[Mb-civic] FW: M. Rubin in Wall St. Journal: "Are We Playing for Keeps?"

[Golsorkhi]

Michael,  This is only the tip of the iceberg.  Reza
------ Forwarded Message
From: Samii Shahla <shahla at thesamiis.com>
Date: Mon, 27 Feb 2006 12:47:31 -0500
Subject: M. Rubin in Wall St. Journal: "Are We Playing for Keeps?"



Begin forwarded message:
> 
>   
> Are We Playing for Keeps?
> by Michael Rubin
> Wall Street Journal
> February 27, 2006
> http://www.meforum.org/article/898
> 
> On Feb. 22, terrorists bombed the Askariya shrine in Samarra, Iraq. The attack
> shocked Iraqis and infuriated Shiites. The Iranian government sought to direct
> public anger toward Washington. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei blamed
> "intelligence agencies of the occupiers of Iraq and the Zionists." Iran's
> Arabic-language al-Alam television repeated the accusations on Feb. 23.
> Because al-Alam is broadcast terrestrially, it is particularly influential
> among poor Iraqis who cannot afford a satellite dish. Furthermore, Abdul Aziz
> al-Hakim, leader of the powerful Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in
> Iraq (Sciri), a movement aligned to Tehran, blamed U.S. Ambassador Zalmay
> Khalilzad for the attack. "Certainly he is partly responsible for what
> happened," Mr. al-Hakim said.
> 
> He is not, nor is Washington, despite the U.S. policymaking elite's tendency
> to self-flagellate. Blame for terrorism rests solely upon its perpetrators and
> their sponsors. Here, though, the White House has lost focus. While
> journalists concentrate on the daily blood, Iraqis describe a larger pattern
> which U.S. officials have failed to acknowledge let alone address:
> Step-by-step, Iranian authorities are replicating in Iraq the strategy which
> allowed Hezbollah to take over southern Lebanon in the 1980s. The playbook --
> military, economic and information operation -- is almost identical.
> 
> Hezbollah's story begins in 1982. As the Israeli army evicted the PLO from
> Lebanon, Ayatollah Khomeini dispatched his elite Revolutionary Guards to the
> Bekaa Valley to arm and organize its Shiites. Hezbollah was born. Iranian
> authorities simultaneously built Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah's Sunni equivalent.
> (The idea that Shiites do not arm Sunnis is taken far more seriously in
> Langley than in Lebanon.) Tehran was so brazen in its support that, until the
> early '90s, it even carried a budgetary line-item. The investment paid off:
> Even after last year's Cedar Revolution, southern Lebanon remains under
> Hezbollah's control. Islamic Jihad remains a force.
> 
> Just as the Revolutionary Guards helped hone Hezbollah into a deadly force, so
> do they train the Badr Corps, Sciri's militia. The Badr Corps infiltrated Iraq
> even before U.S. forces reached Baghdad. This was reflected in the black
> market of Sadr City where the price of Iraqi documents rose while those of
> Iranian passports fell. The Iranian strategy was laid bare with its choice of
> representations. Its first chargé-d'affaires in post-Saddam Iraq was Hassan
> Kazemi Qomi, the Revolutionary Guard's former liaison to Hezbollah in Lebanon.
> Nor did Sciri hide its affiliation. In January 2004, a yellow Lebanese
> Hezbollah flag flew from Sciri's headquarters in the southern city of Basra.
> 
> Iraq's subsequent experience reflects the evolution of Hezbollah tactics. In
> Lebanon, Revolutionary Guard advisers imbued young Lebanese with a cult of
> martyrdom. Hezbollah suicide bombers moved with deadly accuracy, ultimately
> driving U.S. and multinational peacekeepers out of Lebanon. In 1984, Hezbollah
> added kidnapping to its repertoire. The Revolutionary Guards provided
> intelligence to the kidnappers and, in some cases, interrogated the victims.
> The group seized several dozen foreigners, including 17 Americans. Just as in
> Iraq, journalists received no immunity. In 1987, Hezbollah held ABC's chief
> Middle East correspondent hostage for two months. Just as in Iraq, the
> kidnappers sought both to win material concession and shake Western
> confidence.
> 
> Increasingly sophisticated bombs also accompanied Hezbollah's rise. The
> improvised explosive device has become the bane of coalition patrols. In
> October 2005, Tony Blair confirmed that bombs used to kill eight British
> soldiers in Iraq were of a type used by Iran's Revolutionary Guards and its
> Hezbollah proxies. When pressed in a November 2005 meeting in Sweileh, Jordan,
> an Iraqi Sunni insurgent leader acknowledged to me the "possibility" that some
> Iraqi Sunni insurgents took Iranian money, albeit unknowingly.
> 
> While Washington wrings its hands over the Samarra bombing, it should not play
