[Mb-civic] Give Hamas Nothing for Free - Dennis Ross - Washington Post Op-Ed

[William Swiggard]

Give Hamas Nothing for Free

By Dennis Ross
Sunday, February 5, 2006; B07

During my years of trying to negotiate peace between Israel and its 
neighbors, I was struck by how rarely the two sides were in sync. 
Unfortunately, that pattern is holding today. At a time when both the 
Israelis and Palestinians are experiencing political earthquakes, the 
two sides appear poised for far-reaching change -- but in different 
directions.

Israel now has a very broad centrist consensus -- probably for the first 
time since David Ben-Gurion was prime minister -- and the public seems 
ready to disengage from the Palestinians, withdraw extensively from the 
West Bank and get out of Palestinian lives. Ariel Sharon may have shaped 
the consensus, or he may simply have understood that it existed and 
needed a leader to guide it. His natural successor, Ehud Olmert, appears 
determined to follow his path.

By contrast, the Palestinians have now voted to remake the Palestinian 
Authority by electing Hamas, a group that rejects the very concept of 
peace with the Israelis -- or even a negotiated divorce from the 
Israelis, which is what disengagement is really all about.

With 77 percent of Israelis in a poll believing even before the 
Palestinian elections that there was no Palestinian partner for peace, 
Hamas's stunning victory may only reinforce the Israeli impulse toward 
unilateral separation. The problem, of course, is that separation or 
disengagement is not a simple proposition, especially when it comes as 
to the West Bank. Unlike Gaza, where the distances from major Israeli 
cities are significant, the West Bank is so close as to breed serious 
Israeli security concerns. Can Israel be sure that short-range Qassam 
rockets won't be fired from the West Bank at its cities and communities? 
Will Israel, even if it takes the very painful step of evacuating 
settlements from a significant part of the West Bank, preserve either a 
military presence or a readiness for rapid intervention to preempt 
terrorist attacks from Palestinian areas?

Though recognizing that the answers to these questions are complicated, 
the Israelis are likely to proceed anyway, given the public's desire to 
resolve demographic problems and shape both its borders and its future 
without letting either be held hostage to Palestinian dysfunction or 
outright rejection.

While Hamas's instinct may be to avoid any cooperation with Israel, it 
will find that governing presents dilemmas. Israel supplies Palestinian 
electricity and water, and it collects taxes and customs revenue that 
provide much of the money needed for the Palestinian administration. And 
Israel controls nearly all access into and out of Palestinian areas.

Hamas must face one other reality: It ran, and won, on a platform of 
reform and delivery of a better life. But life is not likely to be 
improved unless Hamas has the "quiet" it needs to reconstruct society -- 
which will require dealing with chronic corruption and lawlessness, 
providing social services and developing an economy that offers jobs and 
promise for the future. When its leaders declare that Hamas will create 
a new social policy, a new health policy, and a new economic and 
industrial policy, they raise expectations. Can they deliver on them if 
they are at war with Israel?

The external Hamas leaders, such as Khaled Meshaal in Damascus, will 
push for a return to violence soon, especially with their backers in 
Iran urging this course and perhaps tying increased funding to it. 
Internal leaders such as Mahmoud Zahar and Ismael Haniyeh, who live in 
Gaza and have to deal with the daily realities of life, may have very 
different priorities. While joining in the rejection of Israel, they may 
seek at least an indirect dialogue with the Israelis to preserve calm 
and to see what Israel can do for them. As Zahar has already said, "If 
Israel has anything to bring the Palestinian people, we will consider 
this. But we are not going to give anything for free."

The Israeli position (and the international community's as well) should 
be a mirror of that posture: Hamas gets nothing for free. It has to 
prove it will change. It may want quiet for its own needs, but it will 
try to use this necessary "calm" to get recognition from the outside and 
goods from the Israelis.

It may be that both Hamas and the Israelis will find a de facto 
relationship useful. Israel gains calm and proceeds to complete the 
separation barrier. Hamas has the freedom to focus on internal 
reconstruction. Sounds logical, but it's sustainable only if Hamas 
desists from building and amassing Qassam rockets and bombs, prevents 
terrorist attacks by Islamic Jihad and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, and 
stops the smuggling of new and improved weapons into Gaza and the West Bank.

Israel will not go along with a "calm" that gives Hamas all the benefits 
and yet requires nothing of it. Calm punctuated by acts of terrorism 
(and a buildup of capability for even greater acts of terrorism later 
on) would mean no calm to the Israelis. They will act to preempt attacks 
and any buildup of the terrorist infrastructure. Meanwhile, it can be 
assumed that Hamas will seek to do the minimal and gain the maximal.

But it must not be let off the hook.

<>Hamas cannot be allowed to avoid making choices. Any hope of seeing 
this Palestinian party transformed by the realities of having to govern 
will fade if its ideologists can show that change is unnecessary. At 
some point, Israel may let some non-Hamas Palestinians act as 
go-betweens to see whether a de facto relationship is possible, but 
Israel's terms will be clear, particularly on security.

The United States must be no less clear on what Hamas has to do if it is 
to have a relationship with the international community. Hamas will want 
to have it both ways: having relations with the greater world while 
preserving its fundamental doctrine of rejection of Israel and support 
for violence. But no half-measures or vague formulations are acceptable. 
Hamas must recognize Israel's right to exist as a Jewish state, reject 
violence and be obliged to stop all acts of terrorism. The U.S. role 
must be to forge a consensus on these conditions and ensure they are not 
eroded over time. In the end, what happens at a de facto level between 
Israel and Hamas will be one thing. What the international community 
insists on must be another.

The writer was director for policy planning in the State Department 
under President George H.W. Bush and special Middle East coordinator 
under President Bill Clinton. He is counselor of the Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy and author of "The Missing Peace."

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/03/AR2006020302605.html
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