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Fri Feb 24 11:55:10 PST 2006
lly comfortable villa, with a swimming pool. Amini had indicated tha=A0 Sanjab=
i was important as the leader of the National Front—the political remn=
ant of the most serious previous challenge to the Shah. That had bee=A0 made b=
ack in 1951-53 by Mohammed Mossadegh, who, as Prime Minister, confiscated th=
e formerly British oil holdings and put together=A0 nationalist following embr=
acing the mullahs, the bazaaris, and, for a time, the Tudeh Party. At one po=
int, in August, 1953, Mossadegh forced th=A0 Shah to flee the country. But a c=
ountercoup was organized with help from the Central Intelligence Agency. Mos=
sadegh was driven from power=A0 and the Shah returned. Sanjabi, a lieutenant o=
f Mossadegh’s in those days, had survived years of prison to emerge as=
the foremost figure in th=A0 National Front<BR>
He spoke French to me, and was wearing yellow-gold-rimmed glasses, a gray s=
uit of rich flannel, and Italian shoes. “There is unhappiness at every=
level,” he told me. “It engulfs all classes—intellectuals=
, students, mullahs, bazaaris, civil servants, teachers, peasants. A true ag=
rarian reform is necessary. The relations between the landlords and the peas=
ants are still not just. Despite the talk of land reform, the distribution o=
f land was not fully achieved. It was not accompanied by the passing out of =
the credits, fertilizers, tractors, and irrigation facilities that modern fa=
rming requires. We had a twenty-billion-dollar gift in the oil-price rise of=
1973. We should have developed rural Iran first, and then industry. Instead=
, the Shah spent most of that gift on his family. So we had a terrible infla=
tion, a building boom that collapsed, and acute shortages of food. Disconten=
t became universal. Now everybody in the universities is against the regime.=
The young men have twentieth-century ideas, but, as in a war or any difficu=
lt period, their sentiments turn to religion. The corner mosque is the only =
forum for discussion. And the mullahs are not as backward as you might think=
. The Iranian people are capable of democracy. The West thinks we’re i=
n the fifth century. That’s wrong. Mossadegh was a sincere democrat. H=
e wanted democracy in this country and in this century.”<BR>
I brought Sanjabi back to the present with a series of questions. How did h=
e see the present government? What were the chances of a military coup? What=
did he expect from a visit to Paris to see Ayatollah Khomeini, which he was=
to undertake the next day?<BR>
He said, “The government of Sharif-Emami has done some good things. B=
ut he enjoys no confidence. The public doesn’t trust him. He has to ta=
ke radical decisions, but he doesn’t. He waits, and the situation gets=
worse and worse. Now it’s too far gone.” He acknowledged the po=
ssibility of a military coup. “But it has no chance of succeeding,R=
21; he said. “There’s no political support. The Army could stay =
in power only by force, as in Pakistan and South Vietnam. It couldn’t =
last. Thus, the great misfortune of this country is the Shah. He detains all=
the liberals and keeps down men of integrity. He likes thieves. He has sexu=
al weaknesses. He is not sincerely for liberalization. He wants to gain time=
, divide the religious from the lay opposition, and go back to his old syste=
m, which is essentially military rule.” Of his visit to Paris, Sanjabi=
said, “I am not worried about my coming encounter with Khomeini. I am=
an optimist. Ayatollah Khomeini doesn’t want chaos. We have to turn t=
o Ayatollah Khomeini.”<BR>
<BR>
As it happened, nobody’s plans—not those of the Shah or those o=
f Prime Minister Sharif-Emami or those of former Prime Minister Ali Amini o=A0=
those of opposition leader Karim Sanjabi—carried the day. On Wednesda=
y, November 1st, the Shah, apparently convinced that Sharif-Emam=A0 could not =
continue, received Ali Amini for the first time in years and began conversat=
ions concerning the formation of a coalition regime=A0 According to the local =
press, Amini told the Shah he needed support from Sanjabi, and the Shah agre=
ed to receive Sanjabi on his return fro=A0 Paris. On November 3rd, after seein=
g Sanjabi, Ayatollah Khomeini said in an interview on the Paris-based Radio =
Luxembourg, “We have told th=A0 representatives of the opposition, such =
as Ali Amini and Karim Sanjabi, that if they agree to negotiate with the reg=
ime they will be banned fro=A0 our movement.” Karim Sanjabi came back to=
Teheran and called a press conference to announce his terms for negotiating=
with the regime. Th=A0 press conference never took place. By that time, event=
s had pushed another set of actors, the military, to center stage. Two month=
s before, o=A0 September 4th, there had been large demonstrations in Teheran t=
o mark the end of Ramadan. Though the demonstrations were peaceful=A0 thousand=
s marched, and the military feared that matters might get out of hand. On Se=
ptember 6th, the government banned unauthorize=A0 gatherings, and the next day=
there was another large rally against the Shah in Teheran. That afternoon, =
the military leaders went to the Shah an=A0 asked for a proclamation of martia=
