MB Civic

By Anthony H. Cordesman  |  June 11, 2006  |  The Boston Globe

THE DEATH of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi will have little lasting meaning unless the Iraqi government follows up with a series of actions that can reduce support for the insurgency, bring security to most Iraqis, and convince Iraq’s Sunnis that they have a place in Iraq’s new political structure.

Zarqawi’s Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia makes up no more than 10 percent of the insurgency, so other organizations will not be affected, and much of Al Qaeda will probably survive Zarqawi’s death. The overall resilience of the insurgency in Iraq will depend on how well the new Iraqi government can follow up with actions that build a national consensus and defeat and undermine all the elements of the insurgency.

Fortunately, Zarqawi’s death comes at a time when Prime Minister Nouri al- Maliki and his new government may well be prepared to move forward.

New ministers of defense and the interior have been appointed. The minister of defense is a respected Sunni general, and the minister of interior does not have ties to Shi’ite militias or hard-liners. One key to real victory is to convince Sunnis that the Ministry of Interior and its forces would no longer support attacks on Sunnis, while still reassuring the Shi’ites and Kurds. These new ministers cannot be successful overnight, but simply appointing them is an important first step.

However, appointing ministers is not enough. Iraqis need to see the new government clean up the Ministry of Interior, security forces, police forces, and facilities protection forces.

Maliki has talked about a sweeping cleanup and reorganization, with new uniforms and badges, tighter controls and discipline, and backed by a MNSTC-I (Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq) that gives the “year of the police” real meaning. There already has been considerable progress in the Ministry of Interior, prison system, and several key security units associated with “death squads.” If a broader effort can begin to take hold, this could have a major impact.

At the same time, the government must move forward in dealing with the militias and irregulars: Maliki has already delivered key messages calling for an end to militia operations. One message was delivered in Basra — showing that Maliki will deal with Shi’ite militias even in trouble areas. Making good on his words will be difficult, dangerous, and time consuming, but it would have a huge impact.

Security measures cannot succeed without political compromise and a government that actively reaches out to the Sunnis. Maliki is seeking to include Sunnis in the political process, those who supported the insurgency for political reasons and not out of loyalty to Saddam or religious extremism. Many of them have every reason to fear or hate the more extreme insurgents, and Zarqawi’s death may convince them to move back toward the center.

The government must also move forward in freeing detainees and bringing Sunnis, Ba’athists, and the Iraqi forces back into the government. Prime Minister Maliki has already taken a vital step by freeing some detainees and may free more. Moreover, he has talked about bringing more Sunnis and Iraqi forces into office as well as more Ba’athists. This latter step is critical because so many leading secular Iraqis joined the Ba’ath simply to survive and are innocent of any of Saddam’s abuses.

Maliki must also appoint a group to review the constitution. The new government has four months to develop a constitution that Iraqis will be willing to support in a popular referendum. Sunnis, Shi’ites, Kurds, and others will be more willing to believe in the new government and reject the insurgency if they see an appointed body working on a draft of a constitution that is national and representative.

Iraqis also need to see Iraq investigating allegations of American abuses. It is essential that both the Iraqi government and the United States make it clear who is guilty of what, punish the guilty, and identify the innocent. Only such Iraqi action can show the government is truly sovereign and provide a basis for showing there is no cover-up or concealment. It is vital to establishing that many of the charges being piled on the US military are almost certainly exaggerated or false, and to rebuilding Iraqi-US trust and confidence.

Finally, security and stability have meaning only if they come to Iraq’s major cities. Plans have been underway for months for Iraqi-US action to take back the parts of Baghdad that have come under Shi’ite militia (Sadr) and insurgent control. A major sweep led by Iraqi forces with a real Iraqi government can’t win back the whole city, but it could be a critical start. If other actions take place in Mosul, Kirkuk, and Basra, the move toward reestablishing security in the most important areas in the country could offset many of the problems created by more than half a year of political turmoil.

There is no way the new Iraqi government can implement all of these actions overnight, and many will take a year or more. Iraq will still need US aid and a US troop presence well into 2007, and almost certainly well into 2008. However, the deterioration of Iraq because of the political turmoil over the constitutional referendum and the December election does not have to continue. The new Iraqi government has viable options to correct the situation, and some important actions are already underway. If Iraq acts on these initiatives, Zarqawi’s death may come to be seen as the first step in a process that leads to real victory, and not just a passing moment like Saddam’s capture or the death of his sons.

Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and is author of “The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons.”