[Mb-civic] FW: Sects and Violence

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From: Samii Shahla <shahla at thesamiis.com>
Date: Sat, 25 Feb 2006 01:09:15 -0500
Subject: Sects and Violence


NY Times
February 23, 2006
Op-Ed Contributor

Sects and Violence

By VALI NASR
Monterey, Calif.

THE bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra, Iraq, is an ominous development
for America, Iraq and the entire Middle East. Just when it looked as if
Muslims across the region were putting aside their differences to unite in
protest against the Danish cartoons, the attack showed that Islamic
sectarianism remains the greatest challenge to peace. It also highlighted
the poor job America has done in trying to balance the interests of Shiite
and Sunni Muslims in Iraq.

The shrine is one of the Shiites' holiest sites; they believe that their
messiah vanished from the site, to return only on Judgment Day. Thus its
destruction is a direct attack on the Shiite faith. It also symbolized the
depth of Sunni rage against Shiites for having come to power in the country
since the American-led invasion. But perhaps most important, it should serve
as a warning to the United States of the rising tide of Sunni extremism in
the Middle East.

The postwar insurgency may have provided the arena for militants from across
the Arab world to gather for jihad against America, but it is the
centuries-old Sunni war on Shiism that is at the heart of the campaign of
death. A full-out sectarian war would, of course, make it impossible to
create a viable Iraq. Yet for too long Washington refused to acknowledge the
centrality of Shiite-Sunni antagonism to Iraqi politics. Instead, the Bush
administration insisted that the insurgency was largely the work of foreign
meddlers and Baathist loyalists.

As the attacks continued over months and years, Washington was finally
compelled to contend with sectarian realities; yet its response was to
demand that Iraqis bury the hatchet and just get along. On Tuesday,
Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad publicly threatened the Shiite-dominated party
that won the January parliamentary elections, saying that unless it formed
national unity government that included Sunnis, it risked losing American
financial assistance. He also insisted that politicians with ties to Shiite
militias be banned from the Interior and Defense Ministries.

Among the Shiites, such threats carry an ominous tone; not only because they
view their militias as the only force now protecting them from car bombs,
but also because Shiites see the overt American push for a national unity
government as nothing more than coddling the Sunnis and, worse yet,
rewarding the insurgency.

Shiites also see American policy as unduly influenced by Sunni rulers in
Jordan and Saudi Arabia, who have been aggressively lobbying Washington for
a greater Sunni role in running Iraq. This has led many Shiites to talk of a
"second betrayal" by the United States, a sequel to what occurred in 1991
when the Shiites rose up against Saddam Hussein only to be butchered as
American forces refused to intervene.

The United States can no longer take Shiite support in Iraq for granted. The
Samarra bombing led the paramount cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, to
say that if the state couldn't protect them, "the believers are able to do
so with the might of God." The ayatollah, who has for three years urged
restraint and calm after every car bomb and murder, seems to have reached
the limits of his patience. So have his followers: his call for peaceful
protest went unheeded yesterday as Shiites attacked Sunni mosques and killed
a Sunni cleric.

This American desire to placate the Sunnis could also hurt our regional
ambitions. The White House has reasonable concerns about ties between Iraqi
Shiites and Iran; the stated intention is to wean away Iraqi Shiites from
Iranian influence. This will not be easy to achieve in any circumstance, but
will be impossible if Iraq's Shiites don't trust America's commitment to
protecting their interests.

In the aftermath of Samarra bombing, the American policy of pushing the
Shiites to compromise with Sunnis will only backfire. The United States may
not feel ready to choose winners and losers in Iraq, but it will find it
increasingly difficult and costly not to do so.

Vali Nasr is a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School and the author of
the forthcoming book "The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will
Shape the Future."


Copyright 2006The New York Times Company
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URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/23/opinion/23nasr.html?_r=1&n=Top%2fOpin
ion%2fEditorials%20and%20Op%2dEd%2fOp%2dEd%2fContributors&oref=slogin


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