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Fri Feb 24 11:55:10 PST 2006
tially totalitarian concept of vilayat-e faqih (rule of the jurisprudent), w=
hich simply meant absolute political power for a “supreme leader”=
; and a small clique of top clerics. Though claiming to derive its legitimac=
y from Islam and having a version of Islamic fanaticism as its ideological b=
anner, this system had much more in common with the Nazi Fuehrer prinzip and=
the Bolshevik “vanguard party” concept than with anything found=
in the Quran or the Twelver Shia doctrine. Indeed, it followed the organiza=
tional and operational modus operandi of its totalitarian confreres to the l=
etter, complete with a “cult of personality” of the leader and b=
rutal suppression of the rule of law, dissent, freedom of speech and basic h=
uman rights by means of a typical totalitarian security services network and=
extrajudicial violence. It also followed closely the totalitarian economic =
model in its socialist version, with 70% of the economy controlled by the st=
ate, central planning, five-year plans etc. <BR>
<BR>
Overtime, the system became progressively ossified and corrupt and failed t=
o perform economically. Timid half-baked reform experiments under President =
Khatami predictably came to nothing, yet, despite being tightly controlled, =
threatened the absolute power and economic privilege of the clerics. The rul=
ing oligarchy responded by putting an end to even the pretense of reform and=
toleration of reformists and opted out for a new wave of wholesale repressi=
on, euphemistically dubbed the “Second Islamic Revolution.” All =
the while, the regime continued to blame the Great Satan and evil Zionists f=
or its own failures with the time-tested “externalization of evil̶=
1; propaganda tactic of totalitarians. <BR>
<BR>
The result has been the near complete stifling of dissent in Iran. Reformis=
ts have been prevented from contesting elections, most reformists publicatio=
ns have been banned and many hundreds of journalists, bloggers and non-confo=
rmists have been jailed on trumped up charges and often tortured. Since the =
arrival of Ahmadinejad on the scene, this process has been accelerated and l=
ed to the thorough purge of suspected reformists from all levels of governme=
nt and their replacement with hard-line zealots. <BR>
<BR>
The growing tendency of the regime to seek greater ideological conformity a=
nd use repression as a first resort in its efforts to deal with the palpable=
discontent of Iranian society, has dramatically enhanced the political clou=
t of the most reactionary parts of the regime’s support structures in =
the security, intelligence and paramilitary vigilante baseej forces and thei=
r hardline Islamist mentors. It is these circles that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad em=
erged from and represents. <BR>
<BR>
While this group of extremists is a zealous defender of the Islamist regime=
, their views are even more radical than those of most regime clerics in vir=
tually all aspects and they see themselves as the true representatives and g=
uardians of Ayatollah Khomeini’s legacy. In this respect, they implici=
tly and sometimes quite explicitly, criticize the clerical establishment for=
not being radical enough in pursuing the goals of the Islamic revolution as=
they see them. <BR>
<BR>
Two areas of particular relevance for our discussion here are their attitud=
es toward the West and the messianic nature of their beliefs. Guided by the =
teachings of their ideological godfather – the ultra-hardline Ayatolla=
h Mesbah-e Yazdi and the “Westoxication” conspiracy theories of =
Ahmad Fardid, a third-rate Persian follower of Nazi sympathizer Martin Heide=
gger, these zealots exhibit a pathological hatred of the West and its civili=
zation and a firm belief in the inevitability of an apocalyptic struggle bet=
ween Islam and the West that will usher in the final triumph of Islam worldw=
ide. By itself, this fervent fantasy is hardly new, but its current interpre=
tation by Ahmadinejad and the extremists now in power in Tehran is novel and=
highly disturbing. For they have combined it with the messianic Shiite beli=
ef in the reappearance of the Hidden Imam and appear to believe that the fin=
al violent confrontation with the enemies of Islam is not only close at hand=
, but that it could be speeded up and that it is the religious obligation of=
the Iranian people to do that through the “art of martyrdom.” A=
nd martyrdom in Ahmadinejad’s fantasy world is no longer just about in=
dividuals but about the whole nation. “A nation with martyrdom knows n=