l law. The Shah told them to clear it with the Prime Minister and his govern=
ment. The issue was argued betwee=A0 the soldiers and the Cabinet late into th=
e night of September 7th. Toward midnight, the Cabinet gave its consent, and=
early the next mornin=A0 martial law was decreed in Teheran and eleven other =
cities. But it was too late for a public proclamation to reach most people. =
Later that morning—Friday, September 8th—a large crowd gathered =
in Jaleh Square, a central meeting spot in downtown Teheran. After repeated =
orders to dispers=A0 were ignored, the security forces opened fire. More than =
a hundred people were killed, by the official count, and many hundreds wound=
ed<BR>
The shock of that massacre caused everybody to draw back. Prime Minister Sh=
arif-Emami was able to negotiate a loose understanding whereby, martial law =
was not enforced to the letter. Strikes by civil servants, which had begun i=
n September, were not broken up, though they were illegal. Nor were student =
demonstrations, though the martial-law proclamation forbade any gathering of=
more than three persons. “There was martial law without there exactly=
being martial law,” the Prime Minister observed to me.<BR>
That fuzzy condition put an obvious strain on the military leaders. Top com=
manders were unsure of their responsibilities. At one point, in October, the=
commander of the ground forces, General Gholam Ali Oveisi, sent an officer =
to warn the staff of the English-language daily Kayhan against articles he c=
onsidered inaccurate and inflammatory. The reporters thereupon threatened to=
go on strike, and the Prime Minister backed them up. Unit commanders never =
knew exactly when to intervene. At least some of the rank and file, and perh=
aps some of the junior officers, sided with demonstrators. On two occasions,=
provincial police officers were shot by enlisted men in the Army.<BR>
Moreover, the military leaders had trouble reaching a consensus on what to =
do. The Shah, to assure his supremacy and to guard against coups, had set up=
separate lines of communication with many different security organizations =
and their leaders. The Shah himself is Supreme Commander of the armed forces=
. He has a personal chief of staff, General Gholam Reza Azhari, who oversees=
all the branches of the military, and meets tête-à-tête =
with the Shah twice a week. There are the chiefs of the three separate servi=
ces—General Oveisi, commander of the ground forces, with two hundred a=
nd eighty thousand men; Admiral Kamaleddin Habibollahi, commander of the nav=
al forces, with thirty-two thousand men; and General Amir Hossein Rabii, com=
mander of the Air Force, with forty-eight thousand men—who also report=
individually to the Shah. There is the head of the rural police, or gendarm=
erie, which is some seventy-five thousand strong and exercises administrativ=
e control over all villages with a population of less than four thousand, Ge=
neral Abbas Gharabaghi, who was also Minister of the Interior in the Sharif-=
Emami government. There is the head of the secret police, General Nasser Mog=
haddam. There is, finally, the head of procurement, General Hassan Toufanian=
, who also serves as Vice-Minister of War to a figurehead Minister of War, G=
eneral Reza Azimi.<BR>
The differences in military specialty are compounded by variations in perso=
nality and experience. The commanders of the Air Force and the Navy are rela=
tively young men—both are forty-six—and do not carry a lot of we=
ight in the system. Air Force General Rabii is known as a typical fly-boy, w=
eak in political and geopolitical understanding. General Oveisi, a former cl=
assmate of the Shah at the military college, is particularly close to the ru=
ler. General Azhari, the Shah’s chief of staff, is sixty-nine and is n=
oted for his deliberate ways and lack of ambition. “He is underwhelmin=
g,” an American who worked with him once said. “He always gives =
the impression that he’d rather climb a mountain or read a book than c=
ommand an army. He’s exactly the right man when tensions run high.R=
21;<BR>
Toward the end of October, I went to the Army headquarters, northeast of Te=
heran, to visit General Oveisi. I found a solidly built, plainspoken man who=
se chest was covered with ribbons. He was in a distinctly unhappy mood. He d=
id not like one bit the messy politics associated with the Shah’s libe=
ralization campaign, which he felt played directly into the hands of the Com=
munists. He said, “Two years ago, the Shah decided to let people be re=
ally free. Iranians who had fled the country—writers and people like t=
hat—came back here. The National Front began speaking out. The Communi=
st Party began acting up. The religious people asserted themselves. Basicall=
y, there were two types. One group was very religious. They followed Shariat=
madari, and they didn’t meddle in politics. The other group specialize=
d in politics. They were the followers of Khomeini. They started to organize=
people against the government and its institutions. The Communists took adv=
antage of the situation. They made strong statements. They burned banks and =
schools. Some students and many instructors in high schools and colleges are=
