MB Civic

By Andrew J. Bacevich  |  June 12, 2006  |  The Boston GlobeALTHOUGH FUTURE historians may well see June 2006 as a turning point in the global war on terror, it will not be because US forces finally succeeded in getting Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the reputed leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq. They will remember this as the month when, in Washington D.C., reality bit.

As satisfying as Zarqawi’s elimination may be, the impact of his demise will be slight. Zarqawi himself is not irreplaceable. Nor is Al Qaeda the primary source of the violence that has destabilized Iraq. Sectarian divisions remain and are the larger problem. Indeed, the celebration touched off by Zarqawi’s departure actually serves to obscure developments of far greater significance.

Historians are likely to see June 2006 as the month when the Bush administration sobered up — when it finally recognized that the course on which it had embarked after 9/11 wasn’t working and had become unsustainable. To make this case, they will cite the following points.

First, in June 2006 the United States all but abandoned its tough-guy approach on Iran. The administration has now signaled its preference for negotiating with Tehran instead of a military showdown and for proceeding multilaterally instead of going it alone. As it already had done in the case of Colonel Moammar Khadafy’s Libya, the Bush administration has tacitly indicated a willingness to cut a deal with bona fide terrorists.

Second, by this June the resurgence of the Taliban had become unmistakable. Despite its many tribulations in Iraq, the Bush administration has long touted Afghanistan as its “success story” — proof that with a bit of patience our efforts to export democracy to the Muslim world were sure to bear fruit. Now the evidence suggests that this ostensible success is coming undone. The chief fruit coming out of Afghanistan is not a liberalized version of Islam but a bumper crop of heroin. Violence is on the rise. The Afghan government is still unable to assert real authority much beyond Kabul, its capital.

Third, in June the US effort to keep Somalia out of the hands of the Islamists collapsed. The idea of fending off the “bad Islamist” warlords by funneling money and arms to “good secular” warlords was always fanciful and betrayed a remarkable naiveté. What’s striking is that the Bush administration is now tacitly owning up to that fact, with the State Department’s spokesman indicating a tentative willingness to open conversations with the victors. Could it be that there are “good Islamists”?

Fourth, this June finds the Bush administration policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in disarray. The president got his heart’s desire: a Palestinian government that reflects the will of the people. Unfortunately, that government consists of individuals who profess a commitment to Israel’s destruction. Could it be that democracy as such is not an antidote to violence and hatred?

Fifth, this June the administration quietly shelved long-awaited plans to start bringing US troops home from Iraq. Neatly timed to coincide with the run-up to the November’s congressional elections, this was to be the big indication that Iraq was finally turning around. In anticipation of this announcement, the Pentagon in May had placed on hold the planned deployment of the Germany-based 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, a first step toward reducing US troop strength in Iraq from 130,000 to 100,000 by year’s end. But this past week the Pentagon reversed course: The 2d Brigade is once again on orders to deploy.

Indeed, without much fanfare the United States has actually increased the number of soldiers it has in Iraq, recently committing to the war zone a brigade previously held in reserve in Kuwait. It’s now evident that George Bush will not deliver the victory he has promised in Iraq. Instead, as with Harry Truman in 1953 and Lyndon Johnson in 1969, the war he started will be left to his successor to finish.

Do these various developments indicate that the West is facing imminent defeat and that the Islamists will soon succeed in establishing their caliphate? Not at all. But they do indicate that in Washington the initial conception of the war on terror as a militarized crusade to transform the Islamic world has just about run its course. Events are obliging the world’s only superpower to temper its expectations and adjust its methods. Strategy is beginning to replace ideology. After an absence of several years, prudence has reappeared. Realism is reasserting itself.

Future historians are likely to say that it happened not a moment too soon.

Andrew J. Bacevich is professor of history and international relations at Boston University.