o captivity,” he exalts and warns that those who undermine this “=
;principle … undermine the foundation of our eternity.” The way =
to avoid this great misfortune is simple in his view and he urges the Irania=
ns to follow those who are “doing their best to pave the way for the u=
rgent reappearance of the Hidden Imam.” How long that will take is als=
o no secret and Ahmadinejad is on record saying that he expects the Imam to =
appear in two short years. What exactly “paving the way” for the=
Messiah’s appearance involves is not clear from the ravings of these =
lunatics, but for the civilized world to assume that these fantasies are tot=
ally unrelated to Tehran’s quest for nuclear weapons would be folly. R=
ecently, a religious scholar and disciple of Ahmadinejad’s mentor Ayat=
ollah Mesbah-e Yazdi, better known to Iranians as “Professor Crocodile=
,” publicly justified the use of nuclear weapons against the enemies o=
f Islam in what regime opponents saw as a new effort by the hardliners to &#=
8220;prepare the religious grounds for the use of these weapons.”2 <BR=
>
<BR>
There are many in the West that are already dismissing these ominous threat=
s as empty bluster and yet again urging dialog and calling for more toleranc=
e of the intolerant. For them, it may be instructive to see how some promine=
nt Iranians who are far from being friends of the West or enemies of the Isl=
amic republic perceive these trends. Abdul- Karim Soroush, the most prominen=
t Iranian philosopher still living in the country, for instance, sees a R=
20;hidden fascism” on the march and believes that the current Tehran r=
ulers are going “even further than the Taliban,” while, in the w=
ords of former president Khatami, they aspire “to imitate Bin Laden=
221; and “compete with the Taliban in calling for violence and in carr=
ying out extremist crimes.” <BR>
<BR>
<B>Toward a Strategy for Regime Change</B> <BR>
<BR>
If the analysis above has any merit, the West is now facing an imminent and=
acute threat from a terrorist regime armed with a culture of death and a me=
ssianic belief in the virtue of apocalyptic violence. And soon to be armed w=
ith nuclear weapons. While there is some benefit in getting international an=
d United Nations acknowledgment of this reality, to wait for a highly unlike=
ly solution of the problem by them would be tantamount to a dereliction of d=
uty. It will either not happen or will be dragged out to the point of becomi=
ng meaningless. What needs to be done immediately is for the United States t=
o formulate and begin executing a comprehensive strategy that aims to preven=
t or delay as long as possible the acquisition of a nuclear capability by Ir=
an as the first step and effect regime change in Tehran as the ultimate obje=
ctive. <BR>
<BR>
As any sound integrated strategy it should consist of a military contingenc=
y plan and coordinated but independent plans for economic and political warf=
are against the Tehran regime. <BR>
<BR>
<I>The Military Option</I> - A discussion of the military dimension of such=
a strategy is beyond the scope of this essay and the competence of its auth=
or, except for pointing out that regardless of the technical feasibility of =
a strictly military solution, it should not be taken off the table as an opt=
ion and a political lever. It is also imperative for any military option to =
include plans to surgically decapitate the regime and its key supporters wit=
h as little collateral damage as possible. At the very least, targets should=
include the top leadership and the regime’s key support structures an=
d instruments of political oppression such as Republican Guard, Baseej and i=
ntelligence headquarters and essential installations. The Economic Option- T=
he economic dimension of such a strategy is essential and clear cut. Iran is=
a terrorist state and anybody that contributes to its economic and therefor=
e political well-being ought to be subject to sanctions under existing Ameri=
can law. An effective sanctions regime that will bring an end to European st=
rategic exports may by itself critically undermine the regime’s econom=
ic viability and seriously affect its political stability as well. An effect=
ive economic strategy to undermine the regime need not be just a government =
affair. Many if not most of the large European companies that currently prop=
Tehran economically, both do a large amount of business in the United State=
s and have billions of dollars invested in their stock by American funds and=
individuals. This is especially true of the 100 largest U.S. pension funds =