Communists. The instructors persuaded all the students to go on strike, and=
so all classes were postponed.<BR>
“Most people in the United States and Europe are against our governme=
nt. You send journalists here who see only leaders of the opposition. Then t=
he journalists produce stories that are broadcast by the radio here and prin=
ted in the press. So the people here think they are not free.<BR>
“We have a well-disciplined and well-trained Army. The forces are nin=
ety-nine per cent loyal to the Shah. Maybe there’s one per cent not lo=
yal—I don’t know. I just say that to be careful. So we are not w=
orried. What does worry me is that there is a Communist Party growing strong=
er. What worries me more is that when the Communists use freedom to write or=
to speak to undermine the government, the government is silent. When people=
strike and make difficulties for others, it is not correct. It jeopardizes =
security.”<BR>
General Moghaddam, the head of Savak, who is a tall, pleasant-faced man wit=
h receding iron-gray hair, expressed similar ideas when I called on him in l=
ate October at his headquarters in Teheran. He said that the demonstrations =
were “organized one hundred per cent by the Communists, working throug=
h students and religious leaders.” He said that he himself had talked =
with Shariatmadari. He was convinced that Shariatmadari “supports the =
regime but is afraid to speak out”—afraid because the government=
offered no protection. It was too weak to take action even against the Comm=
unists. “Two weeks ago, we identified a writer who was very active in =
provoking people to demonstrate against the government,” he told me. &=
#8220;We asked the government’s permission to arrest him. We were told=
no. We did arrest several press people for instigating rebellion with false=
stories. We were obliged to release them all. The military and the police n=
ow have things under control. But there are dangers. It is difficult for our=
security forces to attack young people. If the students keep pouring into t=
he streets, they will paralyze our security forces. If we had a powerful gov=
ernment that met difficulties in a powerful way, we could deal with the trou=
bles. But we now believe the government is not strong enough. We in the secu=
rity forces—in the Army, the police, and Savak—feel handcuffed.&=
#8221;<BR>
The security forces’ sense of being handcuffed by a weak government i=
nevitably intensified in late October and early November. Demonstrations gre=
w ever larger in scope, and strikes spread, reaching the oil industry and th=
reatening to cripple it. Negotiations for a wider coalition picked up steam.=
In the first week of November, the two series of events moved in counterpoi=
nt to a showdown. In Paris, on November 3rd, Ayatollah Khomeini refused to p=
lay at coalition-making and ordered his followers not to stop demonstrating =
until they had forced the Shah from power. In Teheran, on November 4th, the =
university students, sallying forth from the campus, toppled a statue of the=
Shah at the entrance. The troops there forced them back onto the campus. Bu=
t the next day, November 5th, there was another demonstration. This time, th=
e troops fired first into the air and then into the crowd, killing several s=
tudents. The students went on the rampage, burning banks, theatres, and the =
British Embassy. The day after that, Prime Minister Sharif-Emami submitted h=
is resignation, apparently in protest against the breach of the understandin=
g about limited use of martial law. The military, with General Oveisi in the=
van, seized the opportunity. They insisted that the resignation be accepted=
and that a military regime be appointed. The Shah consented.<BR>
<BR>
On Monday, November 6th, at noon Teheran time, the Shah went on national te=
levision and radio with an extraordinary statement. H=A0 announced the appoint=
ment of a military government, but at the same time he recognized the legiti=
macy of the opposition, and promised to dea=A0 with grievances and to move tow=
ard free elections. He spoke with contrition, and referred to himself as the=
Padeshah of Iran—a term meanin=A0 simply “King,” and far le=
ss exalted than Shahanshah, or King of Kings. He said<BR>
Dear People of Iran: <BR>
In the open political atmosphere, gradually developed these two recent year=
s, you, the Iranian nation, have risen against cruelty and corruption. This =
revolution cannot but be supported by me, the Padeshah of Iran. <BR>
However, insecurity has reached a stage where the independence of the count=
ry is at stake. Daily life is endangered and what is most critical, the life=
line of the country, the flow of oil, has been interrupted. <BR>
I tried to form a coalition government, but this has not been possible. The=
refore, a temporary government has been formed to restore order and pave the=
way for a national government to carry out free elections very soon. <BR>
I am aware of the alliance that has existed between political and economic =
corruption. I renew my oath to be protector of the constitution and undertak=
e that past mistakes not be repeated and [be] compensated. I hereby give ass=
