens have seized the initiative to show they
> seek a better, more democratic future. Both Americans and Europeans should
> lend democrats across the Middle East their support. With all due respect to
> Vedrine, it is the European politicians that are guilty of simplisme. Dialogue
> with dictators backfires. Europe and the United States should stand together
> for freedom. The Middle East is ready.
>  
>> Michael Rubin, editor of the Middle East Quarterly, is a resident scholar at
>> AEI.
> 
> 
> 
> You may freely forward this information, but on condition that you send the
> text as an integral whole along with complete information about its author,
> date, and source.
>  



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