to say nothing of the hundreds of American mutual funds and a grass roots ca=
mpaign to divest from these companies will in short order force them to choo=
se between the American market and doing business with terrorists. 3 It will=
not be a difficult choice to make. In fact, such a campaign already exists =
but it needs much greater public support to be effective. <BR>
<BR>
<B>The Political Warfare Option</B> <BR>
<BR>
The greatest promise for regime change in a democratic direction lies in a =
well-designed campaign of political warfare toward that end. The nearly comp=
lete absence of willingness on the part of the U.S. administration to engage=
in a systematic political warfare effort is our greatest policy failure to =
date in Iran and, indeed, in the war on terror as a whole. In fact, the very=
term political warfare has disappeared from our lexicon, except when used t=
o describe campaigns against domestic political opponents. Yet, political wa=
rfare is and has always been an indispensable instrument of national power i=
n times of serious international conflict and theUnited States has tradition=
ally engaged in it, more often than not with considerable success, as in the=
Cold War. It is of particular relevance in conflicts of ideological nature =
like the current one that cannot be won by military means alone. Instead, wh=
at we claim to be doing or are at least interested in doing is something cal=
led “public diplomacy” an ill-conceived and futile exercise in p=
olitical correctness unlikely to provide any meaningful contributions to U.S=
. foreignpolitical desiderata.4 <BR>
<BR>
Unlike public diplomacy, which seems to pursue the objective of convincing =
our enemies that we are decent and well-meaning people or provide answers to=
questions such as “why they hate us,” political warfare is abou=
t identifying an enemy’s internal weaknesses, analyzing them carefully=
and developing an integrated strategy to exploit them through the various i=
nstruments at the nation’s disposal. It is a strategy that holds espec=
ial promise in dealing with opponents that run politically oppressive and ec=
onomically failing regimes that lack legitimacy and the support of large par=
ts of the population. In Iran’s case, the regime’s vulnerabiliti=
es are numerous and glaring. It is a country where a significant segment of =
society has no illusion as to the reactionary nature of the regime and would=
support the democratization of the country. It is also a country with a lar=
ge, well-educated and, for the most part, democratically-oriented diaspora i=
n the West which could serve as the catalyst in a democratization effort. <B=
R>
<BR>
Given these existing conditions, in order to be effective, a political warf=
are campaign would have to be in sync with the quintessential interests and =
aspirations of the Iranians themselves and help them understand that while t=
he mullah regime presents a problem for the West it presents an existential =
threat to the socio-economic future and the physical security of its people.=
A sophisticated political warfare campaign would necessitate a detailed stu=
dy of the regime vulnerabilities and formulating a set of key messages to be=
delivered with the appropriate instruments. This is clearly beyond the scop=
e of this essay, but the few examples below should provide a sample of what =
possibilities exist. <BR>
<BR>
<I>The nature of the conflict</I> – It is of the utmost importance fo=
r the U.S. working with democratic opposition groups in and outside ofIran t=
o explain to the Iranian people the nature of the current conflict with the =
Tehran regime. First and foremost, it must be made abundantly clear that nei=
ther Washington nor anybody else in the West has any objections against the =
peaceful use of nuclear energy by Iran. This is a key point because the regi=
me has had some success in convincing public opinion in Iran that the opposi=
te is true. Secondly, it needs to be constantly reiterated that the regime&#=
8217;s nuclear weapons ambitions coupled with its messianic warmongering pre=
sent a real danger of nuclear conflagration of which the Iranian people will=
be the real victim. Finally, a clear message, should also be relayed that i=
n any potential conflict it is the reactionary mullah regime and the regime =
alone that is the enemy and main target. <BR>
<BR>
<I>Islam or Islamist ideology</I> – Iran is an Islamic republic with =
a government ostensibly based on shari’a and Twelver Shia precepts as =
a source of its ideological legitimacy. While this is the theory, the realit=