urance that government will do away with repression and corruption and that =
social justice will be restored, after the sacrifices you have made. . . . <=
BR>
At the present juncture, the Imperial Army will fill its duties in accordan=
ce with its oaths. Calm has to be restored with your coöperation. <BR>
I invite the religious leaders to help restore calm to the only Shiite coun=
try in the world. <BR>
I want political leaders to help save our Fatherland. The same goes for wor=
kers and peasants. <BR>
Let us think of Iran on the road against imperialism, cruelty, and corrupti=
on, where I shall accompany you. <BR>
By validating the revolution and pledging early free elections, the Shah pr=
esumably hoped to put a straitjacket on the soldiers even as he handed over =
power to them. He named as Prime Minister of the new government the mildest =
of the military chiefs, General Azhari. But the military, once in office, ac=
ted with brisk confidence. Soldiers were moved into the refineries, and the =
striking workers, threatened with the loss of their jobs, gradually went bac=
k to work. Demonstrations were repressed with heavy force. Several leading o=
fficials—including former Prime Minister Hoveida; General Nasseri, the=
former Savak head; and former Mayor Nikpay—were placed under arrest. =
When Sanjabi, the National Front leader, after his return from his meetings =
with Ayatollah Khomeini in Paris, tried to hold a press conference, he, too,=
was arrested. Investigations were opened into two highly sensitive matters&=
#8212;corruption in the royal family, and corruption in the Pahlavi Foundati=
on. Either investigation could be conducted in a way that might implicate th=
e Shah himself.<BR>
The opposition reacted very strongly. Both Ayatollah Khomeini in Paris and =
Ayatollah Shariatmadari in Qum denounced the military government. Khomeini e=
xhorted Iranians to “broaden their opposition to the Shah, and force h=
im to abdicate.” In a series of fiery statements, he called for a camp=
aign of mounting demonstrations during Moharram—the Shiite month of mo=
urning, which began this year on December 2nd. He singled out as a special t=
arget the holidays of Tasua and Ashura, which this year fell on December 10t=
h and 11th, and which commemorate the deaths of Hossein, the third Imam and =
the grandson of Mohammed, and his followers, at the Battle of Karbala, thirt=
een hundred years ago. Normally on Ashura, religious Iranians dress themselv=
es in black, gather at the principal bazaar, and march to the main mosque. A=
s they march, some cut their heads with swords and whip their bodies with ch=
ains in an ecstasy of atonement. The processions, with blood drenching the g=
arments of frenzied believers, are a revolutionary’s dream.<BR>
Sensing peril, the military government on November 28th banned “proce=
ssions of any kind” during Moharram. Nevertheless, crowds demonstrated=
in Teheran during the first two days of the holy month, and there were viol=
ations of the curfew on a large scale. Oil production dropped from 5.8 milli=
on to below 2 million barrels a day. An exodus of Americans got under way. B=
ut even as high noon approached, the major protagonists drew back. The Shah =
ordered that a hundred and twenty political prisoners be freed on Sunday, De=
cember 10th. On December 6th, Karim Sanjabi, the National Front leader, was =
released from custody. On December 8th, Ayatollah Shariatmadari, at a press =
conference in Qum, urged his followers to avoid violence. That same day, the=
military government announced it would permit the religious processions, an=
d the next day pledged to keep troops only in the northern sections of Teher=
an, out of the line of march.<BR>
On Sunday and Monday, December 10th and 11th, crowds of several hundred tho=
usand paraded through the downtown streets. They shouted Islamic religious s=
logans, and showed hostility toward the Shah, the military government, and t=
he United States. But there was no serious violence, and those who tried to =
make trouble were constrained by more responsible elements in the procession=
. The troops drawn up in the northern section of town, in the vicinity of th=
e Niavaran Palace, were not even tested.<BR>
Obviously, there had been put into effect at the last moment a typically Pe=
rsian compromise. The palace and the military government—working throu=
gh former Prime Minister Ali Amini—had struck a deal with Shariatmadar=
i to avoid a violent showdown. But, though the testing time has passed, all =
the contending forces are still in place. The moment seems ripe for steps to=
ward a regime that limits the role of the Shah, in keeping with the 1906 con=
stitution. But the moment is not going to last very long. Just before the pe=
aceful processions began, Shariatmadari indicated that he was prepared to re=
new pressure if concessions were not forthcoming. He was asked when the scre=
w would be turned again. He said, “It will be soon.” <BR>
---<BR>
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URL:=A0<a href=3D"http://www.newyorker.com/archive/content/articles/060306fr_ar=
chive01">http://www.newyorker.com/archive/content/articles/060306fr_archive0=
1</a><BR>
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