> into Iranian hands and repeat the mistake of Najaf: Following the Aug. 29,
> 2003 bombing at the shrine of Imam Ali, coalition authorities acquiesced to
> demands to empower militias for security. Once implanted, militias take root.
> Iran is patient. While Washington rejoices in short-term calm, Tehran looks to
> long-term influence.
> 
> As in southern Lebanon, what cannot be won through bribery is imposed through
> intimidation. Neither Hezbollah nor Iraq's Shiite militias tolerate dissent.
> Constitutions mean little and law even less. In southern Lebanon, Hezbollah is
> judge, jury and executioner. In Iraq, the Shiite militias do likewise.
> Militiamen have broken up coed picnics, executed barbers and liquor store
> owners, instituted their own courts, and posted religious guards in front of
> girls' schools to ensure Iranian-style dress.
> 
> Force, though, is not the only component of the Hezbollah playbook. In
> Lebanon, Hezbollah used Iranian money to create an extensive social service
> network. It funded schools, food banks and job centers. It's a tried and true
> strategy. When I lived in Dushanbe toward the end of Tajikistan's civil war,
> babushkas lined up under Khomeini's portrait to pick up food from the Imam
> Khomeini Relief Committee. Driving through Shiite neighborhoods of Baghdad,
> similar scenes unfold. While the U.S. Embassy boasts billions of dollars
> spent, it has little to show ordinary Iraqis for its efforts. Not so the
> Shiite militias. Mr. al-Hakim's son Amar has opened branches of his Shahid
> al-Mihrab Establishment for Promoting Islam throughout southern Iraq. They
> distribute food and gifts of money, so long as patrons pledge their
> allegiance. For impoverished Iraqis lacking electricity and livelihood, it's
> an easy decision.
> 
> U.S. officials have no strategy to counter this. At a recent American
> Enterprise Institute panel, James Jeffrey, the State Department's Iraq
> coordinator, said, "We don't believe in bags of money in the middle of the
> night like [the Iranians] do." In principle this is fine; in reality it is a
> recipe for defeat: While Tehran understands the importance of patronage
> networks, Washington does not. While U.S. funds go to Bechtel and Halliburton,
> Iran-backed groups address Iraqis' immediate needs. And not only is U.S.
> policy ineffective, but Foggy Bottom ineptitude has bolstered Tehran. Take
> Bayan Jabr, a Sciri functionary who, with U.S. acquiescence, became Iraq's
> Interior Minister: He has transformed the Iraqi police into a Badr Corps jobs
> program. According to one Iraqi minister, he has employed 1% of the Najaf
> workforce. These recruits do little, they receive a salary courtesy of the
> U.S. Congress, and the Badr Corps reaps the gratitude.
> 
> The final part of Hezbollah's strategy is information warfare. Since 1991, it
> has used al-Manar TV to spread its message. Iran founded Al-Alam for the same
> purpose and succeeded in beginning broadcasts three months before the
> U.S.-funded Iraqi Media Network commenced. Well-endowed, al-Alam provided cars
> and video cameras to students, making them correspondents and promising
> rewards to those providing footage embarrassing to the U.S. mission.
> 
> It is in the info-war that Washington has stumbled most severely. The U.S.
> operates in Iraq as if the country is a vacuum. Sheltered within the Green
> Zone, diplomats are oblivious to enemy propaganda. Resistance to occupation is
> Hezbollah's mantra. It is a theme both the Badr Corps and firebrand cleric
> Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army adopted. Why then did Foggy Bottom acquiesce on
> May 22, 2003 to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483 which formalized U.S.
> and Britain as "occupying powers." What U.S. diplomats meant as an olive
> branch to pro-U.N. European allies was, in reality, hemlock. With the stroke
> of a pen, liberation became occupation: Al-Manar and Al-Alam barraged ordinary
> Iraqis with montages glorifying "resistance." They then highlighted U.S.
> fallibility with images of withdrawal from Vietnam, Lebanon and Somalia.
> 
> Tehran has a formula for success in Iraq; Washington does not. Victory will
> require U.S. diplomats to recognize that any successful policy must include
> strategies not only to promote U.S. and Iraqi interests, but also to derail
> our adversaries' strategy. Iran's methods are clear. Less clear is U.S.
> resolve. The stakes in Iraq are high, and one side is playing for keeps. Are
> we?
>  
>> Mr. Rubin, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, is editor
>> of the Middle East Quarterly.
> 
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>  



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