y is a theocratic, totalitarian regime based on the absolute supremacy of th=
e clerics under Khomeini’s invention of the vilayat-e faqih, or the di=
ctatorship of a supreme Islamic leader and a small mafia around him made up =
of corrupt clerics and a pervasive secret service and paramilitary vigilante=
groups. It is every bit as totalitarian as the Nazi and Soviet models excep=
t that it uses religion rather than secular ideology as a source of legitima=
cy. But it is at great odds with the Shia religion and that is a significant=
vulnerability that should be exploited for the purposes of delegitimizing t=
he regime. <BR>
<BR>
It is a historical fact that in Twelver Shia Islam direct involvement in po=
litics by the Islamic establishment has historically been frowned upon. Thus=
the vilayat-e faqih model and its various nostrums directly contradict age-=
old Shia traditions. Many Iranian theologians and ayatollahs, such as Ayatol=
lah Montazeri, have openly spoken about this and publicly urged the separati=
on of religion and state, as have other prominent Shia clerics like grand ay=
atollahs Ali Sistani and Al-Fayad in Iraq. This key fault-line needs to be a=
nalyzed and a campaign to exploit it organized with the help of prominent Sh=
ia scholars. <BR>
<BR>
<I>The economics of poverty</I> – Iran is currently enjoying windfall=
profits from its oil exports campaign already exists and has scored some su=
ccess but much greater public support could and should be mobilized in order=
to make it truly effective.5 because of exorbitant prices, but take away th=
e oil (which accounts for 90% of exports) and you have a failed state econom=
ically that compares very unfavorably in terms of economic development to Sh=
ah’s period. Even with the oil windfall, there has been no reduction i=
n poverty, which afflicts 40% of the population and unemployment among the y=
oung averages 35%. Things are especially dire under shari’a for young =
women who are easily the best educated in the Middle East, yet are openly di=
scriminated against and have an unemployment rate of 50%. The prospects of t=
he massive youth cohort are anything but bright - a reality the 70% of the p=
opulation under 30 know only too well. Moreover, with half a million youths,=
many of them college educated, joining the ranks of the unemployed each yea=
r, things are set to get worse. <BR>
<BR>
Iran is also stymied by the continued practice of ossified Marxist economic=
dogmas in the form of central planning and five-year plans that a recent st=
udy called a “costly exercise in futility.” And like in the Sovi=
et economy of yesteryear, the large number (over 40%) of state-owned firms t=
hat operate in the red year in year out drag the whole economy down and suff=
ocate the private sector. Overall, it would not be very difficult to make th=
e case that, like everywhere else it has been imposed, the Islamist regime h=
as already proven an economic failure with all this implies for the socio-ec=
onomic prospects of the Iranian people. While official statistics are far fr=
om reliable, a recent parliamentary research report indicated the percentage=
of people living under the poverty line at 50% of the rural population and =
20% among city dwellers. As in other states that have succumbed to extremism=
and despite its huge oil wealth, poverty seems to be the only certain produ=
ct of Islamism in Iran. This is a particularly pertinent message for the lar=
ge number of poor people in the country that have placed their faith for a b=
etter life in Ahmedinajad. <BR>
<BR>
<I>Regime Corruption</I> – Pervasive systemic corruption at all level=
s of government may be the single greatest vulnerability of the clerical reg=
ime today. This is so because not only is the wide-spread corruption a much =
discussed public knowledge, but because it is associated with the ruling cle=
rical establishment in the mind of the public. This explains, at least partl=
y, the victory of Ahmadinejad, who campaigned on an anti-corruption platform=
against Rafsanjani, who was widely seen as a poster child of high clerical =
corruption. <BR>
<BR>
The problem, in short, is that after 26 years in power, the ruling Islamist=
establishment has built a vast system of economic spoils designed to benefi=
t them directly. It is a parasitic system that functions in ways remarkably =
similar to the Soviet nomenklatura and like it is immune to reform because r=
eform would threaten the collapse of the regime that underpins it. This is o=
ne reason, why nothing will change under Ahmadinejab, despite his promises. =
<BR>
<BR>
Just two examples would suffice to indicate the magnitude of the problem. F=
ollowing the overthrow of the Shah, the royal family’s vast holdings w=
ere incorporated into semigovernment foundations designed ostensibly to prom=
ote public welfare and philanthropy. With 30% to 40% of the entire economy&#=
8217;s assets under their control, these “bonyads” have been tra=
nsformed into huge holding companies that dominate most of the manufacturing=
and trade sectors and operate by rules of their own to avoid taxation, comp=
etition and regulations to which private companies are subjected. Not surpri=
singly, virtually all of the bonyads are indirectly owned by the top clerica=
l nomenklatura. This explains why despite hundreds of court cases of flagran=
t embezzlement and corruption, few have resulted in any convictions since in=
variably the defendants turn out to be related to the high and mighty. <BR>
<BR>
A similar corrupt scheme is at work in the lucrative oil and gas sector whe=
re hundreds of nominally private companies owned by the clerics have positio=
ned themselves as the compulsory partners of foreign investors in the sector=
and the beneficiaries of huge commissions, a practice identical to the one =
perfected by the royal family in Saudi Arabia. <BR>
<BR>
There are also numerous other real and potential fault-lines and specific t=
arget audiences that could and should be addressed in an integrated politica=
l warfare campaign. These include ethnic issues, women, students and youth, =
private business, the poor etc. To take just the first of these, it has beco=
me increasingly evident that the regime’s brutal treatment and discrim=
ination of sizable ethnic and religious minorities such as the Iranian Kurds=
, the Arabs in oil-rich Khuzestan, Baluchis, Turkmen and others has given ri=
se to the kind of ethno-religious alienation that could easily lead to the b=
reakup of the multiethnic country in which the dominant Farsi make up only h=
alf of the population. It should be made clear to the Iranian people, that o=
nly the replacement of the current dictatorship by a democratic regime accep=
table to all could prevent these dangerous centrifugal tendencies. <BR>
<BR>
To effectively reach the intended audience, a campaign of this kind would n=
eed to develop appropriate communication instruments and strategies but this=
should not be difficult. Open societies enjoy an unbeatable advantage over =
closed, dictatorial ones in this respect as the Cold War struggle proved con=
clusively. It is also the case that technological progress in the form of th=
e Internet and satellite television and radio have made communications virtu=
ally impervious to jamming and totalitarians that are trying to keep informa=
tion out are fighting a losing battle. In just one example, it is now believ=
ed that there are over 100,000 active blogs in Iranwith the vast majority of=
them antiregime, prompting an irate ayatollah to call blogging “a Tro=
jan horse with enemy soldiers in its belly.” <BR>
<BR>
To sum up, Iran and its warmongering Islamofascist regime present a clear a=
nd present danger to the West and to its own people. It is a danger that mus=
t and could be dealt effectively with an integrated military, economic and p=
olitical warfare strategy by the USand allies that is long overdue. A succes=
sful outcome would dramatically improve the prospects of the democratic proj=
ect in theMiddle East and beyond; the failure to do that will likely bring u=
s to the threshold of nuclear conflagration and signal a seminal defeat for =
the Free World in the war on terror. <BR>
<BR>
<BR>
1 Interfax News Agency, Moscow, Feb. 15, 2005 <BR>
<BR>
<BR>
2 Roozonline.com, Feb. 16, 2006 as translated in Memri Special Dispatch #10=
96, Feb. 17, 2006,www.memri.org/bin/opener_latest.cgi?ID=3DSD109606 <a href=3D"h=
ttp://www.memri.org/bin/opener_latest.cgi?ID=3DSD109606"><http://www.memri.=
org/bin/opener_latest.cgi?ID=3DSD109606></a> =A0 <BR>
<BR>
3 A recent study has found out that the top 87 US pension funds have invest=
ed a staggering $188 billion in foreign companies that do business in terror=
ist states. See Christopher Holton, Stop Investing in Terror, in <BR>
Frank Gaffney, War Footing, Naval Institute Press, 2005,pp.59-74. <BR>
<BR>
4 For details on the failures of “public diplomacy” see Michael=
Waller et al., Chapter 8, “Wage Political Warfare” in Frank Gaf=
fney, War Footing, Naval Institute Press, 2005 <BR>
<BR>
5 See www.divestterror.org <a href=3D"http://www.divestterror.org/"><http:=
//www.divestterror.org/></a> =A0<BR>
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